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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Τεύκρος: ...ες γην εναλίαν Κύπρον, ου µ' εθέσπισεν 
            οικείν Απόλλων, όνοµα νησιωτικόν 
            Σαλαµίνα θέµενον της εκεί χάριν πάτρας.’ 
‘Teucer: ...Apollo has declared that my home shall be 
in the sea-girt shores of Cyprus, giving to it 
the name of my homeland, Salamina’  
Helen, Euripides (412 B.C.) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In the first film of what could be loosely considered Theo Angelopoulos’ Trilogy of 
Borders, The Suspended Step of the Stork (1991), there is an image of a stranger 
standing on a bridge poised over the dividing line between two countries. He has one 
leg suspended in mid-air, like a stork. ‘If I take one more step I am... somewhere 
else, or... I die.’ 
Allegorical as it may be, this powerful scene could be a metaphor for the realities that 
the Cypriots have been facing for four decades1 and even -to a lesser extent- for the 
present status quo on the island. Since the break-up of the Republic in 1963-1964, 
after which the vast majority of the Turkish-speaking citizens of the bi-communal 
Republic of Cyprus were secluded in enclaves and especially in the aftermath of the 
1974 Turkey’s military intervention when the geographical division of the island took 
its well-known shape, the two ethno-religious segments have been separated by a 
Green Line. Only after the massive demonstrations of the Turkish Cypriots in April 
2003, did the regime in the North unilaterally partially lift the restrictions on the free 
movement of people across the island, making it possible for the Cypriot “storks” to 
start “stepping” wherever they wanted. Acceptable rules for both communities with 
regard to the crossing of persons and goods were finally provided with the 
                                                 
1
 See among else Eur. Court H.R., Case of Solomou v. Turkey  (Application No 36832/97) 
(judgment 24 June 2008) and Case of Isaak v. Turkey (Application No 44587/98) (judgment 
24 June 2008) that deal with the assassinations of two Greek Cypriots that passed the 
dividing line in August 1996. 
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implementation of the Green Line Regulation,2 two days before the accession of the 
Republic of Cyprus to the Union. 
Despite the partial normalisation of relations between the two ethno-religious 
segments on the island, Cyprus’ accession to the EU meant neither its reunification 
nor the restoration of human rights nor a complete end to the political and economic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. Ironically enough, the accession of the 
island to the EU actually added a new dimension to the division of the island. 
According to Protocol 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, the Republic of 
Cyprus joined the Union with its entire territory. However, due to the fact that its 
Government cannot exercise effective control over the whole island, pending a 
settlement, the application of the acquis is ‘suspended in those areas of the Republic 
of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not have effective 
control.’3 
It is of critical importance to note, however, that the scope of the suspension is 
territorial: Cypriots residing in the northern part are able to enjoy, as far as possible, 
the rights attached to Union citizenship that are not linked to the territory as such,4 as 
we shall see in CHAPTER THREE. Moreover, until the withdrawal of the suspension 
takes place, Article 2 has allowed the Council, as already mentioned, to define the 
terms under which the provisions of EU law shall apply to the “Green Line”.5 On the 
other hand, Article 3 allows measures with a view to promoting the economic 
development of those areas, such as the Financial Aid Regulation.6 In addition to the 
above-mentioned legal matrix that allows the partial application of the acquis in 
northern Cyprus, there is the case law of several national and international courts 
that discuss the suspension of the acquis directly or indirectly.  
Given this unprecedented (for an EU Member State) situation of not controlling part 
of its territory, the main research question of the present doctoral thesis is to analyse 
the limits of the suspension of the acquis communautaire in the areas North of the 
                                                 
2
 Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 of 
Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003 O.J. 2004, L 206/51. 
3
 Article 1(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003 O.J. 2003 L 236/955. 
For a more detailed account of the terms of Cyprus’ Accession, see in general M. Uebe, 
‘Cyprus in the European Union’ 46 German Yearbook of International Law (2004) 375. 
4
 Uebe, op. cit., supra note 2, at p. 384. 
5
 Article 2(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus. 
6
 Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006 establishing an instrument of 
financial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2667/2000 on the European Agency 
for Reconstruction O.J. 2006, L 65/5 is a measure that promotes the economic development 
of those areas.  
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Green Line. In other words, the telos of this particularly challenging research is to 
map the partial application of Union law in an area where there are two competing 
claims of authority. 
 
2. THE MAIN CHALLENGES  
Cyprus is widely seen as a graveyard for the diplomatic aspirations of the UN 
Secretary-Generals ever since U Thant held office as well as an ‘international and 
European lawyer’s goldmine’ as Hoffmeister has noted.7 On the other hand, in his 
report of 1 April 2003 to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan stated that ‘given the 
intractability and the variable geometry of the issues it is not far-fetched to describe it 
as a diplomatic “Rubik’s cube”.’8 It is exactly the intractability of the Cyprus conflict 
and the various legal issues arising from it that make a doctoral thesis on the 
interrelationship of the Cyprus problem and the Union legal order particularly 
challenging. More precisely, two different sets of challenges that have been present 
in the course of the research can be distinguished, namely the legal challenges and 
the political challenges. 
 
2.1 Legal Issue 
As it is obvious from the main research question, this thesis focuses on the legal 
issues that arise from the interrelationship of Cyprus’s post-1974 status quo and 
Cyprus’s Union membership. The demands of the present project, however, go far 
beyond a typical analysis of the provisions of the relevant Union legislative 
instruments. The analysis of the legal issues that are connected with the post-
accession situation require a deep knowledge of international law, Cypriot 
constitutional law, the “laws” of the “TRNC”, the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and various other national and international courts and obviously EU 
law. In other words, the main challenge of the present research project, as a thesis in 
legal science, is that it calls for a “multidisciplinary” legal approach. 
CHAPTER THREE deals with the free movement of persons and provides the best 
example of the aforementioned challenge. This is because, firstly, in order to 
                                                 
7
 F. Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) p. 239. 
8
 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus of 1 April 2003, UN 
Doc S/2003/398, at para 4. 
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examine who among the inhabitants of northern Cyprus has access to the Union 
citizenship status not only was it necessary to analyse the relevant provisions in the 
Cyprus Agreements, the 1960 Constitution and the Citizenship laws of the Republic, 
but also the relevant “laws” of the “TRNC” in order to shed light on the issue of 
“settlers”. In addition, the situation with regard to the protection of fundamental rights 
is analysed through a close examination of the relevant case law of the Strasbourg 
Court, the Court of Justice and national courts in Cyprus and the UK. Moreover, the 
exercise of the rights attached to the ‘fundamental status of nationals of Member 
States’9 by all Union citizens in those “Areas” is examined by focusing on the Green 
Line Regulation and the relevant Cypriot laws. Finally, it was deemed necessary 
throughout that CHAPTER to refer to the relevant provisions of the Annan Plan. 
 
2.2 Political issue 
Obviously, in addition to the sheer complexity of the legal issue, the Cyprus conflict 
remains one of the most tantalizing international political problems that affects the 
political lives of three Member States, a candidate State and obviously the Union as 
a whole. No matter how focused any research is on the legal aspects of this Gordian 
knot, it inevitably has to acknowledge the historical and political background. 
The intractability of this age-old dispute is inter alia a result of the existence of two 
conflicting narratives with regard to the history of the problem. For the Greek Cypriots 
the Cyprus problem has been caused by Turkey’s military intervention in 1974 and its 
grave consequences. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots, unsurprisingly, focus 
on events that took place in the aftermath of the break-up of the Republic in 1963. 
Although lately there have been some efforts to revise those unbalanced views on 
Cypriot history,10 given the discrepancies between the two narratives, it is almost 
impossible for any view expressed on the issue to be accepted as objective by both 
sides in the conflict. This is a rather common challenge for anyone studying any 
conflict. Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry address the difficulty of researching 
                                                 
9
 Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-
Neuve (CPAS) [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; reaffirmed in Case C-413/99, Baumbast, R. v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091, para 82. 
10
 For a comprehensive analysis of those efforts see Y. Papadakis, History Education in 
Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the 
“History of Cyprus” (PRIO Report 2/2008). At para 11.2.3 of Resolution 1628 (2008) the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has called upon the authorities of the 
Republic of Cyprus to ‘make full use of Council of Europe experience and assistance as 
regards history teaching for reconciliation, and to review history textbooks in such a way as to 
avoid hate speech and inflammatory language with regard to painful events of the past.’ 
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conflict by explaining how all conflict has a ‘meta-conflict’ (conflict about what the 
conflict is about) that co-opts academic attempts to provide objective understandings 
on a particular conflict.11 
Apart from the conflicting narratives that create a hurdle in order for a view to be 
perceived as objective by both communities, the terminology that a social scientist 
uses when dealing with the Cyprus issue is always under scrutiny. Terms used in 
order to describe aspects of the Cyprus conflict are very rarely neutral. Almost every 
term has a political connotation that automatically reveals the political identity of the 
person using it to the “connoisseurs” of the Cyprus issue discourse. A couple of 
examples of this “code” shed light on this challenge. 
The first and most obvious dilemma that one faces when dealing with this 
“vocabulary” is the choice of a term to describe the entity North of the Green Line. 
Being a Greek national, I was used to the term “Occupied Territories in Cyprus”. 
Obviously, that term is never used by the Turkish or Turkish Cypriots, who 
unsurprisingly prefer geographical terms like Northern or northern Cyprus or political 
terms like “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. On the other hand, the European 
Court of Human Rights has used the term Turkey’s “subordinate local 
administration”.12 The European Union, meanwhile, uses a rather politically neutral 
description, by referring to “areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
does not exercise effective control”. Despite the inventive nature of the latter term, it 
is the term which was chosen to be used throughout the thesis. It has been chosen 
because although it is a “monument” of political correctness, it still provides for a 
description that has been accepted by the leaders of both communities, despite the 
fact that is far from flawless. 
Another example of that “code” is the term “European approach/solution”. Although it 
is beyond reasonable doubt that a future settlement should be in line with the 
principles in which the Union is founded, since Cyprus is an EU Member State, it is 
noted that there are possible tensions between the principles on which the two 
communities have agreed any future settlement should be based and the Union legal 
order, as we shall see to a greater extent in CHAPTER FIVE. This does not 
automatically mean that the framework that has been agreed upon 30 years ago by 
the leaders of the two ethno-religious segments should be amended. The Union has 
expressed its willingness and is capability of accommodating a solution that would 
                                                 
11
 B. O’Leary and J. McGarry, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Blackwell, 1995). 
12
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Titina Loizidou v. Turkey (Application No 15318/89) (judgment 18 
December 1996) at para 52. 
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entail derogations from Community law in order to achieve a viable solution to the 
Cyprus problem.13 Those tensions, however, have been used in order to cover up 
maximalist/rejectionist views, especially on the Greek Cypriot side. More analytically, 
former President Papadopoulos asked the Greek Cypriots ‘to rally together for a new 
and more hopeful course for the reunification of our country through the European 
Union.’14 This idea was later picked up by the most nationalist Greek Cypriot party, 
the “European Party” which is an advocate for a unitary state solution. Thus, the term 
“European approach/solution”, as innocuous as it may sound, is perceived in the 
Cyprus’ issue “vocabulary” as referring to a settlement that overthrows the agreed 
framework by favouring a unitary state where the Turkish Cypriots are relegated to 
the position of a privileged minority. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
It is clear that a solid methodological approach has been necessary in order for the 
research to respond effectively to the two aforementioned distinct sets of challenges 
arising from the legal dimension and the political and historical background of the 
Cyprus issue. The methodology used addresses the legal complexities of a conflict 
that has been heavily judicialised without ignoring its political nature. 
Given that the very telos of the project has been to create an analytical framework of 
the partial application of the acquis in the areas not under the effective control of the 
Republic of Cyprus, it became obvious at a very early stage of the research that a 
positivist legal analysis of the relevant legal provisions was the first necessary step. 
Such an approach, first of all, ensures that the research retains its legal nature, 
which is of vital importance for a doctoral project in legal science. At the same time, 
despite the well founded critique against legal objectivism,15 by means of a “black-
letter law” approach one can dissociate, in a way, the legal ontology of the issue and 
the several ideological positions expressed on the solution of the issue. In other 
words, as a first step, it was deemed necessary to distinguish what “is” the legal 
situation from what “ought” to be the political status quo on the island, by mapping 
the partial application of the acquis. 
                                                 
13
 5th Recital of the Preamble of the Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. 
14
 Press Release, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 7 April 2004. 
15
 For example, R. M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Harvard University Press 
1983) pp. 5-14. 
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On the other hand, a legally “autistic” thesis on the interrelationship of the Cyprus 
conflict and the Union legal order would have been meaningless, given the political 
and historical causes of the given legal “anomalies”. In addition, it is almost 
impossible for anyone dealing with the Cyprus issue to completely distinguish the 
legal aspect of the conflict from its political one. Even the decisions of the Strasbourg 
and the Luxembourg Courts on cases arising from this Gordian knot have failed to 
completely distinguish the political dimension from the legal reality of the problem. As 
we shall see to a greater extent in CHAPTERS THREE and FOUR, the judgments of both 
the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights take the dynamics of the conflict 
into account to some extent.  
It was of critical importance, therefore, that the methodology would take the political 
environment of the conflict into account. Thus, following the well established tradition 
of the EUI department of law, the present thesis tries to put the analytical framework 
of the partial application of the acquis into its political and historical context. In other 
words, the research points to the many ways the legislative devices of the Union 
have been conditioned by the insistent realities of the conflict. Thus, the thesis, 
starting from a positivist analysis of the relevant legal provisions, consists of a 
critique of the Union policy on sensitive issues arising from the conflict such as the 
“settlers” and the economic and political isolation of the Turkish Cypriot EU citizens 
but also the positions of the parties in the conflict with regard to the future settlement 
of the dispute.  
Unsurprisingly, the methodology has influenced the outcomes of the present 
research, which point to the legal and political dimension of the issue. More 
analytically, with regard to the former, although almost all the aspects of the Cyprus 
issue have been extensively analysed by a number of social scientists, the present 
thesis tries to address a lacuna in the existing literature concerning the 
interrelationship of the Union legal order with the dispute. In a way, the present 
research examines, from a legal point of view, issues that were raised after the 
period on which the excellent works of Tocci,16 Ker-Lindsay17 and Diez18 focus. 
Taking into account important books that present the legal positions of the parties in 
                                                 
16
 N. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace and 
Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). 
17
 J. Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave Macmillan 2005). 
18
 T. Diez, (ed.) The European Union and the Cyprus conflict. Modern conflict, postmodern 
union (Manchester University Press, 2002).  
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the conflict,19 and having as a background essays on several questions that the 
Cyprus’ accession has posed,20 the present doctoral project tries to present an 
overall picture of the partial application of the Union law in northern Cyprus. In other 
words, the thesis analyses how the four freedoms apply in that unprecedented (for a 
Union Member State) situation. 
Apart from extensively analysing which provisions of the acquis apply, the thesis also 
assesses the pragmatic approach that the Union has adopted when dealing with 
issues arising from the conflict. It provides for a critique of the seemingly depoliticised 
and overly technical approach of the Union to this international political problem. In 
order to achieve that, it particularly highlights the pragmatic solutions the Union offers 
to certain political problems, such as the crossing of the Green Line by the “settlers” 
and the crossing of goods without the recognition of any other authority on the island 
apart from the Government of Cyprus. Thus, in every CHAPTER, there is an analysis 
of the relevant legal issues concerning the partial application of the acquis and the 
compatibility of a possible future settlement plan with the Union legal order. At the 
same time, the research points to the political realities that led to the given legal 
solutions. 
 
4.  THE THESES OF THE THESIS 
In undertaking the present thesis I had two main goals. First of all, I wished to 
describe the very special status quo of northern Cyprus within the Union legal order. 
Despite the existence of other territorial/geographical exceptions to the application of 
EU law, such as the French overseas departments and the Overseas countries and 
territories that are listed in Annex II of the EC Treaty, Mount Athos etc., northern 
Cyprus was a unique case. In the case of northern Cyprus, the suspension of the 
                                                 
19
 K. Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2000); Z. Negatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in 
International Law (2nd Revised Edition) (Oxford University Press, 1996); C. Palley, An 
International Relations Debacle (Hart Publishing, 2005).  
20
 F. Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 207-215; A. De Mestral, ‘The Current Status of the 
Citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Light of the Non-Application of the 
Acquis Communautaire’ in S. Breitenmoser, B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassoli, W. Stoffel, and B. W. 
Pfeifer (eds.), Human rights, democracy and the rule of law : liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber 
(Nomos, 2007) 1423; N. Skoutaris, ‘The application of the acquis communautaire in the areas 
not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus: The Green Line Regulation’, 45 
Common Market Law Review (2008) 727; C. Tomuschat, ‘The Accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union’ in P. Haberle, M. Morlok, V. Skouris, (ed.) Festschrift fur Dimitris Th. 
Tsatsos (Baden-Baden, 2003), 672; M. Uebe, ‘Cyprus in the European Union’ (2004) 46 
German Yearbook of International Law 375. 
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acquis was mainly a result of an unprecedented (for a Union Member State) political 
anomaly that did not allow a recognised Government to exercise effective control 
over the whole territory envisaged by its own Constitution. This part of the research 
was largely an extension of an earlier research concerning the Union citizenship 
status of the inhabitants of the areas not under the effective control of the 
Government of the Republic.21 Following the outcome of the previous research, the 
working hypothesis for this part of the thesis was that, however unacceptable it is for 
the political life of the Union, the EU legal order has the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate that international dispute. 
Indeed, although the application of the acquis is suspended in the areas not under 
the effective control of the Republic pursuant to Article 1 of Protocol No 10 of the Act 
of Accession 2003, the territorial character of the suspension and the adoption of the 
Green Line Regulation, along with the instrument of financial support, have allowed a 
limited integration of northern Cyprus within the EU. Obviously, more measures 
should be adopted in order for the Turkish Cypriot community to come even closer to 
the Union. In the meantime, it should be noted that, by (indirectly) allowing 
exceptions to the absolute suspension of the acquis North of the Green Line, mainly 
through the application of Union citizenship rights to Turkish Cypriot citizens of the 
Republic and through the Green Line Regulation regime, the Union has provided for 
a significant step in bridging the cleavages of Cypriot society and a possibility for 
differentiated integration of the Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious segment within the 
Union. The viability of this unprecedented regime of “variable geometry” within a 
Member State’s Union membership, proving the flexibility of the EU legal order in 
accommodating even international disputes, is under scrutiny at the moment in front 
of the Court of Justice. If the Court of Justice follows the recently delivered Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, to be discussed in greater detail in CHAPTER THREE, then 
the proper functioning of the regime is secured.22  
The second goal of this doctoral research was to examine whether the Union 
membership of the Republic could influence the well-known parameters of a future 
settlement. This is all the more important in the aftermath of the overwhelming Greek 
Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and the “European approach/solution” proposed 
by a significant number of academics and politicians as an alternative not only to the 
post-referendum political stasis but also as a solution that would be based on a bi-
                                                 
21
 N. Skoutaris, op. cit., supra note 20. 
22
 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams (delivered on 
18 December 2008). 
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zonal and bi-communal federation.23 The working hypothesis of this part of the 
research has been that since it has been proven that the Union is capable of 
accommodating the present stalemate, it would therefore be absurd to pose hurdles 
to a mutually agreed solution of this age-old problem.  
Concerning this, the thesis argues that the Union is ‘ready to accommodate the 
terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.’24 In 
other words, despite the foreseeable existence of tensions between a solution that 
would be based on the principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality 
and the Union legal order, the EU is willing and capable of accommodating the 
possible derogations from the acquis that such a solution could entail. The 
accommodation of a solution that would entail derogations from the acquis is not only 
compatible with Protocol No 10 but also with the fact that according to Article 6 EU, 
the Union is founded ‘on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.’ 
In general, despite the fact that the present thesis examines a case study in a very 
special situation, it provides for proof of the omnipotence of the Member States as 
“Master of the Treaties” to find tailor-made solutions which even go as far as to 
accommodate an international political problem with innumerable ramifications within 
the Union legal order. The suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus, to the extent 
that it would not create ‘any unrealisable obligations for the Republic of Cyprus in 
relation to Northern Cyprus which bring it into conflict with Community law’,25 has 
allowed the Union to provide for legislative measures which would promote the 
growing together of the two parts of the divided country thereby achieving a degree 
of integration of an area within the Union whose ports of entry have been closed for 
over thirty years. This achievement, however, should be seen as evidence of the 
capability of the Union to find technocratic but effective and practical solutions to 
even the thorniest political issue rather than as a model of integration that can be 
applied in analogous situations such as in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
                                                 
23
 See infra part 3 of CHAPTER FIVE.   
24
 5th Recital of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus, op. cit., supra note 3. 
25
 Supra note 22, at para 42. 
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5.  THE ANALYSIS 
As already mentioned, the particular terms under which Cyprus joined the Union 
were necessitated by the post 1974 status quo and the failure of the parties in the 
conflict to achieve a settlement. Therefore, CHAPTER TWO analyses the political, 
historical and legal background of these particular terms which result in the 
suspension of the acquis. Without providing for an exhaustive account of the modern 
history of Cyprus, it sets the suspension of the Union law in its historical and political 
context by referring to the most important political and legal debates, from the birth of 
the Republic on 16 August 1960 to the accession of the island to the Union on 1 May 
2004. CHAPTER TWO examines the Cyprus Agreements by virtue of which the 
Republic was founded. It further refers to the 1963-1964 crisis that led to inter-
communal violence and eventually to the “first partition”. It questions the legality and 
legitimacy of the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the ramifications of the 
continuous presence of Turkey in northern Cyprus. Moreover, it presents the debate 
concerning the Cypriot application for accession to the EU. Furthermore, it analyses 
the proposed UN plan aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. 
Finally, it discusses the terms under which the Republic of Cyprus entered the Union 
and compares this case with other cases where parts of the acquis are suspended 
for different political or historical reasons. 
CHAPTER THREE starts by responding to the fundamental question: who, among the 
inhabitants of northern Cyprus, has access to Union citizenship, which has been 
characterised by the Court of Justice as the ‘fundamental status of nationals of 
Member States’?26 Furthermore, this CHAPTER analyses the situation with regard to 
the protection of fundamental rights in the areas not under the effective control of the 
Government of the Republic, by referring to the case law of several European courts. 
It further presents the framework for the protection of human rights in the United 
Cyprus Republic as envisaged in the Annan Plan. This examination is deemed 
necessary since, although it was massively rejected by the Greek Cypriots, the 
Annan Plan remains the most holistic approach to solving the Cyprus problem. 
Finally, the exercise of the free movement rights of the Union citizens in northern 
Cyprus is examined by an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Green Line 
Regulation. 
                                                 
26
 Supra note 9. 
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In CHAPTER FOUR, the thesis focuses on the trade relations of the Turkish Cypriot 
community with the EU. After thoroughly analysing the pre-accession economic 
isolation of the Turkish speaking Cypriot citizens, by reference to the Anastasiou 
judgments27 of the Court of Justice, this CHAPTER focuses on the Union legislative 
instrument that regulates the free movement of goods from the northern part of the 
island to the southern part and from there to the rest of the Union and also the free 
movement of goods from the southern part of the island to the northern part i.e. the 
Green Line Regulation. Particular emphasis is given to the pragmatic approach 
adopted by the Union in order to partially, but effectively, lift the economic isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriot community without, at the same time, providing for the 
recognition of any other authority apart from the legitimate Cypriot Government. 
Furthermore, the Commission proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation is assessed 
legally and politically by reference to the notion of “Taiwan-isation”. 
CHAPTER takes Cyprus’s Union Membership into account for a future settlement plan. 
Although, as already mentioned, the concept of a “European approach/solution” 
covers quite different notions and has been used to cover up irredentist views, it 
mainly refers to two distinct but interconnected understandings of the role of the EU 
in the political equation. According to the first understanding, since Greece and 
Cyprus are Union Member States and Turkey is a candidate State, the EU should 
probably replace the UN as the principal locus and actor in any new initiative to move 
towards a solution. According to the second understanding, any future solution 
should be in ‘strict compliance with European constitutional principles and the acquis 
communautaire, and international human rights and minority protection standards 
derived from international law and from the European Convention on Human Rights 
and other European instruments.’28 With regard to the former proposition, this 
CHAPTER supports the view that the Union does not have the competence under the 
present and the future (after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) institutional and 
legal framework to become the principal locus and actor in a possible future initiative. 
Furthermore, even if the Union had this competence, there are serious political 
                                                 
27
 Case C-432/92 Regina v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. 
Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and Others (hereafter Anastasiou I) [1994] ECR I-3116; Case C-
219/98 Regina v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and Others (hereafter Anastasiou II) [2000] ECR I-5241; Case C-140/02 Regina 
v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and 
Others (hereafter Anastasiou III) [2003] ECR I-10635. 
28
 A. Auer, M. Bossuyt, P. Burns, A. De Zayas, S. Marcus-Helmons, G. Kasimatis, G., D. 
Oberdoerfer, and M. Shaw, A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the 
light of international and European law (Paper of the International Expert Panel, committed by 
the Committee for a European solution in Cyprus, presented to Members of the European 
Parliament, 12 October 2005), at para. 26. 
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constraints to such an initiative. As far as the latter is concerned, it is argued that 
despite the possible tensions between the principles upon which any future 
settlement should be based, agreed upon by the two communities, and the Union 
legal order, the Union is willing and capable of accommodating a solution that would 
not be in strict compliance with Community law in order to achieve a viable solution 
to the Cyprus problem.   
CHAPTER SIX provides the concluding remarks of the thesis. It argues that although 
the present legal regime is fairly stable and functional, only a comprehensive 
settlement can provide for a solution to all the pending issues of the Cyprus Gordian 
knot. Furthermore, it has to be stressed that if a lesson is to be learned for the 
political life of the Union, it is that the accession is not a panacea for all the possible 
problems that each candidate State faces. Despite offering more political stability to 
the Member-States, the solution of grave international problems such as the Cyprus 
issue needs, first and foremost, the political willingness of the main actors. 
The law and policy developments are reflected as they were on 31 January 2009.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF 
THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACQUIS IN NORTHERN 
CYPRUS 
 
‘And the rivers swelling, blood in their silt, 
All for a linen undulation, a filmy cloud, 
A butterfly’s flicker, a wisp of a swan’s down, 
An empty tunic-all for a Helen.’  
Helen, George Seferis (1955) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The Cyprus conflict1 is one of the most ancient political sagas in Europe. The pages 
of this fascinating political novel whose end is neither yet known nor seems probable 
to be “happily ever after” contain inter alia a short-lived bi-communal polity that was 
                                                 
1
 For a more detailed account of the modern history of Cyprus see inter alia (in alphabetical 
order): M. Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 
1979); A. Borowiec, Cyprus a Troubled Island (Praeger Publishers, 2000); K. 
Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000); V. Coufoudakis, Cyprus, A Contemporary Problem in Historical 
Perspective (Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of 
Minnesota, 2006); M. Droushiotis, Η "Εισβολή" της Χούντας στην Κύπρο [The “invasion” of 
the colonels’ regime in Cyprus] (Stachi, 1996); M. Droushiotis, ΕΟΚΑ, Η σκοτεινή όψη [EOKA, 
the dark side] (Stachi, 1998; Alfadi, 2002); M. Droushiotis, Η πρώτη διχοτόµηση, Κύπρος 
1963-1964 [The first partition, Cyprus 1963-1964] (Alfadi, 2005); M. Droushiotis, Cyprus 1974 
- The Greek coup and the Turkish invasion (Bibliopolis, 2006); D. Hannay, Cyprus, The 
Search for a Solution (I.B. Tauris, 2005); R. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-
1959 (Clarendon Press Oxford University, 1998); J.S Joseph, Cyprus, Ethnic conflict and 
International Politics, From Independence to the Threshold of European Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan 1997); J. Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2005); W. Mallinson, A Modern History of Cyprus (I.B. Tauris 2005); D. W. 
Markides, Cyprus 1957-63: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis. The Role of the 
Municipal Issue, (Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, University of 
Minnesota, 2001); K. C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (Yale University 
Press, 1977); Z. Negatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law 
(2nd Revised Edition) (Oxford University Press, 1996); C. Palley, An International Relations 
Debacle (Hart Publishing, 2005); Y. Papadakis, Echoes from the Dead Zone – Across the 
Cyprus Divide (I.B. Tauris, 2005); L. Stern, The Wrong Horse, The Politics of Intervention and 
the Failure of American Diplomacy (Times Books, 1997); N. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics 
and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus (Ashgate, 
2004). 
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founded in 1960 but collapsed three years later in the aftermath of an inter-
communal armed conflict, a coup d’état against the elected Greek Cypriot President 
of the Republic orchestrated by the Greek colonels’ regime, the 1974 Turkey’s 
“peace operation” and a handful of rejected UN plans for comprehensive settlement.  
On 1 May 2004 a new variable was added to the complicated political equation of the 
Cyprus issue, the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus, despite the fact that it 
cannot exercise effective control over all the areas envisaged by the 1960 
Constitution because of the continuous presence of Turkey in the northern part of the 
island, became, as a whole, one of the ten new Member States acceding to the 
Union in the so called “Big-Bang” enlargement of 2004.  Unsurprisingly, the terms 
under which Cyprus entered the EU clearly depict this unprecedented (for an EU 
Member State) situation. The application of the acquis communautaire, pursuant to 
Article 1 of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, is suspended in 
the areas which are not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Before analysing the limits of the suspension of the acquis in the subsequent 
CHAPTERS and evaluating the Union policies on this very sensitive issue for the 
political lives of two Member States and a candidate State, it is imperative to 
examine the historical, political and legal context of the suspension. It is beyond the 
purposes of the present chapter and the thesis in general to provide an exhaustive 
account of the modern history of Cyprus, which is rarely recounted in a balanced, 
informed way. The scope of the chapter is rather to describe, in a concise, thorough 
and as far as possible, objective manner, the most important political and legal 
debates from the birth of the Republic to its EU accession in order to place the 
suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus in its historical, political and legal 
context. In order to achieve this scope, the CHAPTER focuses on inter alia the 
constitutional structure of the Cypriot polity and the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance 
and Establishment, examines the legal issues arising from the 1963-1964 crisis, 
questions the legality and legitimacy of the 1974 Turkish invasion and the continuous 
presence of Turkey in northern Cyprus, comments on the debate concerning the 
Cypriot application for accession to the EU, describes the proposed UN plan for a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and discusses the terms under 
which the Republic of Cyprus entered the Union. 
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2. THE BIRTH OF A REPUBLIC BUT NOT OF A NATION 
2.1 Struggling for Enosis,2 Fighting for Taksim,3 Achieving 
Independence 
Six centuries after the departure of Richard the Lionheart from Cyprus, the British 
returned to the island in 1878. In Istanbul on 4 June of the same year, Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II, in the name of the Ottoman Empire, signed the Convention of Defensive 
Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of 
Turkey. According to this Convention, the Ottoman Empire agreed to hand over 
Cyprus, the population of which, at that time, consisted of approximately 180,000 
Greeks and 46,000 Turkish, ‘to be occupied and administered by England.’4 In return, 
Britain would provide protection to the Ottoman Empire against a possible Russian 
aggression. In 1914, however, after the outbreak of the First World War, Britain 
annexed Cyprus and the island became a part of His Majesty’s Dominions.5 The 
annexation of Cyprus was recognised by Turkey in article 20 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, 1923. Despite the fact that Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 
1960, the British retained and developed the Ottoman millet system of communal 
separation, since it accorded them the role of umpire on the island and thus 
facilitated colonial rule.       
During the 1920’s the Greek Cypriot majority became increasingly dissatisfied with 
British colonial rule. However, unlike most of the 20th century decolonisation 
movements, desire for freedom was not expressed as a demand for independence. It 
was rather envisaged as Enosis with the motherland Greece. Any alternative to 
Enosis, including self-government, was not regarded as appropriate. Indeed the 
struggle for Enosis began in October 1931 when the Orthodox Bishop of Kition 
officially demanded union with Greece and by doing so triggered violent riots in 
Nicosia that entailed the burning of the Government House. On 12 August 1948 the 
Church of Cyprus, in the name of the Greek Cypriot people, rejected the British 
Constitutional Plan proposing limited self-government through a “Consultative 
Assembly”. Instead, in 1950 the Greek Cypriot Church, under the leadership of the 
                                                 
2
 Enosis [‘Ενωσις] means ‘union’ in Greek; it depicted the devotion of the Greek Cypriots to 
union with Greece. 
3
 Taksim means ‘partition’ in Turkish; it depicted the intention of the Turkish Cypriots for self-
governance. 
4
 K. Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus, A Study in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2000) at 20. 
5
 The Cyprus Annexation Order in Council 1914, S.R.O. 1924, No 1629, S.R & O. Rev (1948), 
vol. II, pp. 577-578. 
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newly elected and future first President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios III and 
backed by the Cypriot Communist party AKEL, called a plebiscite on the question of 
union with Greece. Any inhabitant of Cyprus could indicate their position by signing 
one of the large books in which the phrase ‘We demand the unification of Cyprus 
with Greece’ was printed on each page. 215,000 out of the 224,000, i.e. ninety-six 
per cent of the Greek Cypriots and a small number of Turkish Cypriots, signed in 
favour of Enosis.  
In the light of this petition, the Greek Cypriot leadership increased its pressure on 
Greece to support its cause. As a result of that and of the failure to find a solution 
through bilateral negotiations, on 16 August 1954, the Government of Greece 
brought the Cyprus issue to the UN as a case of self-determination. However, on 17 
December 1954, the UN General Assembly decided that a resolution on Cyprus 
would not be opportune ‘for the time being.’6 Under those circumstances, the Greek 
Cypriot movement resorted to an armed struggle against the British colonial 
administration. On 1 April 1955, the EOKA7 organised a series of explosions around 
the island that initiated what would become a four years campaign by the Greek 
Cypriots to end British rule and to achieve Enosis. 
Aware of the potential danger of Enosis to Turkish Cypriots, given the expulsion of 
Turkish/Muslim populations from predominantly Orthodox areas of the Ottoman 
Empire after their annexation to Greece, the British encouraged the community’s 
counter-mobilisation to serve its own colonial aims. Thus, it is mainly after 1955, and 
especially after the rejection from Greece and Greek Cypriots of the Radcliff Plan in 
1956, a plan which foresaw a Greek-dominated Assembly and guaranteed 
safeguards for the Turkish-Cypriot community, that the Turkish Cypriots began 
countering EOKA through Volkan and then the TMT.8 The seeds for the future 
heated inter-communal confrontation were sown. Hence, by 1957, Turkey had 
already formulated its own counter-position to Enosis: Taksim. 
By 1957, Greece and the Greek Cypriots were fighting for Enosis, the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey were responding by asking for a Taksim and Britain was 
determined to retain full sovereignty on the island. In the Macmillan Plan of 1958, 
however, a suggestion for a compromise that was later further developed in the 
Zurich-London Agreements and led to the birth of the Cyprus Republic made its 
                                                 
6
 UN General Assembly Resolution 814 (IX) of 17 December 1954. 
7
 Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston [Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών] – National 
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters. 
8
 Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı – Turkish Defence Organisation 
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appearance for the first time. Such a compromise entailed the establishment of an 
independent sovereign State of Cyprus while at the same time British sovereignty 
over two military bases was reserved. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus gained its 
sovereign independence from the UK by virtue of three treaties, namely the Treaty of 
Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment and a Constitution, 
all of which came into operation the same day –16 August 1960.9 
 
2.2 The Constitution 
The Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959 between the then Prime Ministers of 
Greece and Turkey contained inter alia the basic structure of the new State. This 
basic structure has been incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic and 
comprised its outline. Indeed, out of the 27 Basic Articles of the Zurich Agreement, a 
Constitution of 199 Articles was developed. It was agreed that those Basic Articles 
cannot be amended by way of constitutional change.10 Eventually, the Constitution 
was signed by Sir Hugh Foot, Governor of the Colony of Cyprus until 15 August 
1960, representatives of Greece and Turkey, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. F. 
Kutchuk11 on 6 April 1960. 
It has been acknowledged that the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic is one of the 
most complex in the world.12 In order to achieve a political compromise between the 
UK, Greece and Turkey and to ensure the balance between the island’s two main 
ethno-religious segments, a complicated power sharing structure was designed. The 
Constitution was drawn up explicitly in terms of the two communities13 and was 
referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a “functional federation” although 
that expression does not actually appear in the Constitution itself. Moreover, all of the 
principles of the consociational democracy –grand coalition, proportionality, 
autonomy and veto– were elaborately embodied in the 1960 Constitution. 
The Constitution provides for ‘an independent and sovereign Republic with a 
presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President14 being 
                                                 
9
 See in general http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/ 
10
 Article 182(1).  
11
 Chrysostomides, op. cit., supra note 4, at 25. 
12
 S.A. De Smith, The new Commonwealth and its Constitutions (Stevens, 1964). 
13
 According to the 1960 census, the Greek Cypriot segment comprised about 78%, and the 
Turkish Cypriot about 18% of the population, the remaining 4% being the minorities of the 
Maronites, Armenians and Latins. 
14
 See in general Part 3 (Articles 36 - 60) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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Turkish, elected by the Greek and the Turkish communities of Cyprus respectively.’15 
The President and Vice-President exercise executive power.16 Their common powers 
are specifically enumerated in Article 47 while the two subsequent Articles provide 
the exclusive enumeration of their separate, almost identical, powers. According to 
Article 54, all the executive powers not expressly reserved to the President and the 
Vice-President are exercised by the Council of Ministers. The cabinet had to consist 
of seven Greek ministers designated by the President and three Turkish ministers 
designated by the Vice-President. More importantly, the 1960 Constitution provided 
for absolute veto power over decisions by the cabinet or the legislature in the fields of 
foreign affairs, defence and security to both the President and the Vice-President.17 
A seven-to-three ratio entailed a deliberate overrepresentation of the Turkish minority 
rather than strict proportionality, also affecting the composition of the legislature  
which was unicameral. The House of Representatives comprised of 35 
Representatives belonging to the Greek community and 15 belonging to the Turkish 
one.18 Laws are passed by simple majority but any amendment to the electoral law, 
the passing of laws concerning municipalities, and any law imposing taxes or duties 
requires a separate majority among Greek and Turkish Cypriot Representatives 
present and voting in accordance with Article 78(2). In addition to that, the 
amendment of any non-basic constitutional provision requires a two-thirds majority of 
the representatives of each community voting separately.19 The Constitution also 
guaranteed a great deal of autonomy for the two ethnic segments by setting up two 
separately elected communal chambers with exclusive legislative powers over 
religious, educational, cultural, and personal status matters.20  
The judicial system was to consist of a Supreme Constitutional Court,21 a High Court 
of Justice and lower courts.22 The Supreme Constitutional court was composed of a 
Greek-Cypriot judge and a Turkish Cypriot judge and it was presided over by a 
neutral judge that was neither a Cypriot citizen nor a citizen of any of the Guarantor 
States. Its jurisdiction ranged from constitutional issues arising from the interpretation 
of provisions of the Constitution23 to the settling of conflicts or disputes regarding the 
                                                 
15
 Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
16
 Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
17
 Article 50 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
18
 See in general Part 4 (Articles 61 - 85) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
19
 Article 182(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
20
 See in general Part 5 (Articles 86 - 111) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
21
 See in general Part 9 (Articles 133-151) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
22
 See in general Part 10 (Articles 152-164) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
23
 Article 149 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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extent of authority of legislative and administrative bodies.24 The High Court of 
Justice, which consisted of two Greek-Cypriot judges, one Turkish Cypriot judge and 
one foreign presiding judge, was the appellate court of civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
The composition of lower courts depended on the community of the disputants.25 
In addition to that, several other constitutional provisions were designed to safeguard 
the bi-communal nature of the State. For example, Article 173 provided for the 
establishment of separate municipal councils in the five largest towns of the island.26 
At the same time, while the public service had to be composed in accordance with 
the aforementioned seven-to-three ratio,27 a six-to-four ratio was set for the army and 
the police.28 All those provisions and similar ones relied on the cooperation of the two 
communities but did little to encourage it. By 1963, several issues of contention had 
already emerged. 
 
2.3 The Treaties 
2.3.1 The Treaty of Guarantee 
Article 181 of the Constitution provides that the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance 
have constitutional force and are considered as fundamental clauses that are not 
capable of being amended. More analytically, the Treaty of Guarantee was 
concluded on 16 August 1960 between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Britain and 
Turkey. According to Article I, the Republic of Cyprus undertook to ensure its 
maintenance, territorial integrity, security and respect for its Constitution while, at the 
same time, undertook not to participate in any union with any State or to proceed to 
partition. Taking note of the aforementioned undertakings, Greece, Turkey and 
Britain guaranteed Cyprus’s ‘independence, territorial integrity and security.’29 
Equally, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertook to respect the integrity of the UK 
Sovereign Base Areas.30 Most importantly, Article IV provided that the Guarantor 
States should consult each other with respect to the ‘measures necessary to ensure 
observance of those provisions.’ However, ‘in so far as common or concerted action 
                                                 
24
 Article 139 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
25
 Article 159 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
26
 D.W. Markides, Cyprus 1957-63: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis. The Role 
of the Municipal Issue, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, Number 8 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 2001). 
27
 Article 123 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
28
 Articles 129-130 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
29
 Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee. 
30
 Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee. 
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may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to 
take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the’ 
Treaty. This second paragraph of Article IV has been used as the legal basis for the 
1974 Turkish military intervention.31 
 
2.3.2 The Treaty of Alliance 
The Treaty of Alliance between the independent State of Cyprus and the two 
motherlands, Greece and Turkey, provided that the three States should ‘co-operate 
for their common defence’32 in order to ‘resist any attack or aggression, direct or 
indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic 
of Cyprus.’33 To this effect, the establishment of a Tripartite Headquarters in Cyprus34 
and the stationing35 of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops that would provide for the 
training of the army of Cyprus were foreseen. 
 
2.3.3 The Treaty of Establishment 
Finally, Cyprus, Greece, the UK and Turkey signed the Treaty of Establishment in 
order to give effect to the Declarations made at the London Conference. Article 1 
provides that the territory of the Republic comprises of the whole island with the 
exception of the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. With regard to those 
Areas, the UK continues to enjoy ‘the international rights and benefits’ it used to 
enjoy with regard to the whole island before 1960.36 Pursuant to Article 2, Cyprus has 
an obligation to cooperate fully with the UK ‘to ensure the security and effective 
operation’ of those military Bases. It is worth examining the unique legal status of this 
relic of colonialism under UK, Cyprus, international and Union law since the special 
status of those ‘little Gibraltars’ –as Macmillan has characterised them- has been 
recognised inter alia by Protocol No 3 of the Act of Accession 2003.  
According to the Halsbury’s Laws of England, the Bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia 
‘consist of those portions of the colony of Cyprus which were not established by the 
Cyprus Act 1960 as the independent sovereign Republic of Cyprus which remain 
                                                 
31
 For a more detailed account see infra 4.1 The 1974 Turkish military invasion. 
32
 Article I of the Treaty of Alliance. 
33
 Article II of the Treaty of Alliance. 
34
 Article III of the Treaty of Alliance. 
35
 Article IV and Additional Protocol n.1 of the Treaty of Alliance. 
36
 Article 8(2) of the Treaty of Establishment. 
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within Her Majesty’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. They are to be regarded, therefore, 
as constituting a colony.’37 However, the term “colony” should be understood only as 
a form of government in UK constitutional terms that is British overseas territory 
within its own form of government38 but not part of the UK itself. Moreover, the UK 
has never treated the Bases as a colony or non-self governing territory in the sense 
of Article 73 of the UN Charter and has not, consequently, transmitted reports to the 
UN on the Bases as it does or did for its other colonies. This may be a result of the 
fact that in Article 2 of the Declaration,39 on the administration of the Sovereign Base 
Areas made by the UK on 16 August 1960, the UK has unilaterally declared inter alia 
that they will neither develop the Bases for other than military purposes nor will they 
set up and administer “colonies” or create customs ports or other frontier barriers 
between the Sovereign Base Areas and the Republic.  
At the same time, there is a series of other rights which are granted to the Republic 
or its citizens, such as the freedom of movement, unrestricted employment as well as 
cultivation of fields, free sailing in the “territorial waters” of the Bases, adoption of the 
Cyprus legislation, imposition of taxes by the Republic, and mainly recognition of 
Cypriot citizenship for all the Cypriot population in the Sovereign Base Areas.40 
Furthermore, from the point of view of Cypriot law, although UK’s sovereignty over 
those areas is recognised,41 it is important to also highlight the recognised exclusive 
right of the Republic to the transfer of the Bases if and when UK abandons them.42 
With regard to international law, the Bases cannot be deemed to be a State, clearly, 
since despite the fact that they do have authorities and legislative possibilities they 
are nevertheless subject to indefinite constraints as a UK overseas territory. 
Furthermore, it is also difficult to consider the Bases to be a colony since the UK has, 
to date, refrained from depositing reports under Article 73 of the UN Charter. The 
approach adopted in the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus in 
                                                 
37
 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 6, para 1074. 
38
 The “Government” of the Bases is vested in the Administrator, who is the commander of 
the UK forces in Cyprus. The Administrator can enact laws after consulting an advisory panel 
and subject to those laws being turned down by a Secretary of State in the UK. There is a 
civilian court as well as provision for a court martial in the Areas. This Court has jurisdiction 
over offences committed within the Bases and a large measure of civil jurisdiction; For a more 
detailed analysis see Chrysostomides, op. cit., supra note 4, at 82. 
39
 Appendix O of the Cyprus Agreements Declaration of Her Majesty’s Government 
Regarding the Administration of the Sovereign Base Areas; available in http://kypros.org/ 
Constitution/English/appendix_o.htm 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Mizrahi v. Republic of Cyprus, (1968) 7 JSC 799; Psaras and Licha v. Republic of Cyprus, 
[1987] 2 CLR 132. 
42
 Graham Thomas Pearce v. “ESTIA” Insurance and Reinsurance Company Ltd., Civil 
Appeal 7656, Ruling of the Supreme Court dated 27th June, 1991. 
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Pearce v. Estia, according to which the Bases, in essence, constitute a servitude 
under international law, is equally not convincing since sovereignty over those areas 
has never actually formed part of the sovereignty of the Republic. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of the present research, it suffices to note that the UK has complete 
territorial control over those Areas and it does represent them internationally. 
The special regime of the Sovereign Base Areas is depicted in Protocol No 3 on the 
Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 
Cyprus. In the Preamble, the High Contracting Parties refer to the Joint Declaration 
on the Sovereign Base Areas of the UK in Cyprus annexed to the UK Act of 
Accession 1972.43 There, it was provided that the arrangements applicable to 
relations between the European Economic Community and the Sovereign Base 
Areas would be defined within the context of any agreement between the Community 
and the Republic of Cyprus. The Contracting Parties also refer to the Treaty 
concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus44 and the associated 
Exchanges of Notes between the Governments of the UK and the Republic of 
Cyprus concerning the administration of the Sovereign Base45 Areas dated 16 
August 1960. In the Treaty and the associated Notes, it is declared that one of the 
main objects to be achieved is the protection of the interests of those resident or 
working in the Sovereign Base Areas. Furthermore, considering that, in this context, 
the said persons should have the same treatment, to the extent possible, as those 
resident or working in the Republic.  
Thus, Protocol No 3 altered Article 299(6)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community to the effect that the Treaty does not apply to the Sovereign Base Areas 
of Akrotiri and Dhekelia except to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation 
of the arrangements set out in the Protocol.46 Consequently, according to Article 2 of 
the Protocol, the Bases are included within the customs territory of the Community 
and, for this purpose, the customs and common commercial policy acts listed in Part 
One of the Annex of the Protocol47 apply to those Areas. Moreover, Title II of Part 
                                                 
43
 Final Act of the Treaty concerning the conditions of Accession to the European 
Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the adjustments of Treaties, O.J. 1972 L 
73/1. 
44
 Appendix A of the Cyprus Agreements; available in http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/ 
English/appendix_a.html 
45
 See supra note 39. 
46
 Article 1 of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
47
 According to Part One of Protocol No 3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 
October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (O.J. 1992 L 302/1), Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and 
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Three of the EC Treaty, on agriculture and provisions adopted on that basis and 
measures adopted under Article 152(4)(b)48 of the EC Treaty,49 also apply to the UK 
Sovereign Bases.  
Generally speaking, it is the UK, which is responsible for the implementation of the 
Protocol.50 In particular, the UK is responsible for the application of the Community 
measures in the fields of customs, indirect taxation and the common commercial 
policy in relation to goods entering or leaving the island through a port or airport 
within the Sovereign Bases51 and for issuing licences, authorisations or certificates 
which may be required under any applicable Community measure in respect of 
goods imported into or exported from the island of Cyprus by the UK forces.52 
However, in contrast with the aforementioned rule, Article 7(2) provides that with 
regard to the payment of any Community funds to which persons in the Bases may 
be entitled, pursuant to the application of the common agricultural policy, it is the 
Republic of Cyprus, which is responsible and thus accountable to the Commission 
for such expenditure. Such a rule is in conformity with the aforementioned scope set 
out in the Associated to the Treaty of Establishment Notes according to which 
Cyprus and the UK should strive to offer, to the extent possible, the same treatment 
                                                                                                                                           
on the Common Customs Tariff (O.J. 1987 L 256/1), Council Regulation (EEC) No 918/83 of 
28 March 1983 setting up a Community system reliefs from customs duty (O.J. 1983 L 105/1), 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code (O.J. 1993 L 253/1), Council Regulation (EEC) No 3677/90 of 13 December 
1990 laying down measures to be taken to discourage the diversion of certain substances to 
the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (O.J. 1990 L 357/1), 
Council Directive 92/109/EEC of 14 December 1992 on the manufacture and the placing on 
the market of certain substances used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances (O.J. 1992 L 370/76), Council Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of 9 
December on the export of cultural goods (O.J. 1992 L 395/1), Council Regulation (EC) No 
3295/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down measures concerning the entry into the 
Community and the export and re-export from the Community of goods infringing certain 
intellectual property rights (O.J. 1994 L 341/8), Commission Regulation (EC) No 1367/95 of 
16 June 1995 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
3295/94 laying down measures concerning the entry into the Community and the export and 
re-export from the Community of goods infringing certain intellectual property rights (O.J. 
1995 L 133/2), Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a 
Community regime for the control of export of dual-use items and technology (O.J. 2000 L 
159/1), apply to the UK Sovereign Base Areas.  
48
 Article 152(4)(b)EC provides that: ‘[t]he Council, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee of the 
Regions, shall contribute to the achievements of the objectives referred to in this article 
through adopting by way of derogation from Article 37, measures in the veterinary and 
phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective the protection of public health.’  
49
 Article 3 of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
50
 Article 7 of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
51
 Article 7(1)(a) of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
52
 Article 7(1)(c) of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
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to people residing and working in the Areas as that which is enjoyed by those 
residing and working in the Republic.   
The customs controls on the goods imported into or exported from the island by the 
UK forces through a port or airport in the Republic may be carried out within the 
Sovereign Base Areas.53 The aforementioned provisions should not be read as 
preventing the Governments of the UK and the Republic of Cyprus from concluding 
arrangements concerning the delegation of any functions imposed by the Protocol 
from one Member State to the other.54  
Most importantly, for the purposes of the present research, it is critical to mention 
that Article 6 of the Protocol provides the legal basis for the Council Regulation 
866/2004. It provides inter alia that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission, may, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the 
objectives of the Protocol, ‘apply other provisions of the EC Treaty and related 
Community legislation to the Sovereign Base Areas on such terms and subject to 
such conditions as it may specify.’ The Green Line Regulation, as shall be seen to a 
greater extent in the two following CHAPTERS is the main legislative mechanism that 
allows the crossing of the Green Line by persons and goods. 
Finally, with regard to the Union citizenship status of the inhabitants of the Sovereign 
Base Areas the following should be noted. The British Overseas Territories Act 
2002,55 by which the “British Dependent Territories Citizens” were renamed as 
“British Overseas Territories Citizens”,56 provides in Section 3(1) that ‘[a]ny person 
who, immediately before the commencement of this section, is a British overseas 
territories citizen shall, on the commencement of this section, become British citizen’ 
and thus an EU citizen. However, British citizenship was not extended to persons 
who, on the day of commencement of the relevant section, were British Overseas 
Territories Citizens by virtue of a connection with the Sovereign Base Areas of 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia.  
However, the British personnel working in the Sovereign Base Areas enjoy British 
citizenship and the Cypriot population residing in the Bases are recognised as 
citizens of the Republic57 and thus, since 1 May 2004, are all EU citizens. 
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 Article 7(1)(b) of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
54
 Article 7(3) and (4) of Protocol No 3 on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 
55
 For a more comprehensive analysis see in general G.-R. De Groot, Towards a European 
Nationality Law – Vers un droit européen de nationalité (Universiteit Maastricht, 2003). 
56
 Section 1 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002. 
57
 See supra note 39. 
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Nevertheless, the extremely limited number of persons, if any, possessing only the 
British Overseas Territories Citizenship by virtue of a connection with the Sovereign 
Base Areas, for the purposes of the Green Line Regulation, are not deemed British 
citizens and thus also not deemed Union citizens. 
 
3. “THE FIRST PARTITION”  
3.1 The 13 Points 
Independence had been granted to the Cypriots, but as Holland writes: ‘In Cyprus 
“freedom” as most people understood it had not been won; self-determination, 
however partisanly defined, was not applied.’58 The aspiration of the vast majority of 
the Greek Cypriots was still ‘Enosis and only Enosis.’59 According to the Cyprus 
Agreements, not only the union with the motherland was banned, but also a 
disproportionately large say in the Government was given to the Turkish Cypriot 
minority. Consequently, the vast majority of the Greek Cypriots attached very little 
legitimacy to the new Republic.60 Even the first President of the Republic, Archbishop 
Makarios, viewed the agreements as a tactical move under the given circumstances. 
On the other hand, many among the Turkish Cypriots regretted that Taksim did not 
take place,61 although most were finding the Cyprus Agreements arrangements 
acceptable. 
Under those circumstances, and given that the cooperation of the two communities 
was a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the Cyprus Republic, it was 
inevitable that the internal stability of the new State would soon be at stake. Thus, 
the viability of the very elaborate and rigid 1960 Constitution was brought into 
question from the very first years of its life when a constitutional dispute over the 
establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest Cypriot cities arose.62 The 
tension rose higher when, in November 1963, the first President of Cyprus, 
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 R. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959 (Clarendon Press Oxford Uni- 
versity, 1998). 
59
 On 22 August 1954, Archbishop Makarios, as the Ethnarch of the Greek Cypriot 
community, delivered his famous speech that has been known as the ‘oath of Faneromeni’ 
where he made clear that the scope of the anti-colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots is 
‘Enosis and only Enosis.’  
60
 K. C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (Yale University Press, 1977),88. 
61
 C. Dodd (ed.), The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus (The 
Eothen Press, 1993), 6. 
62
 Article 173(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘separate municipalities should be created 
by Turkish inhabitants’ of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos. For a more 
detailed account of this constitutional dispute see Markides, op. cit., supra note 26. 
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Archbishop Makarios, proposed thirteen constitutional amendments to the Vice-
president Dr. Kutchuk, which would remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and 
development of the State. He suggested the following: 
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be 
abandoned; 
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in 
case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties; 
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President 
to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the 
Greek Members of the House and the Vice- President by the Turkish Members of the 
House; 
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of 
the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties; 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain 
laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished; 
6. Unified Municipalities to be established; 
7. The administration of Justice to be unified; 
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished; 
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be 
determined by a Law; 
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition 
of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to 
the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; 
11. The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from 
ten to five; 
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority; 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished. 
The atmosphere after the presentation of the thirteen proposals was very tense. 
Three weeks later, the first, low-scale, inter-communal armed conflict broke out in 
Nicosia. All Turkish Cypriot representatives, interpreting the move as a preparation to 
slide into Enosis, immediately withdrew from their posts in the executive, legislative 
and judiciary and the people were regrouped and secluded in enclaves with strong 
lines of defence. British troops policed a truce in Nicosia and the “Green Line”, a 
neutral zone between the Greek and the Turkish quarters in the capital city, was 
established. By March, a UN force had arrived to secure each community from 
further violence. The economic and political isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community, resulting from its seclusion into enclaves and some decisions of the 
Government that subjected it to political, social and economic hardship, was so 
severe that the UN Secretary-General noted on 10 September  1964 that, in some 
instances, it amounted to a ‘veritable siege’.63 Some contemporary writers refer to 
those events as “the first partition.”64  
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 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 10 September 1964, UN Doc 
S/1964/5950. 
64
 M. Droushiotis, Η πρώτη διχοτόµηση, Κύπρος 1963-1964 [The first partition, Cyprus 1963-
1964] (Alfadi 2005). 
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3.2 The doctrine of necessity 
Despite the break-up of the bi-communal Republic in 1963, the State continued 
functioning. The Cypriot constitutional order has been maintained mainly by evoking 
the doctrine of necessity. In Cyprus, the doctrine of necessity has been considered to 
be a constitutional principle which indirectly forms part of the 1960 Constitution and 
the aim of which is to solve problems that were not foreseen by the drafters and 
which threaten the existence of the Republic. 
The doctrine has been spelled out for the first time in the historical Mustafa Ibrahim 
judgment of the Supreme Court.65 In the aftermath of the resignation of the President 
of the Supreme Constitutional Court, professor Forsthoff, the House of 
Representatives enacted the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Law, 33/1964. According to this law, a newly established Supreme Court, would 
exercise the jurisdictions and powers both of the Supreme Constitutional Court and 
the High Court ‘until such time as the people of Cyprus may determine such 
matters.’66 The allegation was that such Law, which was merging two Courts into one 
Supreme Court, was not enacted in accordance with the Constitution. 
The Court held that the doctrine of necessity should be considered to be included in 
the provisions of a strict and written constitution, and is therefore part of the 
constitutional order in Cyprus. It allows the country to safeguard its interests 
whenever the Constitution, due to its rigidity, one-sidedness and narrow ambit, 
contains no provisions giving satisfactory solutions to face extraordinary situations ‘of 
a public necessity of the first magnitude.’67 Most importantly, the Court decided that 
there are four prerequisites in order to determine whether the said doctrine could be 
applied in a particular case: 
1. There is an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstance; 
2. There is no other remedy; 
3. The measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity; 
4. The measure must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the 
exceptional circumstances.68 
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 Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195. For a more detailed 
account see in general Chrysostomides, op. cit., supra note 4, at 100-110; F. Hoffmeister, 
Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2006).  
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 Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [1964] CLR 195,  at 201 and 225. 
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 Ibid. at 234. 
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 Ibid. at 265. 
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The doctrine of necessity, as defined in the Mustafa Ibrahim case, not only has 
provided the necessary legal basis in order for the Cypriot State to deal with the 
absence of the Turkish Cypriots in the Government, and their subsequent 
substitution with Greek Cypriots,69 but also, has allowed the amendment of non-
fundamental articles of the Constitution.70 
 
3.3 The International legitimacy of RoC  
Despite the break-up and the “hellenisation” of the Republic, on 4 March 1964, the 
UN Security Council maintained the view that the Republic of Cyprus continuously 
existed in its entirety and it also recognised the legitimacy of Government of the 
Republic which was, at the time, comprised only of Greek Cypriots with the 
unanimous adoption of Resolution 186 (1964). The said Resolution laid down the 
original mandate of the UN Force in Cyprus (hereafter UNFICYP).71 The General 
Assembly was even more explicit. It declared that ‘Cyprus, as an equal member of 
the UN, is, in accordance with the Charter of United Nation, entitled to enjoy, and 
should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without foreign 
intervention or interference.’72 The adoption of such a Resolution has been 
characterised as a ‘diplomatic triumph for Makarios.’73 Thus, despite the obvious 
constitutional issues which have arisen because of the collapse of the bi-communal 
constitutional structure, with the exception of Turkey, the international community has 
always recognised the Government of the Republic as the only legitimate 
Government on the island. This will be even more obvious when the eligibility of 
Cyprus’s Union membership is addressed. 
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4.  THE 1974 TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE CONTINUED 
PRESENCE OF TURKEY ON CYPRUS 
4.1 The 1974 Turkish military intervention 
From 1963 on, and until 1974, the two Communities, along with the three Guarantor 
States and the UN, were engaged in negotiations in order to find a viable solution for 
Cyprus while disorder and anarchy prevailed on the island. On 2 July 1974, Makarios 
addressed a public letter to Gizikes, the appointed by the colonels’ regime President 
of Greece. With this letter he denounced the regime in Athens as a dictatorship that 
was fomenting civil war in Cyprus and demanded the withdrawal of the Greek officers 
from the Cyprus National Guard since they consisted of a threat to the elected 
Government. Two weeks later, there was a coup against the President of Cyprus 
orchestrated by the military regime in Greece. 
The coup undoubtedly being a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee and given the 
British denial for a joint intervention to restore the ‘constitutional order’ in accordance 
with Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey seized the opportunity to invade 
the island in the morning of 20 July 1974. The very same day, the Security Council, 
adopted Resolution 353 (1974)74 which was meant to mainly address the coup. 
Having learnt of Turkey’s military intervention, the Security Council called upon all 
States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and demanded an 
immediate end to foreign military intervention on the island that was contrary to this 
respect for sovereignty. Nevertheless, on 21 July, the Turkish army seized Kyrenia. 
One day later Greece and Turkey agreed on a cease-fire and on 23 July the Greek 
dictatorship collapsed. 
On 8 August 1974, inter-communal talks started in order for a political settlement to 
be reached. In the course of those negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots, officially for the 
first time, asked for some form of geographical separation of the two communities. 
Makarios rejected the demand and insisted that Cyprus should remain a unitary 
State. The talks unsurprisingly collapsed on 14 August 1974. Within hours, Turkey 
seized 36 per cent of the island including 57 per cent of the coastline75 up to an 
“Attila Line” running from Morphou Bay to Famagusta. The occupied territory 
included about 60 per cent of its industry, 65 per cent of its agriculture and 80 per 
cent of its tourism. The result was a humanitarian catastrophe for the population of 
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the island. Thousands of Cypriots had been killed and wounded and many were 
missing. One third of the Greek Cypriot community and another 50,000 Turkish 
Cypriots had been displaced. Varosha, the predominantly Greek Cypriot region of 
Famagusta, became a “ghost-city” and Nicosia a ‘Mediterranean Berlin, divided by 
barbed wires and barricades.’76 
During the second phase of the Turkish military intervention, the UN Security Council 
adopted four Resolutions with which it called on both sides not to violate the cease-
fire agreement77 and not to kill members of the UNFICYP.78 It also recorded ‘its 
formal disapproval of the unitary military action undertaken against the Republic of 
Cyprus.’79 More importantly, it extended the functions of UNFICYP to offering 
humanitarian relief80 in addition to performing its task of limiting fighting and 
protecting the civilian population in accordance with its original mandate, as well as 
undertaking, as far as possible, tasks of observing the cease-fire called for by 
Resolution 353 (1974) issued on the day of the armed conflict commenced. The UN 
Secretary General has described the latter function of the UNFICYP as trying 
‘pragmatically to maintain surveillance over the cease-fire.’81 Recital (9) of the Green 
Line Regulation recognises the abovementioned mandate of the UN in the area 
between the cease-fire lines, which extends approximately 180 kilometres from east 
to west across the island and is known as the UN buffer zone, by providing that the 
Regulation does not affect this mandate in any way. 
Unsurprisingly, the legality and legitimacy of the Turkish military intervention in 
Cyprus has provided enough ground for a heated debate.82 For the purposes of the 
present research it suffices to mention the following. Turkey has claimed that Article 
IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, and especially its second paragraph, contains an 
authorisation for its action. Article IV provides that: 
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or 
measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. 
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three 
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing 
the State of affairs created by the present Treaty. 
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It is obvious that the coup orchestrated by the Greek junta is a breach of the Treaty. 
One may also argue that Turkey asked for concerted action by making an effort to 
consult with the UK in London while the non-consultation with the Greek Government 
is justifiable given the chaotic political environment in Athens. It could even be 
accepted, for the sake of the argument, that Article IV(2) provides for a right of 
unilateral military intervention of the Guarantor States, although Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter prohibits the use of force and the UN Security Council has labelled the first 
phase of the Turkish operation as ‘foreign military intervention’83 and has also found 
that the second phase constituted a ‘unilateral military action against the Republic of 
Cyprus.’84 It is beyond any reasonable doubt, however, that the aim of the “Attila” 
operation was not to re-establish ‘the state of affairs created by the’ Treaty of 
Guarantee as required by the relevant Article. Instead, the “Attila” operation created 
facts, on the ground, that have completely altered the status quo ante. Even a former 
“Advocate-General” of the “TRNC”, Necatigil, has accepted that the second phase 
did not serve the purpose of re-establishing the previous state of affairs. Rather, he 
has tried to justify this deviation since the re-establishment of ‘the state of affairs’ was 
impracticable after the 1960 break-up of the Republic and especially in a situation 
where UN led negotiations about a new status quo had already started.85 This 
argument is completely unconvincing. Instead of protecting the territorial integrity and 
the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus as it has undertaken under the 
Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey was aiming at territorially dividing the island and 
exercising effective control over the northern part of Cyprus. Undoubtedly, although 
Greece has not respected its obligations as Guarantor State, the 1974 Turkish 
military invasion was a grave violation of international law and of its Treaty 
obligations and thus unlawful.  
 
4.2 The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) 
Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Turkish intervention and the consequent 
territorial segregation of the two communities, a settlement based on some form of 
“functional federation”, as the one designed by the 1960 Cyprus Agreements, has 
been out of the question. From then on, any proposal for a settlement has to include 
some form of Turkish Cypriot territorial entity. This became even clearer on 13 
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February 1975 when the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed in the 
area occupied by Turkish forces. Although the UN Security Council has regretted 
such a unilateral decision,86 one might argue that given that such an entity was 
seeing itself as a federated State within the Republic, such a proclamation did not 
raise serious issues from an international point of view. The unilateral declaration of 
independence of the “TRNC”, however, is a matter that should be examined under 
international law. 
On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their independence as the 
so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Although in the preamble of the 
“TRNC” “constitution” it is mentioned that, since the Republic of Cyprus has lost its 
legitimacy after the 1963 events, the Turkish Cypriot People has, ‘in exercise of its 
right of self-determination’, proclaimed the independence of the “TRNC”. The UN 
Security Council deplored ‘the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus’ 
and called upon all States ‘not to recognise the purported State of the “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus” set up by secessionist acts.’87 This was reiterated in 
Security Council Resolution 550 (1984).88 In other words, the UN Security Council 
has rejected de facto the Turkish Cypriot claim for self-determination. Similarly, by 
declarations of 16 and 17 November 1983, the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States, in the framework of 
European Political Cooperation, rejected the Turkish Cypriot declaration of 
independence and expressed their continued recognition of the Government of the 
then President Kyprianou as the legitimate Government of the Republic.89 
More importantly, the European Court of Human Rights held, in Loizidou v. Turkey, 
that ‘it is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in 
northern Cyprus’ that the Turkish ‘army exercises effective overall control over that 
part of the island. Such control, according to the relevant test and in the 
circumstances of the case’, entails Turkey’s ‘responsibility for the policies and actions 
of the “TRNC”.’90 The Strasbourg Court upheld this finding in the fourth inter-State  
application of Cyprus against Turkey and went a step further by stating that Turkey 
‘[h]aving effective overall control over northern Cyprus, its responsibility cannot be 
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confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials in northern Cyprus but must also 
be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives by virtue 
of Turkish military and other support.’91  
The European Convention of Human Rights being the ‘constitutional instrument of 
European public order’,92 the decisions of its Court provide an authoritative answer 
on the international law questions raised by the unilateral declaration of 
independence of the “TRNC”. The entity in northern Cyprus not only is not an 
independent State founded as an expression of the right of self-determination of the 
Turkish Cypriot People, but rather it is the result of a secessionist act that has 
created a Turkish local administration in northern Cyprus. Despite the fact that under 
international law the Republic of Cyprus is the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus, 
‘international law recognises the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and 
transactions in such a situation, for instance as regards the registration of births, 
deaths and marriages, “the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of 
the inhabitants of the [t]erritory”.’93 In any case ‘the obligation to disregard acts of de 
facto entities is far from absolute. Life goes on in the territory concerned for its 
inhabitants. That life must be made tolerable and be protected by the de facto 
authorities, including their courts; and in the very interest of the inhabitants, the acts 
of these authorities related thereto cannot simply be ignored by third States or by 
international institutions, especially courts, including this one.’94 To that effect, in a 
recent judgment, the Strasbourg Court decided that the temporary deprivation of the 
liberty of Eleni Foka, a teacher living and working in a Greek Cypriot enclave in the 
Karpas peninsula, because she had resisted a search of her bag by “TRNC” offices 
at Ledra Palace crossing point, was in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) ECHR.95 As shall be illustrated in the 
following CHAPTER such legal arrangements may even entail decisions of a 
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Committee on property rights of Cypriots that have been affected by the post-1974 
status quo.96 
No State other than Turkey has thus far recognised the “TRNC”. Therefore, the travel 
documents issued by the “authorities” of the purported independent State are not 
recognised as valid by any other State than the Turkish Republic. Moreover, 
following the Turkish military invasion, the Government of the Republic declared the 
closure of all ports of entry into the Republic which are situated in the areas not 
under its effective control.97 Hence, practically, no movement of persons and goods 
can take place through the relevant ports and airports which are situated to the North 
of the UN Buffer zone with the exception of movements whose destination or point of 
origin is Turkey. Until 23 April 2003, when, after massive demonstrations had taken 
place, the regime in the North decided to partially lift the strict restrictions it had 
posed on the inhabitants in the North with regard to the crossing of the Green Line 
towards the South, the crossing of persons and goods had been extremely limited.  
 
5.  THE ROC AS A CANDIDATE FOR EU ACCESSION 
5.1 The Association Agreement 
With regard to EU - Cyprus relations, on 19 December 1972 an Agreement 
Establishing an Association Between the European Community and the Republic of 
Cyprus and the Protocols Thereto (Association Agreement) was signed.98 Unlike the 
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Association Agreements with Turkey and Greece, no reference was made to the EU 
membership prospects of Cyprus. The Association Agreement provided for the 
bilateral legal basis of the relationship between Cyprus and the EEC/EU insofar as it 
concerned the dispute resolution, trade and accompanying provisions on services, 
persons and capital and other common provisions. According to Article 2(1) of the 
Association Agreement, its original scope was the progressive elimination of trade 
obstacles through a process of reciprocal liberalisation of trade. Two five-year 
phases of liberalisation should have led to the establishment of a customs union. The 
first phase was to come to an end on 30 June 1977. However, it was extended twice 
and it was only on November 1980 that the Association Council decided to start 
negotiating the conditions and procedures for the second phase as from 1982.99 The 
second phase was eventually agreed upon between the then EEC and Cyprus with 
the additional protocol of 19 October 1987.100 
The signing of the Association Agreement was deemed necessary in order to 
maintain the stability of the Cypriot economy. Following the UK accession to the EEC 
and the consequent adoption of the CAP, the exports of Cypriot agricultural products 
to the UK, which exceeded 50 per cent of the total number of exports, would lose the 
commonwealth benefits and would face limitations provided under the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The Association Agreement was securing a satisfying level of 
exports for Cypriot agricultural products to the EEC market and especially the UK 
and Irish markets for some years.101 More importantly, it was an obvious political 
manoeuvre in order for the Cyprus problem to be discussed in the Community 
framework. The intention of the Greek Cypriot community to “Europeanise” the 
Cyprus problem became clearer with the application for accession of the Republic. It 
has been widely accepted that it was exactly the dynamic created by the EU 
accession negotiations that created the window of opportunity which led to the Annan 
Plan.102 
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5.2 The Application for Union membership 
On 4 July 1990, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, George Iacovou, on 
behalf of the whole island, presented an application for membership to European 
Community in accordance with the then Article 237 EEC to the Italian Foreign 
Minister de Michelis. However it was only in late 1992, after the failure of the Boutros 
Ghali’s Set of Ideas, that the Commission started to prepare its Opinion, which was 
issued on 30 June 1993103 and endorsed by the Council on 17 October. 
In its Opinion, the Commission considered Cyprus to be eligible for membership104 
but noted that: 
as a result of the de facto division of the island into two strictly separated parts, the 
fundamental freedoms laid down by the Treaty, and in particular freedom of movement of 
goods, people, services and capital, right of establishment and the universally recognised 
political, economic, social and cultural rights could not today be exercised over the 
entirety of the island’s territory. These freedoms and rights would have to be guaranteed 
as part of a comprehensive settlement restoring constitutional arrangements covering the 
whole of the Republic of Cyprus.105   
This is the main reason why the Commission concluded that: ‘Cyprus’s integration 
with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the 
Cyprus question.’106 It felt, however, that it was necessary to clarify that in case of a 
failure to reach a settlement through the inter-communal talks under the UN 
auspices, the situation should be reassessed.107 
The intransigence of Turkey and the regime in northern Cyprus, as reported by the 
EU special envoy,108 coupled with the political manoeuvres of Greece inside the 
Community framework, pushed the Corfu European Council on 24 June 1994 to 
decide to include Cyprus and Malta in the next round of enlargement. Moreover, in 
1995, it convinced the Council to start accession negotiations with the Republic of 
Cyprus and in exchange to establish a customs union with Turkey. In its historic 
Report, “Agenda 2000: The Challenge of Enlargement”,109 containing its final 
recommendations on accession negotiations, the European Commission expressed 
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the Union’s support for a settlement within the UN framework and in accordance with 
the principles of bi-zonality and bi-communality. More importantly, it stressed that 
‘[t]he Union is determined to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting 
settlement in accordance with the relevant United Nations Resolutions.’  
At the same time, building on the momentum created by the G-8 meeting in Cologne, 
in June 1999, in which the leaders of the eight wealthiest nations in the world invited 
the parties in the conflict to resume negotiations without preconditions and hoping to 
use the carrots and sticks offered by the accession negotiations, the UN Secretary 
General Koffi Annan invited the two communities to re-launch the talks on the basis 
of Resolution 1250.110 In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council,111 
commenting on those important developments, expressed its ‘strong support for the 
UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.’ It 
also underlined that a political settlement would ‘facilitate the accession of Cyprus to 
the European Union’ but clarified that, in case a settlement was not reached by the 
completion of the negotiations, the Council’s decisions would ‘be made without the 
above being a precondition. In this, the Council would ‘take all the relevant factors.’112 
In exchange, Turkey became a candidate State for accession to the EU. 
During all this time, the regime in northern Cyprus, led by Denktash, was challenging 
the application of the Republic of Cyprus mainly on the ground that the Cypriot 
Government did not have a right to speak for the whole Cyprus and that the 
application was illegal under international and constitutional law. In a joint 
declaration, Turkey and the “TRNC” declared that Cyprus could not join ‘international 
political and economic unions to which Turkey and Greece are not members.’113 It is 
exactly the issue of legality of Cyprus’s application that was the subject of an 
interesting legal debate during the late 1990’s. On the request of Turkey, professor 
Mendelson published a legal opinion in June 1997,114 according to which the future 
EU accession of Cyprus would be illegal. A couple of months later, professors 
Crawford, Hafner and Pellet, commissioned by the Republic of Cyprus, rebutted this 
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opinion.115 Four years later, in 2001, professor Mendelson published an additional 
opinion116 to which professors Crawford, Hafner and Pellet replied.117  The main 
arguments of the debate118 relate to the interpretation of Article I(2) of the Treaty of 
Guarantee and Articles 50 and 170 of the Cypriot Constitution. 
Firstly, Article I(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee reads as follows:  
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political 
or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any 
activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition 
of the island. 
Mendelson argues that EU membership would amount to an economic and political 
union with 24 (now 26) other States and in particular with Greece.119 In other words, 
the long-dead aspiration of Greek Cypriots for Enosis would be indirectly resurrected 
through the EU accession.  
However, Article I(2) should be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, as 
provided by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 
1969, which reflects a rule of customary international law that preceded the Vienna 
Convention. If this rule is applied to the provision in question, it would be easy to 
conclude that Mendelson’s interpretation is rather erroneous. Firstly, such an 
interpretation would condemn Cyprus to almost absolute isolation in the world scene. 
However, when the Cyprus Agreements were signed, it was not meant that Cyprus 
would remain an outsider in the international community abstaining from any 
international organisation or structure. This is obvious from Article 50 of the Cypriot 
Constitution which was framed in full cognizance of the Treaty of Guarantee. 
According to Article 50, the membership of Cyprus in international organisations is 
permissible provided that, in the case of accession to organisations in which either 
Greece or Turkey do not participate, there must be a consensus of both ethno-
religious segments of Cyprus, expressed by an agreement between the Greek 
Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic. Thus, a 
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clear distinction between a ‘political and economic union with any State’ on the one 
hand and accession to ‘international organisations and pacts of alliance’ exists in the 
Cyprus Agreements.120  
Such an interpretation is also compatible with the history and the context of this 
provision. The history of the provision shows that its scope is to outlaw Enosis and 
Taksim.121 On this, the opinions expressed by the Greek and Turkish negotiators on 
12 February 1959, after the Zurich deliberations and on 19 October 1959 during the 
London Joint Committee, shed light to the scope of the provision. 
The Secretary of State… turned to the Zurich documents beginning with the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Was the second paragraph of Article I intended to preclude Cypriot 
membership of all international associations, as for example the Free Trade Area if that 
ever came into existence. M. Zorlu explained that the paragraph was intended to prohibit 
partition and Enosis (whether with Greece or with any other country). M. Averoff agreed; 
he explained that the wording was specifically designed to exclude possible Greek 
devices in the direction of Enosis, such as a personal union of Cyprus and Greece under 
the Greek Crown. M. Zorlu and M. Averoff both made it clear that there would be no 
objection to Cypriot membership of international associations.122 
 
Sir Knox Helm then asked if, apart from the proposed Article V Mr Rossides accepted the 
draft text. 
Mr Rossides replied affirmatively. He then asked the meaning of Article I(2). He 
presumed it referred to union with Greece or Turkey, but it seemed rather sweeping, as 
he supposed that Cyprus could for instance join an economic organisation or the 
Commonwealth.  
Sir Knox Helm observed that that was coming near to re-examining the wording of the 
Treaty, and that it was perhaps better not to start to try to interpret the various Articles. 
M. Roumos said he thought they could assure Mr Rossides and put on record that it was 
certainly not intended that Cyprus should be precluded fro membership of the Free Trade 
Area or multilateral organisations. What was meant was that Cyprus should not be 
politically united with Greece or Turkey, or even economically in the narrow sense of 
customs union; but that could not really be said in the Treaty. 
M. Bayulken confirmed that the wording did not refer to any international organisations, 
such as FAO, GATT, etc. 
Mr Rossides thanked M. Roumos and M. Bayulken for their explanation, and then said 
that he must reply to Sir Knox Helm’s remark that he was trying to open discussion of the 
Treaty. When starting, he had said that he did not dispute it, and had asked for 
elucidation… His Delegation had received a constructive reply from Greeks and Turks 
and had thought it proper to raise the issue.123  
The proposed interpretation of the Cyprus Agreements, according to which there is a 
distinction between Cyprus’s accession to the Union and ‘union in whole or in part 
with any other country’, is also consistent with the UN Security Council practice. In 
Resolution 1092 of 1996, the Security Council welcomed the start of the EU 
accession negotiations while at the same time stressed that any comprehensive 
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political settlement of the Cyprus issue must exclude union in whole or in part with 
any other country124 and thus adopted this distinction. 
Interestingly enough, Mendelson refers125 to the advisory opinion126 of the Permanent 
International Court of Justice of 1931, according to which a proposed Austro-German 
Customs Union was deemed to constitute an alienation of Austria’s economic 
independence contrary to treaty obligations that existed at time. What he belittles, 
however, in his opinion, are the implications of Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty 
of 1955 to Austria’s Accession to the EU. The said Article, whose scope was to 
prevent a new Anschluss,127 obliges Austria not to ‘enter into political or economic 
union with Germany in any form whatever.’ This provision is far more detailed and 
explicit than the Austro-German Customs Union case and one may draw interesting 
historical and contextual analogies between Articles 4 of the State Treaty and I of the 
Treaty of Guarantee. The compatibility of Austria’s accession with Article 4 was 
widely discussed following Austria’s application in 1989 to join EEC. Austria, 
however, acceded to the Union without an amendment of the relevant Article. This is 
an important precedent for the compatibility of Cyprus’s accession with the Treaty of 
Guarantee.128  
Moreover, as previously mentioned, Article 50 of the Constitution provides that the 
Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President could veto the 
accession of Cyprus to an international organisation in which either Greece or Turkey 
do not participate. This constitutes an institutional safeguard for both ethno-religious 
segments, to be exercised by their elected representatives in the executive. 
According to Mendelson, Article 50 was providing a veto power to the Turkish Cypriot 
community and not the Vice-President ad personam. Given that in the “TRNC” 
Memorandum of 1990, the regime in northern Cyprus has expressed its opposition to 
the EU membership, the application of Cyprus was clearly in breach of the 
Constitution.129 This argument, however, clearly violates the principle dolo petit. The 
Turkish Cypriot community cannot insist on a veto right provided by a Constitution 
from which they have withdrawn, almost 35 years ago, at the time. 
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Furthermore, Mendelson, as the counsel of the Turkish-Cypriot community, has 
argued that the accession of Cyprus to the Union would be incompatible with the 
obligations provided by Article 170 of the Constitution.130 The scope of Article 170 is 
to ensure substantive equality between the three Guarantor States after Cyprus’s 
independence. Thus, Cyprus, by agreement, should accord most-favoured-nation 
treatment to the three Guarantor States. Unsurprisingly, the Union membership, 
would disfavour Turkey, since the other two Guarantor States, as EU Member 
States, would receive better treatment in the entire field of application of the 
Community Treaties. Tomuschat rightly points out that the term most-favoured-
nation, as term of international trade, appears in Article I GATT 1947. According to 
Article XXIV(5) GATT, no State joining a customs union like the EU Single Market 
has an obligation to accord such a treatment to any third State. Hence, Cyprus is 
exonerated from the obligation to extend all the rights that it grants to the EU 
Member States, including Greece and the UK, their citizens and other legal persons 
established in them under EU law, to Turkey, its citizens and other legal persons.131 
In any case, one has to point out that, even if Article 170 obliges the Republic to 
accord the same rights that Greece and the UK enjoy after the accession of the 
island to the Union, it would be far-fetched to argue that, accordingly, the accession 
is per se incompatible with the Cypriot Constitution. The Republic could, for example, 
have even negotiated for the drafting of a provision in the Accession Treaty that 
would have allowed it to accede to the Union without breaching its own Constitution.  
Finally, with regard to the power of the Cypriot Government to represent both 
communities in the international scene and thus to apply in the name of both 
communities for an EU membership, for the purposes of the present research it 
suffices to mention the following. Since the UN Security Council Resolution 186 
(1964), the international community has never challenged the power of 
representation of the Cypriot Government. On the contrary, they have dealt with it as 
the only effective Government of Cyprus. To that effect, the European Commission 
and the Strasbourg Court have affirmed that any Greek-Cypriot Government has 
international standing as the Government of Cyprus.132 Likewise, the European 
Parliament has declared that the Republic of Cyprus is the ‘only State entitled to 
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represent the island as a whole.’133 The Council has reaffirmed this position shortly 
after the “TRNC” declaration of independence.134 In any case, according to Article 46 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codifies a customary 
international law rule, internal irregularities do not in principle affect the power which 
a government enjoys to enter into binding commitments with other States.  
The aforementioned legal analysis shows clearly that the application of the Republic 
of Cyprus for accession to the Union was legal. Furthermore, although the Greek 
Cypriot community massively rejected the Annan Plan, its drafting proves that the 
rationale, according to which the “Europeanisation” of the Cyprus problem may lead 
to its solution, was partially right. Ironically enough, the very same procedure that led 
to the designing of the plan, also offered most of the arguments that the “rejectionist” 
school of thought used in April 2004.  
 
6.  THE UN PLAN FOR A UNITED CYPRUS REPUBLIC (UCR) 
Since 1963, numerous attempts have taken place to solve the Gordian knot of the 
Cyprus problem. There have been High-Level Agreements, an Interim Agreement, 
the Gobbi Initiative, the Proximity Talks, the Draft Framework Agreement, the First 
and Second Sets of Ideas and finally the Comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
problem, (Annan Plan).135 The principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political 
equality of the two communities were embodied, on all those attempts, as 
fundamental elements of the envisaged solution for Cyprus’s Gordian knot. The 
Annan Plan presented to the two communities, on 31 March 2004 in Burgenstock 
(Switzerland), consists of the most holistic attempt to solve the problem since the 
1960 Cyprus Agreements. The reasons why it was only in 2004, 40 years after the 
break-up of the Republic, that the international community finally managed to design 
a proposal for a comprehensive settlement of this age-old dispute should be found in 
what has been called the “catalyst effect” of the EU accession negotiations.136  
According to this rationale, which is based on a somewhat realist logic of conflict 
resolution, although there was no formal cooperation between the two international 
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organisations, the Union was offering the necessary carrots and sticks for all actors 
in the conflict, in order for the UN settlement efforts to be successful. 
The Annan Plan embodies the main principles of the de Cuellar's and Boutros-
Ghali's sets of ideas and follows the relevant guidelines of the UN Security Council. 
According to them,  
‘[a] Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and 
international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial 
integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in 
the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and 
that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or 
any form of partition or secession.’137  
The United Cyprus Republic, as envisaged in the Annan Plan, would have been a 
federal State modelled on the principle of consociational democracy138 as it has 
successfully been adopted in the constitutions of Switzerland and Belgium.  
In the case of the United Cyprus Republic, segmental autonomy would have been 
institutionalised in the form of federalism in accordance with the principle of bi-
zonality. Articles 2(1)(a) of the Foundation Agreement and 1(1) of the Constitution 
provided that the State envisaged in the Annan Plan would have been an 
independent and sovereign State, which would have consisted of two constituent 
States, namely the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and the Turkish Cypriot 
Constituent State. The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its 
federal Government, and its constituent States, was modelled on the status and 
relationship of Switzerland, its federal Government, and its cantons139 and thus in 
accordance with the principle of consociational democracy.  
On the other hand, bi-communality would have served as the basic standard of 
political representation, public service appointments,140 and allocation of public funds. 
More specifically, the overrepresentation of the Turkish segment was adopted as a 
safeguard of the viability of the new State since, by Main Article iii of the Foundation 
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Agreement, the two communities had acknowledged each other’s distinct identity and 
integrity and that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political 
equality.  
The political equality and the autonomy of the two ethno-religious segments inside 
the political system of the envisaged United Cyprus Republic were also reflected in 
Articles 3 and 12 of the Foundation Agreement and the Constitution respectively, 
concerning the citizenship of the new State. Although there was a single Cypriot 
citizenship, every person holding it would also have enjoyed internal constituent 
State citizenship status as provided for by the Constitutional Law on Internal 
Constituent State Citizenship Status and Constituent State Residency Rights.141 
Despite the fact that such a status would have been complementary to, and would 
not have replaced, the Cypriot citizenship, it would have consisted of the deciding 
criterion for any provision142 that would refer to the constituent State origins of a 
person, and thus it would have been a clear depiction of the autonomy of the two 
ethnic groups of the United Cyprus Republic.143 
More analytically, the federal Government sovereignly would have exercised the 
powers specified in the Constitution.144 The Office of the Head of State would have 
been vested in a Presidential Council which would have exercised the executive 
power.145 The Council would have had six voting members, which would have been 
elected by Parliament for a fixed five-year term on a single list by special majority.146 
Parliament could also elect additional non-voting members. According to Article 26(6) 
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of the Constitution, the composition of the Council would have been proportional to 
the population of each constituent State, although at least one third of the members 
should have hailed from each constituent State. Given the numbers of the Greek 
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot population, this rule would practically mean that the 
Presidential Council of the United Cyprus Republic would have comprised of four 
Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot voting members.  
In addition to the rule about the composition of the Council, in which the 
characteristic of power-sharing was clearly reflected, the Constitution was providing 
for a rule according to which the Council would have strived to reach all decisions by 
consensus.147 Where it would have failed to reach consensus, it would have made 
decisions by simple majority of members present and voting. Such majority, 
however, should have, in all cases, comprised of at least one member from each 
constituent State. Practically, this would have meant that the two Turkish Cypriot 
voting members of the Presidential Council could have been able to block a decision 
in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community, in accordance with 
the principle of political equality.  
According to Articles 2(1)(c) of the Foundation Agreement and Articles 2 and 15 of 
the Constitution, the constituent States were of equal status in order for the principle 
of political equality of the two ethno-religious communities to be strengthened. Within 
the limits of the Constitution and within their territorial boundaries, they would have 
sovereignly exercised all powers not vested in the federal Government148 in 
conformity with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, and representative 
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republican Government under their own Constitutions. The institutionalised, in the 
form of federalism, segmental autonomy was also reflected in Articles 1 and Articles 
1 and 2 of the Constitutions of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Constituent 
States respectively, which repeat verbatim the aforementioned provisions concerning 
the limits of their powers. Articles 3 of the Constitution of the Greek Cypriot 
Constituent State and Article 4 of the Constitution of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent 
State, however, were declaring the fidelity of those entities to the Constitution of the 
United Cyprus Republic.149 
On the other hand, in accordance with Articles 2(2) and 16 of the Foundation 
Agreement and the Constitution respectively, the constituent States would cooperate 
and co-ordinate with each other and with the federal Government on matters150 within 
the competence of the parties through Cooperation Agreements,151 as well as 
through Constitutional Laws approved by the federal Parliament and both constituent 
State legislatures. In particular, the constituent States would have participated in the 
formulation and implementation of policy in external relations152 and European Union 
affairs153 on matters within their sphere of competence, in accordance with 
Cooperation Agreements modelled on the Belgian example. 
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According to Articles 5(1) of the Foundation Agreement and Article 22 of the 
Constitution, the federal parliament would have been composed of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. Each Chamber would have had 48 members. The 
Chamber of Deputies would have been composed of deputies from both constituent 
States, with seats attributed on the basis of the number of persons holding internal 
constituent State citizenship status of each constituent State provided that each 
constituent State would have been attributed a minimum of one quarter of the seats. 
The minorities, being the Maronites, the Latins and the Armenians, would have been 
represented by one deputy at least.154 The Senate would have been a paritarian 
body composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot senators. 
The Senate would have been elected by the Cypriot citizens, voting separately as 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, irrespective of the constituent State citizenship 
they would have held. Although such a provision would have resulted in the 
preservation of the ethnic cleavages in the new State, it was included by the drafters 
in order for the bi-communal character of the State not to be threatened. According to 
Articles 2(1)(5) of the Foundation Agreement and Article 25 of the Constitution, 
decisions of Parliament would have needed the approval of both Chambers with a 
simple majority of members present and voting, including one quarter of the senators 
present and voting from each constituent State and two-fifths in the case of matters, 
on which decision requires a special majority. Hence, it would have also been 
possible for the Turkish Cypriot senators to veto an unfavourable decision.  
With regard to the judiciary, the Supreme Court of Cyprus, whose role would have 
been to uphold the Constitution and ensure its full effect, would have comprised of an 
                                                                                                                                           
exclusively into an area of competence of the constituent States, Cyprus would have been 
represented either by a representative of either the federal Government or a constituent 
State, provided that the latter is able to commit the Republic (Article 19(3) of the Constitution). 
Moreover, Article 19(4) provided that obligations of the Republic arising out of EU 
membership would have been implemented by the federal or constituent State authority that 
enjoyed legislative competence for the subject matter to which an obligation pertained. Thus, 
if a constituent State failed to fulfil its obligations of the Republic vis-à-vis the EU within its 
area of competence, the federal Government could have, after a 90-days notification, taken 
necessary measures in lieu of the defaulting constituent State, to be in force until such time 
as that constituent State discharges its responsibilities (Article 19(5) of the Constitution). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, any new Treaty on the European Union or amendment to 
the EU Treaties would have been ratified by Cyprus unless this would have been opposed by 
the federal Parliament and both constituent State legislatures (Article 19(7) of the 
Constitution). 
154
 With regard to the representation in the European Parliament, Article 7 of the Draft Act of 
Adaptation of the Terms of accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union 
(Appendix D of the Annan Plan) provided that Cyprus would have been represented in the 
European Parliament according to proportional representation, provided that each constituent 
State was attributed no less than one third of the Cypriot seats in the European Parliament. 
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equal number of judges from each constituent State and three non-Cypriot judges.155 
The Annan Plan was providing156 for a system of judicial review since the Supreme 
Court of the United Cyprus Republic would have had exclusive jurisdiction over 
disputes between the constituent States, between one or both constituent States and 
the federal Government and between organs of the federal Government.157 
Moreover, it would have had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any 
federal or constituent State law under the Constitution of the United Cyprus 
Republic158 and primary jurisdiction over violations of federal law.159  
Given that deadlock is almost inevitable in such a binary system of governance, the 
existence of a mechanism that would prevent a paralysis of the State was deemed 
essential. According to Article 36(5) of the Constitution, in such cases the arbiter 
would have been the Supreme Court. Thus, in case of a deadlock in any of the 
federal institutions, with the exception of the Central Bank,160 which would prevent a 
decision from being taken and thereby prevent the federal Government from 
functioning properly, it was the Supreme Court of Cyprus that would have taken an 
interim decision on the matter, to remain in force until such time as a decision on the 
matter would have been taken by the institution in question. Thus, according to the 
constitutional designing of the Annan Plan, the body that would have been meant to 
exercise judicial review in the new legal order would also have been the body that 
would decide on the most divisive issues.  
The attribution of such a role to the judiciary would have raised some questions with 
regard to the rule of law in the United Cyprus Republic. The reason for this is that, in 
European constitutional law, decisions of the executive and legislative branches 
should be susceptible to review by the judicial branch to ensure against violation of 
fundamental principles of the Constitution such as fundamental rights, separation of 
powers, divisions of competences. However, in the UCR, there would have been a 
fusion of powers between the executive and the judicial branch. Furthermore, given 
the presence of the three foreign judges that could obtain the role of the arbiter 
“inside” the arbiter, one could also question the democratic legitimacy of that body.  
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Finally, Article 2(4) of the Foundation Agreement and Article 37 of the Constitution 
provided for the procedure for constitutional amendments. Apart from Articles 1 and 
2 of the Constitution, which are regarded as basic and thus they cannot be 
amended,161 any constitutional amendment should have been considered and 
adopted by the federal Parliament after consultation with the constituent State 
Governments and interested sectors of society. After their adoption by both 
Chambers of Parliament, proposed amendments should have been submitted to 
referendum for approval by a separate majority of the people in each constituent 
State.  
The complex constitutional structure of the UCR and the larger say enjoyed by the 
Turkish Cypriot community, in comparison to the Cyprus Agreements, were not the 
main reasons that an overwhelming 75.82 per cent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the 
Annan Plan.162 The vast majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan 
because satisfactory international Guarantees for the implementation of the 
Agreement were not provided, the Treaty of Guarantee would have continued 
applying mutatis mutandis in the new state of affairs,163 the withdrawal of the Turkish 
troops was not taking place soon enough, a satisfactory proportion of each refugee’s 
property that would have lied in areas belonging to the other constituent State was 
not provided under the sophisticated restitution scheme,164 Turkey was not 
contributing substantially for the compensation of the refugees’ property and a rather 
small number of “settlers” were leaving.  
Those were some of the reasons to which the then president of the Republic, Tassos 
Papadopoulos, referred in his dramatic speech on 7 April 2004. In this speech, he 
asked the Greek Cypriots to say ‘a resounding NO on 24 April.’165 And they did, while 
at the same time a 64.90 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots declared their willingness 
for the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic. A week later the Republic of 
Cyprus, as envisaged in 1960, was becoming an EU Member State despite the fact 
that its Government cannot exercise effective control over the whole island. 
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7.  CYPRUS’S ACCESSION TO THE EU 
7.1 The Suspension of the acquis 
On 16 April 2003 in Athens, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Tassos 
Papadopoulos, signed the Treaty of Accession of the Republic to the European 
Union. Cyprus became an EU Member State on 1 May 2004, a week after the Greek 
Cypriots massively rejected the UN Plan for The Comprehensive Settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, on terms provided inter alia in Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act 
of Accession 2003. 
The unprecedented (for an EU Member-State) situation of not controlling part of its 
territory is acknowledged in Protocol No 10. Given that it was signed at a period 
when there was huge optimism about the reunification of the island, the EU Member 
States and the acceding States reaffirm their commitment to a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem, consistent with relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions166 and their strong support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General in 
the preamble of Protocol No 10. However, since such a comprehensive settlement 
had not yet been reached, they considered that it was necessary not only to provide 
for the suspension of the application of the acquis in the “Areas”, a suspension which 
shall be lifted in the event of a solution, but also for the terms under which the 
relevant provisions of EU law will apply to the line between the “Areas” and both the 
Government Controlled Areas and the UK Eastern Sovereign Base Area. 
Thus, Article 1(1) of the Protocol provides that the application of the acquis is 
suspended in those “Areas”. The main scope of Article 1 is to limit the responsibilities 
and liability of Cyprus as a Member State under EU law. Although Cyprus joined the 
Union with its entire territory, its Government cannot guarantee effective 
implementation of the EU law in the North.167 In fact, according to international 
courts,168 Turkey exercises effective control in those areas. Interestingly enough, 
Tomuschat has argued in favour of a tacit suspension of the acquis.169 Given that 
under such a legal arrangement, the status quo could have been challenged in front 
of the Court of Justice, a more legally certain solution, i.e. the explicit suspension of 
                                                 
166
 For a detailed list of the UN Security Council Resolutions about the Cyprus question see in 
general http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/UNSecurityCouncilList 
167
 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams 
(delivered on 18 December 2008), at paras 40-41. 
168
 See inter alia Eur. Court H.R., Case Cyprus v. Turkey (Application No 25781/94) 
(judgment 10 may 2001) at para 77. 
169
 Tomuschat, op. cit., supra note 118, at 685. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE SUSPENSION 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
63 
the acquis in northern Cyprus was rightly chosen in order to deal with the initial 
impossibility of performance on the Cypriot side.170 
Moreover, although the term acquis is neither a terminus technicus nor is it defined 
by Union legislation, one should note that it has been defined by the Commission in 
texts adopted during the course of, or at the end of, each enlargement process.171 
For example, in a common declaration on the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), annexed to the Act on the conditions of accession of Austria, Sweden, 
Finland and Norway, the Union has noted the confirmation by these States ‘of their 
full acceptance of the rights and obligations attaching to the Union and its institutional 
framework, known as the acquis communautaire, as it applies to present Member 
States. This includes in particular the content, principles and political objectives of 
the Treaties, including those of the Treaty on European Union.’172 More recently, in 
its opinion on the accession of Cyprus and the other nine then candidate States to 
the EU, the Union has stressed that the then applicant States have accepted, without 
reserve, ‘the Treaty on European Union and all its objectives, all decisions taken 
since the entry into force of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and 
the Treaty on European Union and the options taken in respect of the development 
and strengthening of those Communities and of the Union.’173 More importantly, 
however, it should be noted that the scope of the suspension is territorial. This 
means that the citizens of the bi-communal Cyprus Republic residing in the northern 
part of the island should be able to enjoy, as far as possible, the rights attached to 
Union citizenship that are not linked to the territory as such.174 This indirect partial 
application of the acquis is the subject of the following CHAPTER. 
Moreover, as rightly pointed out by Advocate General Kokott, according to Article 
1(1) of Protocol No 10, the acquis ‘is to be suspended in that area and not in relation 
to that area.’175 This reading of the provision which is in accordance with the settled 
case-law176 of the Court of Justice, according to which ‘provisions in an Act of 
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Accession which permit exceptions to or derogations from rules laid down by the 
Treaty must be interpreted restrictively with reference to the Treaty provisions in 
question and must be limited to what is absolutely necessary’,177 clearly sets a limit to 
the suspension. In practical terms, as shall be shown to a greater extent later, it 
means inter alia that judgments of courts that are situated in the Government 
Controlled Areas, with a reference area the northern part of the island, could be 
enforceable in any other Member State. Overall, it has been argued that the 
suspension should be understood as limiting ‘any unrealisable obligations for the 
Republic of Cyprus in relation to Northern Cyprus which bring it into conflict with 
Community law.’178 
The second paragraph of Article 1 provides that the Council, acting unanimously on 
the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the withdrawal of the 
suspension. Nothing in this provision prevents the partial withdrawal of the 
suspension of the acquis. It should also be noted that, according to the preamble, a 
“comprehensive settlement”, to which the first two recitals refer, is not a prerequisite 
for the withdrawal of the suspension. A “solution” to the Cyprus problem is deemed 
enough.179 
Until the withdrawal of the suspension takes place, Article 2 allows the Council, 
acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, to define the 
terms under which the provisions of EU law shall apply to the “Green Line”.180 This 
provision, together with Article 6 of Protocol No 3 of the Act of Accession, provided 
the legal basis for the adoption of the Green Line Regulation, which consists of the 
main legislative device for the partial application of the acquis in the northern part of 
the island.  
The Commission, however, has pointed out that it was not the intention of the 
drafters of Protocol No 10 ‘to exclude the application of all provisions of Community 
law with a bearing on areas under the control of the Turkish Cypriot community.’181 
To that effect, Article 3 allows measures with a view to promoting the economic 
development of those areas and provides that such measures shall not affect the 
application of the acquis in any other part of the Republic. The existence of such a 
provision clarifies that the division of the island should not rule out the economic 
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assistance from the Union to those areas. Indeed, on 27 February 2006, the Council 
unanimously adopted Regulation 389/2006 which establishes an instrument for 
encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.182 
Although the legal basis for this Regulation was Article 308 EC, in the preamble there 
is also a reference to Article 3 of Protocol No 10. 
Finally, in the event of a settlement, the Protocol provides for the Council to decide 
unanimously on adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus with 
regard to the Turkish Cypriot community. Article 4 clearly depicts the willingness of 
the Union to accommodate the terms of a solution of the Cyprus issue in the Union 
legal order.183 Indeed, if the April 2004 referenda had approved the new state of 
affairs envisaged in the Annan Plan, the Council of the European Union, having 
regard to that Article, would have unanimously adopted the Draft Act of Adaptation of 
the Terms of Accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union, 
Appendix D of the Annan Plan, as a Regulation,.  
It has been rightly suggested that such an enabling clause provides for a simplified 
procedure for the amendment of the Act of Accession. Therefore, the relevant 
Council acts, adopted on the basis of Article 4 and accommodating the terms of a 
future comprehensive settlement, would consist of primary law.184 In other words, any 
derogations from Union law that would have been provided for by the Annan Plan or 
equally, any derogations that a future settlement plan could entail, could be 
accommodated in the Union legal order, as part of the primary law, by the adoption 
of relevant legislation under Article 4. 
 
7.2 A unique case? 
Despite the obvious historical and political connotations that the suspension of the 
acquis in northern Cyprus carries, one has to note that it is not the only 
territorial/geographical exception to the application of EU law. Most recently, the UK 
and Poland negotiated and achieved the signing of a Protocol, annexed to the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which contains certain derogations from the application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.185 In addition to those derogations that apply to the whole 
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territory of a Member State, for the purposes of the present research, it should be 
noted that, in many Member States, there are special territories which for either 
historical, geographical or political reasons have differing relationships with their 
national Governments — and consequently also the European Union — than the rest 
of the Member State's territory. Many of these special territories do not participate in 
all or any EU policy areas and programs. Some have no official relationship with the 
EU while others participate in EU programs in line with the provisions of European 
Union directives, regulations or protocols attached to the European Union treaties, 
and especially the relevant Treaties of Accession.186 
First of all, there are seven regions of EU Member States – the French overseas 
departments (Départements d’outre-mer (DOMs), namely Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
French Guiana and Réunion), the Spanish Canary Islands and the Portuguese 
Azores and Madeira, called the Outermost regions, in which the acquis, generally 
speaking, applies by virtue of Article 299(2) EC. The Council, although ‘taking 
account of the structural social and economic situation’ of these reggions and ‘their 
remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely 
restrain their development’, can adopt, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, ‘specific 
measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of application’ of the EC 
Treaty to those regions, including common policies.187 
In general, however, while in Azores and Madeira, EU law applies fully, there are 
derogations to the application of Union law in the other Outermost regions. Thus, 
both the Canary Islands and the French Overseas Territories are outside the 
European Union Value Added Tax Area.188 Moreover, with regard to the latter, whose 
                                                                                                                                           
Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far 
as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.’  
186
 For a comprehensive analysis of the application of Union law to Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs) and to Outermost Regions see in general F. Murray, EU & Member State 
Territories, The Special Relationship under Community Law (Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2004). 
187
 Article 299(2) EC. In June 2001 the Council adopted two sets of Regulations based on the 
priorities identified in the Commission Report on the measures to implement Art. 299(2) EC: 
the Outermost regions of the European Union, COM(2000) 147, 14 March 2000. The first set 
of Regulations (Council Regulations 1447/2001, 1448/2001, 1449/2001, 1450/2001, 
1451/2001, O.J. 2001 L198/1) aimed to take fuller account of the specific nature of the 
outermost regions, under the Structural Funds, as defined in Art. 299(2) EC, while the second 
set (Council Regulations 1452/2001, 1453/2001, 1454/2001, 2001 O.J. L198/11) aimed to 
amend the CAP in order to take greater account of the specific local conditions of the region. 
188
 Article 6 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system 
of value added tax, 2006 O.J. L347/1. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE SUSPENSION 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
67 
status within the EU has been clarified by the Court of Justice in the Hansen 
judgment,189 the Schengen acquis also does not apply.  
Secondly, there are twenty Overseas countries and territories (OCTs), which are 
listed in Annex II of the EC Treaty. Each one of them has a special relationship with 
one of the Member States of the Union: twelve with the UK,190 six with France,191 two 
with the Netherlands192 and one with Denmark.193 Part Four of the EC Treaty governs 
their relationship with the EU. They were invited to form association agreements with 
the EU194 and may opt-in to EU provisions on the freedom of movement for 
workers195 and freedom of establishment.196 They are not subject to the EU's 
common external tariff197 but may claim customs duties on goods imported from the 
EU on a non-discriminatory basis.198 They are not part of the EU and EU law applies 
to them only insofar as is necessary to implement the association agreements.199 
With regard to the EU citizenship status of the inhabitants of those areas, it suffices 
to mention the following. By virtue of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, all the 
British Overseas Territories citizens became British citizens and thus Union 
citizens.200 The same is true for the natives of the French OCTs. Interestingly 
enough, Greenlanders are also Union citizens although they voted for Greenland to 
leave the then EEC in the 1982 referendum. With regard to the citizens of the Dutch 
OCTs, until a recent ECJ decision,201 they were considered EU citizens but they 
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could not exercise the relevant voting rights attached to the ‘fundamental status of 
nationals of Member States.’202 
Apart from the Outermost regions and the OCTs, there are some other territories that 
enjoy ad hoc arrangements in their relationship with the EU. In most of those cases, 
their status is governed by protocols attached to their respective countries’ accession 
treaties. The rest owe their status to European Union legislative provisions which 
exclude the territories from the application of the legislation concerned.  
More analytically, according to Article 299(4) EC, the Treaty applies to ‘the European 
territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible.’ In practice, 
Gibraltar is the only territory covered by this clause. Gibraltar, a British overseas 
territory, is part of the EU, having joined the European Economic Community with the 
UK in 1973. By virtue of Article 28 of the UK Accession Treaty, Gibraltar is outside 
the Customs Union and VAT Area and is excluded from the Common Agricultural 
Policy. With regard to the Union citizenship status of the Gibraltarians, it has to be 
noted that it was only in the aftermath of the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the famous case Matthews v. United Kingdom203 that the 
Gibraltarians could exercise their right to vote for the European Parliament elections, 
despite being British nationals for the purposes of Community law since 1972.204 
Furthermore, in accordance with Protocol No 2 of the Finnish Act of Accession 1994, 
the EC Treaty applies in the Åland Islands, a group of Swedish-speaking Finnish 
islands off the Swedish coast.205 There, derogations to the free movement of people 
and services, the right of establishment and the purchase or holding of real estate 
are provided.206 Moreover, those islands are outside the VAT area.207 The EC Treaty 
also applies to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man but to the extent necessary 
‘to ensure implementation of the ‘arrangements for those islands set out’ in Protocol 
No 3 of the Act of Accession 1972.208 This effectively means that they are part of the 
Union only for the purposes of customs and the free movement of goods and in 
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relation to some aspects of the CAP.209 In contrast to the formerly mentioned areas, 
the EC Treaty does not apply in the Faeroe Islands pursuant to Article 299(6)(a). 
They have, however, the status of a third country enjoying preferential treatment with 
respect to the Union. Such a status is regulated by two basic agreements one 
concerning fisheries210 and the other trade.211 
Finally, in the sake of completeness, there has to be reference to the special status 
of the German enclave town of Büsingen am Hochrhein and the Italian enclaves of 
Campione d'Italia and Livigno which are all fully surrounded by Switzerland and the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast. All those enclaves 
and the German island of Heligoland, despite their different locations, are excluded 
from the Customs Union212 and the VAT area.213  
This brief study shows, in the most emphatic way, that the application of the acquis 
has been influenced on many occasions by certain historical, political even 
geographical purposes. Of course, the differences with the partial application in 
northern Cyprus should be highlighted. On none of those aforementioned occasions, 
was the suspension a consequence of a military invasion. The Governments in most 
of the previously mentioned cases negotiated and achieved such derogations in 
order to facilitate the lives and respect the sensitivities of the respective populations. 
On the other hand, the suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus is dictated by the 
post-1974 status quo and the failure to achieve a comprehensive settlement and it is 
not the expression of the will of either community on the island. 
Given that the suspension of the acquis in the areas not under the effective control of 
the Republic is the result of such a political anomaly, probably, the closest precedent 
to it is the German experience prior to the reunification of the country.214 However, 
one should not try to draw too many analogies, even with that interesting case. The 
main reason is that despite the fact that the western Allies recognised the 
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Government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the sole legitimate Government 
of Germany as a whole, it never acted with legal effect for the territory of the German 
Democratic Republic. More significantly for this research, the relationship of the DDR 
with the Community was clarified in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-
14/74.215 In that decision, the Court held that the relevant rules exonerating West 
Germany from applying the rules of EEC law to German Internal Trade ‘does not 
have the result of making the German Democratic Republic part of the Community, 
but only that a special system applies to it as a territory which is not part of the 
Community.’216 Cyprus, on the other hand, has joined the Union as a whole and its 
Government acts for the island as a whole. The acquis, however, is suspended in the 
areas North of the Green Line until a solution to the Cyprus issue is achieved. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
Once the humorist George Mikes said, ‘the Cypriots know that they cannot become a 
world power, but they have succeeded in becoming a world nuisance, which is 
almost as good.’ Despite his exaggerating manner, Mikes manages to depict in this 
phrase not only the turbulent Cypriot history but also the important implications of the 
conflict for the rest of the world, including the European Union. In a way, the lacuna 
in the Union legal order, created by the suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus, 
is a “nuisance” for the legal and political life of the EU. That is the reason, as shall be 
observed in the following two CHAPTERS, that the Union has tried to create a 
framework for the partial application of the EU law in the areas not under the 
effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, athough 
the main scope of the present research is to provide an analytical framework of those 
derogations to the suspension of the acquis, the two following CHAPTERS will also 
consist of an assessment of the pragmatic approach that the Union has adopted 
when dealing with issues arising from the conflict. In other words, the seemingly 
depoliticised, overly technical approach of the Union to this international political 
problem, that affects the political lives of two Member States and a candidate State, 
will be examined. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE 
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
‘Without consideration, without pity, without shame 
they have built great and high walls around me. 
And now I sit here and despair. 
I think of nothing else: this fate gnaws at my mind; 
for I had many things to do outside. 
Ah why did I not pay attention when they were building the walls. 
But I never heard any noise or sound of builders. 
Imperceptibly they shut me from the outside world.’ 
The Walls, Konstantinos Kavafis (1896) 
 
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The “Big-Bang” enlargement of 2004 allowed the citizens of Lithuania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Malta to become European Union citizens and consequently to enjoy the rights 
attached to the Union citizenship concept. The situation, however, with regard to the 
citizens of the bi-communal Cyprus Republic is somewhat different due to the 
suspension of the application of the acquis in northern Cyprus pursuant to Article 
1(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003.1  
The non-application of EU law in the areas not under the effective control of the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the two competing claims of legitimate 
rule on the island constrain not only the access of the residents of northern Cyprus to 
the Union citizenship status but also the exercise of the relevant rights associated 
with the ‘fundamental status of nationals of Member States’2 by all Union citizens in 
those “Areas”. In addition, the examination of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights proves that northern Cyprus is a unique case within the Union legal 
order. The reason is that although the area North of the Green Line is part of the 
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Republic and thus of the EU, the protection of the fundamental rights of the Union 
citizens in that area falls within the jurisdiction of a candidate State and not of the 
legitimate Government of the Member State. This is a result of the continued 
presence of Turkey on the island in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion. Moreover, 
apart from the territorial character of the suspension which allows, in principle, the 
Cypriots residing in the northern part of the island to enjoy, as far as possible, the 
rights attached to Union citizenship that are not linked to the territory as such, the 
Union has provided for a legal framework for the further facilitation of the free 
movement rights in northern Cyprus. The Green Line Regulation provides for the 
partial application of the free movement of persons acquis in an area that was 
virtually isolated from the rest of the world until April 2003. 
Thus, the telos of the present chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it provides for an 
analytical framework of the partial application of the acquis concerning the Union 
citizenship, the fundamental rights and the free movement of persons in the “Areas”. 
More analytically, it examines the rules concerning citizenship of the bi-communal 
Cyprus Republic and thus the access to the Union citizenship status of the residents 
in the North, it reviews the case law of the Strasbourg Court and other European 
courts with regard to the human rights situation North of the Green Line and it 
analyses the exercise of the relevant rights attached to EU citizenship in an area 
where the application of the acquis is suspended. The holistic approach that the 
CHAPTER has adopted when examining the partial application of the acquis, 
concerning persons in northern Cyprus, has been dictated by the fact that the 
ramifications of the de facto division of the island make it almost impossible to 
conduct an analysis that would treat issues arising from the suspension of the acquis 
with regard to fundamental rights and the free movement of persons separately. The 
Orams case, which is discussed in great detail in the course of the present CHAPTER, 
shows how interconnected those issues are.       
On the other hand, the CHAPTER consists of a critique of the pragmatic approach 
adopted by the Union when dealing with issues arising from this political and 
historical Gordian knot. In this particular case, the Union has tried to facilitate the 
exercise of the free movement rights of Union citizens and people legally residing in 
the North in an area that has been isolated from the rest of the world for 30 years. 
However, it has done so in a seemingly technical, depoliticised way in order to take 
into account the legitimate concern of the only recognised Government on the island 
that any authority in those “Areas” should not be recognised by the EU or its Member 
States.  
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2.  EU CITIZENSHIP 
2.1 The concept of Union citizenship 
Before analysing the rules concerning the access to the Union citizenship status of 
the different categories of residents on the island and especially of the ones in the 
“Areas”, first the relevant concept shall be outlined. The symbolism of the move at 
Maastricht from the European Economic Community to the European Community 
and from Community to Union was also evident in a number of specific EC Treaty 
provisions, such as the introduction of a systematic concept of citizenship of the 
Union through Articles 8 to 8e for the first time. Although, previously, there had been 
no formal concept of Union/Community citizenship, most of the rights and 
characteristics now attached to the concept of Union citizenship were partially 
outlined with the scope of the Rome Treaties and the Single European Act, such as 
the rights of freedom of movement and residence. The Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) initiative took the form of a statement that all nationals of the Member States 
were citizens of the EU, accompanied by a short list of rights which are attached to 
this status i.e. right to free movement and residence (subject to limitations);3 electoral 
rights as far as it concerns the European Parliament and municipal elections;4 
diplomatic and consular protection;5 access to Ombudsman;6 right to petition the 
European Parliament.7 The wording of the Articles relating to citizenship was altered 
to a small extent by the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 18 EC, relating to the right of 
citizens to move and reside within the EU, has also been amended slightly under the 
Treaty of Nice. Finally, both Article I-10 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union reiterate both the 
definition of the EU citizenship and its attached list of rights.8  
                                                 
3
 Article 18 (ex 8a) EC. 
4
 Article 19 (ex 8b) EC. 
5
 Article 20 (ex 8c) EC. 
6
 Article 21 (ex 8d) EC. 
7
 Article 22 (ex 8e) EC. 
8
 For a more detailed account of the relationship between fundamental rights, Community 
rights and EU citizenship rights, see in general C. Hilson, ‘What’s in a right? The relationship 
between Community, Fundamental and Citizenship rights in EU law’, 29(5) European Law 
Review (2004) 636; For a comprehensive study of the electoral rights granted to those who 
do not have the nationality of the State in which they reside, within the EU and its Member 
States see J. Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union, Electoral 
Rights and Restructuring of Political Space (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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Much of the academic commentary at the time of the TEU was critical of the 
inadequacy of the citizenship provisions and also tended to highlight their seemingly 
mere symbolic nature. It has been suggested by B. Wilkinson,9 for example, that the 
European citizen could protest, using the words of Mark Twain, that ‘rumours of his 
or her birth have been greatly exaggerated’ and, as D’ Oliveira suggests, that 
‘[c]itizenship is, in other words, nearly exclusively a symbolic plaything without 
substantive content.’10 Moreover, although citizenship, in general, is regarded as an 
aspirational ideal expressing a deep commitment to public, communal life, which 
describes the citizen’s legal-political status and her/his relations with the polity, the 
Treaty on European Union endorsed the Spanish proposal which had differentiated 
the definition of the concept of citizenship (which was regarded per se as the basis of 
the democratic legitimacy) from the status civitatis, which is defined as a set of rights, 
freedoms and obligations of citizens of the European Union.11 Hence, the notion of 
European demos was not defined accurately by adopting a fully fledged citizenship, 
which would have led, as Weiler12 points out, to the democratic legitimisation of the 
European Union and fundamentally changed the very telos of European integration 
from its unique concept of Community to a more banal notion of nation-building.  
When introducing citizenship at the Maastricht IGC, the Member States  intended the 
introduction of a very instrumental, limited conception of citizenship, as clearly 
depicted by the set of rights attached to the right of citizenship. However, despite this 
clear intention, the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in inter alia Martinez Sala,13 
Grzelczyk, Baumbast,14 and Bidar15 might suggest that nationals of the Member 
States can say, to use Jacobs’ adaptation of the famous words of Cicero and St 
Paul, that ‘civis europaeus sum.’16  
                                                 
9
 B. Wilkinson, ‘Towards European Citizenship? Nationality, discrimination, and free 
movement of workers in the European Union’, 1 European Public Law (1995) 417 at 437. 
10
 J. D’Oliveira, ‘European Citizenship – Pie in the Sky’, in A. Rosas, & E. Antola, (eds.), A 
Citizen’s Europe: in search of a new order (Sage, 1995), 82. 
11
 C. Closa, ‘The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union’ 29 Common 
Market Law Review (1992) 1137 at 1160. 
12
 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘To be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilisation’ in J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 324 at 337. 
13
 Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
14
 Case C-413/99, Baumbast, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR 
I-7091. See also, M. Dougan, ‘The Constitutional Dimension to the Case law on Union 
Citizenship’ 31(5) European Law Review (2006) 613. 
15
 Case C-209/03, The Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of 
Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119.  
16
 H. Toner, ‘Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship – Transformation or 
Consolidation’ 7 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2000) 158 at 159. 
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In Martinez Sala, the Court held that Ms. Martinez Sala, a Spanish national lawfully 
residing in the territory of Germany, came within the scope ratione personae of the 
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship. According to this judgment, the status of a Union 
citizen is linked with the right laid down in Article 12 EC not to suffer discrimination on 
grounds of nationality within the scope of application ratione materiae of the Treaty. 
Thus, the practice of the German State, to require nationals of other Member States, 
authorised to reside in its territory, to produce a formal residence permit issued by 
the national authorities in order to receive a child-raising allowance, was held to be 
discriminatory and, as such, precluded by EC law17 since German nationals are only 
required to be permanently or ordinarily resident in that Member State 
In Grzelczyk, the Court reaffirmed the finding in Martinez Sala that an EU citizen, 
lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State, can rely on Article 12 of the 
Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae EC law.18 It also 
went one step further declaring that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of Member States, enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of 
their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.’19 This 
finding was reaffirmed in paragraph 82 of Baumbast.  
In view of those developments, the Court decided, among other things, to deviate 
from its previous decisions in Lair20 and Brown,21 and to hold in Bidar that the 
situation of an EU citizen, lawfully resident in another member State, ‘falls within the 
scope’ of Article 12 EC ‘for the purposes of obtaining assistance for students.’22 More 
recently, in Morgan the Grand Chamber decided that ‘Articles 17 EC and 18 EC 
preclude […] a condition in accordance with which, in order to obtain an education or 
training grant for studies in a Member State other than that of which the students 
applying for such assistance are nationals, those studies must be a continuation of 
education or training pursued for at least one year in the Member State of origin of 
those students.’23 However, it is not just in cases concerning students that a more 
“generous” interpretation of the Union citizenship provisions can be observed. For 
                                                 
17
 Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala, at paras 60-65. 
18
 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, at para 32. 
19
 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, at para 31. 
20
 Case C-39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161. 
21
 Case C-197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205. 
22
 Case C-209/03, The Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of 
Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119, at para 42. 
23
 Case C-11/06 and Case 12/06 Morgan v. Bezirksregierung Köln and Iris Bucher v Landrat 
des Kreises Düren [2007] ECR I-9161, at para 51. 
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example, in Tas Hagen, the Court held that ‘Article 18(1) EC is to be interpreted as 
precluding legislation of a Member State under which it refuses to grant to one of its 
nationals a benefit for civilian war victims solely on the ground that, at the time at 
which the application was submitted, the person concerned was resident, not in the 
territory of that Member State, but in the territory of another Member State.’24  
In any event, for the purposes of the present research, it has to be noted the fact that 
Union citizenship ‘is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of Member 
States’, linked with the principle of non-discrimination. What remains to be analysed, 
however, is the linkage between the relevant national laws and access to Union 
citizenship status. For the case of Cyprus, the wide discretion that the Member 
States enjoy with regard to the determination of their nationality legislation is critical 
given the existence of two claims of legitimate rule on the island.   
The linkage between Union citizenship and the relevant national laws that regulate 
the nationalities of the Member-States was apparent from the time of the introduction 
of this innovative concept. Article 17(1) EC provides that ‘every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.’25 In addition the special 
“Declaration (no 2) on nationality of a Member State”, which is attached to the 
Maastricht Treaty, clarifies that wherever reference is made in the EC Treaty to 
‘nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the 
nationality of the Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national 
law of the Member State concerned.’  Thus, one could assume that Union citizenship 
appears to be a status that could be acquired only by satisfying the condition 
precedent to being a national of a Member State, thereby excluding those not 
possessing such a nationality, but residing on its territory, from the catalogue of 
rights. This rule is of crucial importance for this research given the presence of an 
important number of Turkish “settlers” residing in northern Cyprus, who could not 
claim the citizenship of the Republic and thus the EU citizenship.26 
Moreover, according to Declaration No 2, the Member States also have the 
discretion to ‘declare, for information, who are not to be considered their nationals for 
Community purposes by way of a declaration lodged with the Presidency and may 
amend any declaration when necessary.’ Hence, according to this declaration, it 
could be argued that in matters of nationality the autonomy of the Member States is 
                                                 
24
 Case  C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen, R.A. Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en 
Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, at para 40.  
25
 Article 20(1) TFEU reiterates this provision. 
26
 See infra 2.2 Access to Union Citizenship. 
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so extensive that they have the possibility to issue an additional declaration ‘for 
information’ regarding the persons who already possess their nationality, extending 
or reducing the ratione personae of their legislation.  
Two Member States have issued special declarations on the issue of who should be 
regarded as their nationals for Community purposes. Germany, as far back as 1957, 
was the first Member State to issue such a declaration. This declaration included, for 
Community purposes, not only Germans within the meaning of the German 
Nationality Act,27 which already included all nationals of the Democratic Republic of 
Germany, but also Germans within the meaning of Article 116 of the German 
Constitution, including ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe if they had entered 
Germany as refugees.28 Apart from Germany, the UK at the occasion of its accession 
to the Union, issued a special declaration29 defining who is British for Community 
purposes. That declaration was replaced by another in 198130 because the rules on 
British nationality had been altered by the British Nationality Act 1981. Because of 
those declarations, some categories of British nationals, in particular most “British 
Dependent Territories Citizens”,31 “British Overseas Citizens”, “British Subjects 
without Citizenship” and “British Protected Persons” are excluded from EU 
citizenship. The validity of the exclusion of certain British nationals from EU 
citizenship was unsuccessfully challenged in the Kaur case,32 analysed below. 
The aforementioned full autonomy of the Member States in matters of nationality was 
somewhat challenged and limited by the decision of the Court of Justice in 
Micheletti.33 In that case, despite the fact that the Court confirmed that the 
determination of nationality for Community purposes rested within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States, it held that they had to exercise it with due regard 
to the requirements of Community law. In that case, the Court decided that 
                                                 
27
 Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz 1913, with amendments. 
28
 See Treaties establishing the European Communities, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities 1978, 573. This declaration, since 1 January 2000 is not of practical 
relevance. According to Article 7 of the German Nationality Act, as amended by Act of 15 July 
1999, anyone recognised as a German within the meaning of Article 116 German Constitution 
simultaneously acquires German nationality ex lege. 
29
 O.J. 1972, L 73/196. 
30
 O.J. 1983, C 23/1. 
31
 By virtue of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, the “British Dependent Territories 
Citizens” were renamed “British Overseas Territories Citizens” and they became British 
citizens and thus EU citizens, with the exception of those who became British Overseas 
Territories Citizens by virtue of a connection with the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia.  
32
 Case C-192/99, Kaur, ECR [2001] I-1237. 
33
 Case C-369/90, Mario Vincente Micheletti and others v. Delegacion del Gobierno en 
Cantabria, ECR [1992] I-4258. 
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Community law on the freedom of establishment precluded Spain from denying an 
Italian national, who also possessed the Argentinean nationality entitlement to that 
freedom on the ground that the Spanish law deemed him to be third country national. 
The overall significance of the case lies in the fact that, without equivocation, the 
Court of Justice upheld one of the primary tenets of international law, that Member 
States themselves are omnipotent as far as determination of nationality is concerned. 
Even though such a competence had to be exercised ‘having due regard to 
Community law.’34 
The findings of the Court in Micheletti, were upheld in Kaur35 and Zhu and Chen.36  
As far as Kaur is concerned, a British Overseas Citizen of Indian extraction argued 
that the 1981 British declaration deprived her of EU citizenship. The Court, having 
observed that the British declaration was in conformity with the special Declaration 
attached to the Maastricht Treaty, concluded that she was not deprived of EU 
citizenship because she had never been an EU citizen according to the British 
declaration. With regard to this case, the Court of Justice reiterated that it is for each 
Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for 
the loss and acquisition of nationality. This, however, does not mean that a Member 
State may restrict the effects of another Member State granting its nationality by 
imposing an additional condition for the recognition of that nationality with respect to 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty. Hence, the UK 
Government had no right to deny Zhu her fundamental right of free movement even 
though she acquired her Member State nationality in order to secure a right of 
residence for her mother, Chen, a third-country national. 
Thus, in short, insofar as the determination of nationality is concerned, it seems that 
the Court of Justice has done very little to reduce the monopoly powers of the 
Member States, thereby perpetuating the iniquities which exist across the entire EU 
in respect of acquiring citizenship. However, the ECJ judgments in the Gibraltar37 and 
Aruba38 cases, which were decided the same day, might suggest a slightly different 
outcome since the Court in those cases discussed the Micheletti criterion concerning 
the ‘due regard to the requirements of Community law.’ 
                                                 
34
 Case C-369/90, Micheletti, at para 10. 
35
 Case C-192/99, Kaur, at paras 19 and 20. 
36
 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, at para 37. 
37
 Case C-145/04 Spain v. U.K. [2006] ECR I-7917. 
38
 Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den 
Haag [2006] ECR I-8055. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
79 
In the Gibraltar case, which is the ECJ sequel of Matthews v. the United Kingdom,39  
the Court of Justice reaffirmed that the Union citizenship ‘is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States,’ enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of 
their nationality. Such a statement, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
rights recognised by the Treaty are limited to EU citizens.40 In other words, although 
Union citizens are the necessary vestees of the right to vote in the EP elections, it 
does not mean that they are the only one. According to paragraph 78 of the Gibraltar 
judgment, in the current state of EC law the definition of persons entitled to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in the European Parliament elections falls within the 
competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law. 
Consequently, the Member States are not precluded from granting that right to vote 
and to stand as a candidate to certain persons, other than their own nationals or EU 
citizens resident in their territory, who have close links to that Member State. 
Advocate General Tizzano, opined that the exercise of such power by the Member 
States should take place in compliance with the general principles of the Community 
legal order, such as the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and non-
discrimination.41 By its decision, the Court, in essence, endorsed the submission of 
the Commission that although the Union citizenship concept is fundamental to the 
EU, the same applies to the Union’s commitment to respect the national identities of 
its Member States. 
On the other hand, in the Aruba case, the ECJ held that since according to Article 
17(1) EC ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of 
the Union,’ it is irrelevant whether that Member State national resides or lives in an 
OCT42 and thus s/he may rely on the rights conferred on Union citizens in Part Two 
of the Treaty.43 Moreover, the Court of Justice reiterated that, in the current state of 
EC law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election falls 
within the competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law.44 
More specifically in that particular case, given the special association arrangements 
set out in Part Four of the Treaty, Articles 189 EC and 190 EC do not apply to those 
                                                 
39
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Matthews v. United Kingdom (Merits) (Application No 24833/94) 
(judgment 18 February 1999). 
40
 Case C-145/04 Spain v. U.K., at para 74. 
41
 Case C-145/04 Spain v. U.K.; Case C-300/04 Aruba at para 103 of the AG Tizzano’s 
Opinion. 
42
 Case C-300/04, Aruba at para 27. 
43
 Ibid. at para 29. 
44
 Ibid. at para 45. 
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countries and territories and thus the Member States are not required to hold 
elections for the European Parliament there.45 The Court of Justice further noted that 
even the criterion linked to residence does not appear, in principle, to be 
inappropriate to determine who has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
the European Parliament elections, given the case law of the Strasbourg Court on 
Article 3 of Protocol No 1 ECHR and as pointed out by the Advocate General in 
paragraphs 157 and 158 of his Opinion.46 However, the principle of equal treatment 
or non-discrimination linked with the status of EU citizen precludes a Member State 
from granting the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European Parliament 
elections to its nationals residing in Overseas Countries and Territories when, at the 
same time, it grants such right to its nationals residing in a non-member country.47 
It is obvious from the analysis above that the Micheletti judgment is far from 
overruled. According to this judgment, the Member States are omnipotent as far as 
the determination of nationality is concerned, although this competence has to be 
exercised ‘having due regard to Community law’. This competence of the Member 
States is wide enough not to preclude them from granting electoral rights attached to 
the Union citizenship to non-EU citizens since the Union’s commitment to respect the 
national identities of its Member States is fundamental to the EU, as it has been 
clearly stated in the Gibraltar case. It seems, however, that the Court, both in the 
judgment in the Aruba case and in the Opinion of the Advocate General for both 
cases, tries to emphasise and explain the “having due regard to Community law” 
condition, with particular emphasis on the non-discrimination/equal treatment 
principle. 
Thus, it could be argued that, in those two recent cases where the issue was not only 
the delimitation of the status of citizen of the Union but also the way in which the 
rights associated with that status are provided for, it was clearly stated that the 
exercise of such power by the Member States should take place in compliance with 
the general principles of the Community legal order, such as the principles of 
reasonableness, proportionality and mainly non-discrimination.48 If those principles 
are applied in our case, it could be argued that the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus enjoys wide discretion with regard to the determination of the citizenship of its 
State and thus the access to Union citizenship, as long as it exercises such 
                                                 
45
 Ibid. at paras 46 and 47. 
46
 Ibid. at paras 54 and 55. 
47
 Ibid. at para 58. 
48
 Ibid. at paras 39 and 59; para 103 of the AG Tizzano’s Opinion. 
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competence with due regard to Community law and especially to the principle of 
equal treatment. The suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus does not prevent 
the Republic from considering the Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the bi-communal 
State. The principle of equal treatment, however, should be taken into account in any 
regulation/legislation concerning the exercise of the rights associated with such 
status. 
Thus, the main questions that have to be answered in the following parts of the 
chapter are: first, if according to Article 17(1) ‘[e]very person holding the nationality of 
a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’ who, among the inhabitants of the 
“Areas”, are entitled to the nationality of this Member State; and second, how the 
rights attached to Union citizenship and the fundamental rights are exercised in the 
areas not under the effective control of the Government, where the application of the 
acquis is suspended.  
 
2.2 Access to Union Citizenship49  
Article 19850 of the Constitution provides that ‘any matter relating to citizenship shall 
be governed by the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty of Establishment’ until a law 
of citizenship is made incorporating such provisions. In 1967, the Republic of Cyprus 
issued the relevant citizenship law51 which provides for the acquisition and 
renunciation and deprivation of the Cypriot citizenship. According to section 3 of the 
aforementioned law ‘[c]itizens of the Republic shall be the persons who, on the date 
of entry into force of the Law, have either acquired or are entitled to acquire 
                                                 
49
 For a more detailed account of the relevant requirements see N. Skoutaris, ‘Differentiation 
in European Union Citizenship Law: The Cyprus Problem’ in A. Ott, A. and K. Inglis, (eds.), 
The Constitution for Europe and Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? (Europa Law Publishing, 
2005) 160.  
50
 Article 198(1) reads as follows: 
1. The following provisions shall have effect until a law of citizenship is made 
incorporating such provisions –  
(a) any matter relating to citizenship shall be governed by the provisions of Annex D 
to the Treaty of Establishment; 
(b) any person born in Cyprus, on or after the date of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution, shall become on the date of his birth a citizen of the Republic if 
his father on that date of his birth is a citizen of the Republic or would but for his 
death have become such a citizen under the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty 
of Establishment.   
51
 The Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law 1967 as amended by Laws Nos. 43 of 1967, 1 of 
1972, 74 of 1983, 19(1) of 1996, 58(1) of 1996, 70(1) of 1996, 50(1) of 1997, 102(1) of 1998, 
105(1) of 1998, 105(1) of 1998, 65(1) of 1999, 128(1) of 1999.  
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citizenship of the Republic under the provisions of Annex D or who acquire thereafter 
such citizenship under the provisions of this Law.’ 
Section 2 of Annex D52 of the Treaty of Establishment provides the main rule for 
acquiring the citizenship of the Cyprus Republic. According to this Section of Annex 
D any person who, between 1914 and 1943, became a British subject under the 
provisions of the Cyprus (Annexation) orders in Council, or descended in the male 
line from such a person, or was born in the Island of Cyprus on or after 5 November 
1914 and was ordinarily resident on the island of Cyprus at any time in the period of 
five years immediately before 1960 became a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus on 15 
August 1960. Annex D also provided for the right of different categories of people, 
such as spouses of those entitled to the citizenship of the Republic, or those that 
have been naturalised as citizens of the UK and Colonies by the Governor of Cyprus, 
to apply to the appropriate authority in order to be granted the Cypriot citizenship. 53 
More importantly for the purposes of this research, it is noted that, by virtue of 
section 4 of the Citizenship law of 1967, a person acquires citizenship of the 
Republic of Cyprus by birth if one of his/her parents was a citizen at the time of 
her/his birth but also if s/he is married to a citizen of the Republic and the two have 
lived together for at least two years in accordance with section 5(2). On the other 
hand, a citizen may renounce his/her citizenship54 by making a formal declaration. 
It is clear from the provisions of Annex D of the Treaty of Establishment and The 
Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law of 1967 that Cypriots of Greek or Turkish origin 
could claim the nationality of that Member State and thus have access to EU 
citizenship. As far as the situation of the residents of the “Areas” are concerned, the 
Republic of Cyprus continues to recognise, in accordance with the aforementioned 
legal status quo, the citizenship and the right to citizenship of all residents being 
Cypriots of Turkish origin, residing in the North, and which can prove that they come 
under the scope ratione personae of Annex D or the subsequent legislation.55  
Hence, one could argue that the Turkish Cypriots possess EU citizenship in 
“hibernation” which can be activated if they provide proper documentation to the 
relevant authority of the only recognised Government in the island. In practice, the 
                                                 
52
 Annex D of the Treaty of Establishment; available at http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/ 
English/annex_d.html 
53
 Sections 5 and 6 of Annex D. 
54
 Section 7 of The Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law of 1967. 
55
 The Republic of Cyprus has so far had to supply 50,974 of the quarter million inhabitants of 
the North with EU passports. Some 81,805 have applied for and received ID cards. Figures 
as of 18 April 2008 from Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Nicosia.  
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Republic of Cyprus regularly issues passports to Turkish Cypriots upon application. 
This situation is analogous to the one faced by the citizens of the Democratic 
Republic of Germany, who, before the fall of the Berlin wall, were considered to fall 
under the ratione personae of the EEC Treaty.56 
It has to be stressed, however, that it is only through the aforementioned procedure 
that any inhabitants of the “Areas” can successfully claim EU citizenship since the 
breakaway state in the North, that has proclaimed its independence on 15 November 
1983, has not been recognised by any other state except Turkey. As a result, several 
fora have refused to recognise the “TRNC” “nationality”. In Caglar v. Billingham,57 the 
representative of the “TRNC” in London claimed, for revenue purposes, to be a 
“TRNC” citizen in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution of the “TRNC” and 
the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Citizenship Law”58 and thus not a 
Commonwealth citizen. The court held that his possession of the nationality of the 
Republic, under the aforementioned Citizenship law of 1967, would be asserted 
against him for the purposes of determining which regime of income tax assessment 
should be applied. Likewise, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal treated an 
asylum seeker from northern Cyprus as a citizen of the Republic, albeit discounting 
the possibility of an internal flight alternative. It was further noted that ‘Australia along 
with the rest of the world –with the single exception of Turkey– does not recognise 
the existence of the TRNC and I, concurring with this international view, do not 
accept that the TRNC can be regarded as his “country of nationality”. My view is that 
he is and remains a citizen of Cyprus.’59  
Apart from the Turkish Cypriot citizens of the bi-communal Cyprus Republic, there 
are many residents in the “Areas” who fall within the definition of national established 
by Article 67 of the Constitution of the “TRNC” and the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus Citizenship Law” but are excluded from the nationality of the Republic 
because they come under the category of “settlers”. In the northern part of the island, 
Turkey’s Government has, since 1974, implemented a policy of systematic 
                                                 
56
 In 1957,Germany declared that Germans within the meaning of the German Nationality Act 
(Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz 1913,with amendments)-which included all nationals 
of the Democratic Republic of Germany-must be regarded as Germans for European 
Community purposes. 
57
 Caglar v. Billingham (Inspector of Taxes) [1996] STC (SCD) 150. For a more detailed 
account of this case and a discussion of the issue of nationality and unrecognised states see 
in general A. Grossman, ‘Nationality and the Unrecognised State’ 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2001) 849. 
58
 Law of 21 May 1993, Resmi Gazette KKTC No 52, 27 May 1993. 
59
 Case N95/07552, 12 June 1996 Kadiroglu v. Minister of Immigration [1998] 1656 F.C.A. 
(1998). 
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colonisation in order to change the demographic character of those areas, and 
accordingly of the island.60 According to reports confirmed in both the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot press, those “settlers” come from the Turkish mainland and are of 
Turkish citizenship. The regime in the North, while accepting that they have come 
from Anatolia, refer to the Cypriot origin of those “settlers”. Today, according to the 
Republic’s authorities,61 there are about 115,000 “settlers” in the part of Cyprus that 
is North of the Green Line. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot sources refer to a 
number less than 90,000. There is also, of course, the presence of 35,000 Turkish 
occupation troops.62 
It is important to note, for the purposes of the present CHAPTER, that international law 
is clear on the issue of the implantation of settlers63 in occupied territories stating that 
such persons are deemed to be illegal settlers and should be repatriated, taking into 
account humanitarian considerations. The receiving State in the present case, the 
Republic of Cyprus, has no obligation under international law to grant residence or 
nationality to such settlers. Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of 1949 provides that ‘[t]he 
Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies.’ According to article 85 of the first Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions,64 such practices are considered to be grave breaches of the 
Conventions and, as such, war crimes. 
No distinction should be made between those “settlers” who were directly transferred 
or implanted by decision of the Turkish Government, or those who moved there 
voluntarily after 1974. Both settlements are prohibited. The aforementioned Article 
49(6) appears, by its terms, to apply to any transfer of parts of its civilian population, 
whatever the objective and whether involuntary or voluntary, by an occupying power. 
According to Pictet ‘[t]his clause […] is intended to prevent a practice adopted during 
the Second World War by certain Powers which transferred portions of their own 
                                                 
60
 See in general the Cyprus question in www.mfa.gov.cy 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 For a more detailed analysis A. De Zayas, ‘The Annan Plan and the Implantation of Turkish 
Settlers in the Occupied Territory of Cyprus’ The Cyprus Yearbook of International Relations 
(2006) 163. 
64
 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
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population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they 
claimed to colonise those territories.’65  
In numerous Resolutions, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly deplored ‘all 
unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus.’66 Moreover, in 
its Resolution 1987/50 of 11 March 1987, the UN Commission on Human Rights 
expressed concern over ‘the fact that changes in the demographic structure of 
Cyprus are continuing with the influx of great numbers of settlers.’ On the other hand, 
the Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in its Resolution 
No 1987/19 of 2 September 1987 expressed ‘its concern also at the policy and 
practice of the implantation of settlers in the occupied territories of Cyprus which 
constitute a form of colonialism and attempt to change illegally the demographic 
structure of Cyprus.’67 
Turkey’s policy of colonisation is also contrary to the 1960 Treaty of Establishment68 
of the Republic of Cyprus. Annex D to the Treaty governs Cyprus’s citizenship and 
makes it impossible and unlawful for either community to upset the demographic 
balance by bringing in large numbers of ethnic Turks or Greeks and contending that 
they were of Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot descent and therefore entitled to come 
to Cyprus. Section 4(7) imposes quotas regarding the granting of citizenship to 
persons who had emigrated to Greece, Turkey or the British Commonwealth having 
been resident in Cyprus before 1955 or who descended from Ottoman subjects 
resident in Cyprus in 1914.  
The Republic of Cyprus does not consider those alien persons, who have settled 
illegally and without permission in the areas under control of the Turkish forces, as 
legitimate claimants to Cypriot citizenship69 and thus they do not have access to EU 
citizenship via the citizenship laws of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the 
legislation of the Republic, they are considered to be illegal immigrants.70 By not 
                                                 
65
 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, (Geneva, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) 283. 
66
 UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15 (9 November 1978), UN General Assembly 
Resolution 24/30 (20 November 1979), UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253 (13 May 
1983) etc. 
67
 UN General Assembly Resolution 1987/19 (2 September 1987) at para 3. 
68
 Appendix A of the Cyprus Agreements; available at http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/ 
English/appendix_a.html 
69
 See in general U.S. Office of Personnel Management Investigation Service, Citizenship of 
the world, March 2001, page 62; available in http://labs.ucop.edu/internet/security/forms/ 
citizenship.pdf 
70
 See in general Ο Περί Αλλοδαπών και Μεταναστεύσεως (Τροποποιητικός) Νόµος του 2004 
[Aliens and Immigration (Amending) Act 2004)].   
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recognising those persons as lawful claimants of the citizenship of the bi-communal 
Republic, the Cypriot Government acts in conformity with its own Constitution, which 
was part of an international agreement, and within the wide limits of autonomy that 
the Member States enjoy in matters of nationality in accordance with the Micheletti 
principle developed by the ECJ. 
The aforementioned legal framework providing the rules for acquiring Cypriot 
citizenship and thus Union citizenship would have been significantly altered if the 
establishment of the United Cyprus Republic, as envisaged in the Annan Plan, was 
approved by both communities in the two referendums that had taken place on 24 
April 2004. It is important to examine the provisions of the Annan Plan referring to the 
Cypriot citizenship, not only because the provisions of the Constitution attached to 
that unification plan differentiate from the policy adopted by the Republic of Cyprus 
towards the “settlers” but, because it is more than probable that, in any future 
settlement plan, there will be similar provisions on citizenship. To that effect, 
President Christofias has said that he will accept 50,000 “settlers”.71 
According to Article 3 of the Foundation Agreement and Article 12 of the Constitution 
of the United Cyprus Republic (hereafter UCR), there is a single Cypriot citizenship. 
Moreover, all persons holding Cypriot citizenship would have also enjoyed internal 
constituent state citizenship status as provided for by constitutional law. Such status, 
attributed on the basis of the residence at the date the settlement would have come 
into force, would have been complementary to, and would not have replaced, Cypriot 
citizenship.72 It is important to note that no one would have held the internal 
constituent citizenship status of both constituent States. Provisions, which stated that 
the internal constituent state citizenship status was regulated by the Constitutional 
Law on Internal Constituent State Citizenship Status and Constituent State 
Residency Rights,73 were included in the Constitutions of both the constituent Cypriot 
States.74 The constituent State citizenship status, similar to the regime in the Åland 
islands75 and to the EU citizenship, was designed to be connected with the exercise 
of political rights by the UCR citizens as was analysed in the previous CHAPTER. 
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 Christofias interviewed by CNN Turk, referenced in the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Politis, 25 
March 2008; also in press statement, London, 5 June 2008. 
72
 Article 3(2) of the Foundation Agreement and Article 12(2) of the UCR Constitution.  
73
 Constitutional Law on Internal Constituent State Citizenship Status and Constituent State 
Residency Rights. 
74
 Article 8 of the Constitution of the Greek Cypriot State and 73 of the Constitution of the 
Turkish Cypriot State.  
75
 See in general The Åland agreement in the Council of the League of Nations, 1921, 
League of Nations Official Journal, 701, September 1921.  
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However, it was the Federal Law to Provide for the Citizenship of the United Cyprus 
Republic and For Matters Connected Therewith or Incidental Thereto76 that would 
have regulated the Cypriot citizenship and thus access to EU citizenship status for 
the nationals of this State. According to section 3(1), the descendants and spouses 
of any person who held Cypriot citizenship on 31 December 1963,77 would have 
been considered citizens of the United Cyprus Republic upon the relevant date.  It is 
worth noting that, according to the estimations of the Republic of Cyprus, 18,000 
“settlers” have become spouses of Cypriot citizens. 
In addition to the above, persons, whose names78 were on a list handed over to the 
UN Secretary-General by each side, would have been considered citizens of the 
Republic. Each side’s list could include no more than 45,000 persons, including their 
spouses and children. Applicants would have been included on the list according to 
the following criteria and in the following order of priority: (i) persons who enjoyed 
permanent residence on Cyprus for at least seven years before reaching the age of 
18 and for at least one year during the five years immediately preceding the relevant 
date and (ii) other persons who have enjoyed permanent residence on Cyprus for 
more than seven consecutive years based on the length of their stay. The previously 
mentioned provision clearly offered the possibility for 45,000 “settlers” to become EU 
citizens.  
Moreover, Article 7 of the Federal Law gave the possibility to acquire the citizenship 
of the United Cyprus Republic by naturalisation to persons who were of full age and 
capacity, had enjoyed permanent residence in Cyprus for at least nine consecutive 
years immediately before submitting an application, including at least four years after 
the relevant date, had some knowledge of either Greek or Turkish, were not the 
objects of a security measure and had not been sentenced for a criminal act for 
longer than one year. According to the estimations of the Republic, another 17,000 
“settlers” would have been eligible to apply for citizenship under this provision.  
Overall, if the new state of affairs would have been realised, around 80,000 “settlers” 
(45,000 in the list, 18,000 spouses, 17,000 naturalised) could have become citizens 
of the United Cyprus Republic and thus of EU. Also, although in a possible future 
unification of the island the number of citizens may be altered, it is inevitable that 
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 Federal Law to Provide for the Citizenship of the United Cyprus Republic and For Matters 
Connected Therewith or Incidental Thereto.  
77
 This date is connected with the incidents that led to the establishment of the “Green Line” 
during December 1963. 
78
 Section 3(2); See Supra note 76. 
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similar provisions will give the opportunity to a significant number of “settlers” to 
obtain access to EU citizenship, which has been, until now, impossible under the 
formerly mentioned legal status quo of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 
2.3 The exercise of Union citizenship rights  
Since the legal framework concerning the access of the Cypriots residing North of 
the Green Line to Union citizenship has been extensively analysed, it is crucial now 
to examine how the rights attached to the ‘fundamental status’ of the Cypriot 
nationals could be exercised in an area that the application of the acquis is 
suspended. Obviously, the suspension of the acquis means that the Union citizens, 
whether residing in northern Cyprus or not, cannot invoke any rights derived from 
primary or secondary Union law against the regime in the North. Despite this, as 
already mentioned, such a suspension is territorial and thus the Union citizens 
residing in the “Areas” should be able to enjoy, as far as possible, the relevant rights 
that are not linked to the territory as such.79  
Firstly, pursuant to Article 190 EC, the people of each Member State should elect 
their own representatives in the European Parliament. Given that the vast majority of 
Turkish Cypriots do not participate in the constitutional life of the Cyprus Republic 
since 1963 and that the relevant Cypriot Law 72/79 does not provide for any 
separate electoral list for the Turkish Cypriot community in view of the post 1974 
status quo, the impediments for the exercise of such electoral rights become evident.  
Interestingly enough, the political rights of the Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious 
segment attached to the concept of citizenship of the Republic and to Union 
citizenship are effectively protected in the aftermath of the judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Aziz v. Cyprus.80 In that case, the Strasbourg Court found 
that the refusal of the Cypriot Ministry of Interior to enrol the applicant, a Turkish 
Cypriot, on the electoral roll in order to exercise his voting rights in the parliamentary 
elections of 2001, consisted of a breach of the obligations of the Republic as a 
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 M. Uebe, ‘Cyprus in the European Union’ 46 German Yearbook of International Law (2004) 
375; F. Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 207-215; A. De Mestral, ‘The Current Status of the 
Citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Light of the Non-Application of the 
Acquis Communautaire’ in S. Breitenmoser, B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassoli, W. Stoffel, W. and  B. 
W. Pfeifer (eds.), Human rights, democracy and the rule of law : liber amicorum Luzius 
Wildhaber (Nomos, 2007) 1423. 
80
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Aziz v. Cyprus (Application No 69949/01) (judgment 22 June 
2004). 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
89 
Contracting Party to the Convention under Article 3 of Protocol No 1. According to 
that provision, the States should ‘hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature.’ Moreover, such a practice was in breach of 
Article 14 of the Convention that provides that ‘[t]he enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.’  
In the aftermath of this decision, the Turkish Cypriots residing in the South can be 
included in the Greek Cypriot electoral system while Turkish Cypriots residing in 
northern Cyprus can cross the Green Line to vote in the South provided that they 
have registered there. With this decision, the Strasbourg Court not only acted as a 
guard of the bi-communal structure of the Republic but also indirectly enhanced the 
exercise of EU citizenship rights concerning the election of representatives to the 
European Parliament. Obviously, the situation is far from ideal81 given also that if the 
Annan Plan was approved, the whole Turkish Cypriot community would have been 
participating in the electoral process and represented by two European 
Parliamentarians. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that, theoretically speaking, 
all the Turkish-speaking Cypriots could participate in the political life of the Union, 
although the Republic of Cyprus does not have an obligation to hold European 
Parliament elections in an area where the acquis is suspended, if  the rationale of the 
Aruba judgment is applied in this case. 
Recently, it has been suggested that the Union should create ‘forms of political 
representation for Turkish Cypriots which can be implemented without violating the 
suspension’ of the acquis ‘and the EU’s non-recognition policy towards the TRNC, 
while at the same time providing an effective voice to the Turkish Cypriots in EU 
public policy making.’82 More precisely, the introduction of some form of observer 
status for Turkish Cypriot representatives in the European Parliament has been 
recommended.83 In a way, such a development would be following the paradigm of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which has developed 
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 At the elections for the European Parliament on 13 June 2004, approximately 500 Turkish 
Cypriots were registered, out of which 97 actually voted. 
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 M. Brus, M. Akgün, S. Blockmans, S. Tiryaki, T. van den Hoogen, W. Douma, A promise to 
keep: Time to end the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (Tesev Publications, 
2008) at 36. 
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a mechanism to meet the demands of the Turkish Cypriots for access to the political 
debates. In the aftermath of the referendums in April 2004, the level of participation 
of the Turkish Cypriots in the debates and operations of PACE underwent formal 
upgrading. Until 2004, a Turkish Cypriot parliamentarian was only invited to attend 
committee meetings in PACE whenever the situation of Cyprus was to be 
discussed,84 however, with the adoption of Resolution 1376 (2004), PACE decided 
‘to associate more closely elected representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly and its committees, beyond the 
framework of resolution 1113.’85 Thus, the Turkish Cypriot representatives are now 
allowed to give their views on all issues under discussion but they still may not vote. 
In July 2007, however, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament 
rejected such a proposal. As, ‘from a legal point of view, it is not possible for the 
European Parliament to invite observers from the Turkish Cypriot community.’86 
Politically speaking, however, if the two communities agree that a number of Turkish 
Cypriot representatives should enjoy observer status in the European Parliament, it 
would be difficult for the Union institutions to reject such a proposal. For the time 
being, this prospect seems rather improbable.  
On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots can participate in Community programs87 and 
work in the institutions of the Union. With regard to the latter, in the first recruitment 
competition after Cyprus’s Union accession, the European Commission required that 
examinations should be passed in the Greek language.88 Two Turkish Cypriots 
brought an action before the Court of First Instance, arguing that this requirement 
constituted unlawful discrimination against Cypriot citizens whose mother tongue is 
not Greek. By its Order of 5 May 2007, the CFI held that the action was 
inadmissible.89 On 19 October, the Court of Justice upheld the order of the CFI.90 
Undoubtedly, if it was not for the procedural issues, the judgment of the Court would 
have been particularly interesting. It would have been difficult for the Commission to 
justify what seems to be a breach of the equal treatment principle. Given the body of 
case law concerning Union citizenship analysed above, there is a good possibility 
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 Resolution 1113 (1997) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
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 Resolution 1376 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
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 See supra note 82 at 42 citing PE392.496/cpg: Summary of Decisions of the Conference of 
Presidents Meeting on 12.07.2007. 
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 See Commission Decision C(2006)6533 of 15.12.2006; and The European Union 
Scholarship Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community; available at 
http://www.benavrupadaokumakistiyorum.org/ 
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 EPSO/A/1/03. 
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 Case T-455/04 Beyatli and Candan v Commission [2007] [not reported yet]. 
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 Case C-238/07 P Beyatli and Candan v Commission [2007] [not reported yet]. 
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that the Court would have found in favour of the applicants. To that effect, it is not 
meaningless that, in the meantime, new recruitment competitions for Cypriots may 
be passed in any official Community language.  
 
2.4 Remarks 
As it has become obvious from the previous analysis, the Turkish Cypriots residing in 
the North have access to the nationality of the bi-communal Republic in accordance 
with the 1960 Constitution and thus to Union citizenship. However, the limits for the 
exercise of the rights that are associated with the Union citizenship concept are 
extremely narrow in an area where the application of EU law is suspended. What 
should be further examined is how the fundamental rights of Union citizens are 
protected in those areas, given that the Union is founded inter alia on the principle of 
the protection of human rights, and how the exercise of the rights connected with 
Article 18 EC concerning the free movement of persons have been facilitated by the 
Union through the Green Line Regulation, in an area that has been isolated from the 
Rest of the World for 30 years.   
 
3.  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Article 6 EU provides that the Union is founded on the ‘principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law.’91 On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous section of this CHAPTER 
‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States.’ Thus, it is critical to analyse the level of protection of fundamental 
rights in this part of EU territory where the acquis is suspended pursuant to Article 1 
of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. Interestingly enough, the protection 
of fundamental rights of Union citizens in northern Cyprus is not mainly a 
responsibility of the relevant Member State but of a candidate Member State, 
according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This legal 
paradox is a result of the overall control exercised by Turkey over the territory of 
northern Cyprus.  
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Thus, starting from the analysis of the fundamental rights protection in the Union 
legal order, this part of the CHAPTER thoroughly examines the judgments of several 
courts in Europe on cases arising from this political and legal anomaly, with particular 
emphasis on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Its most recent 
judgments may suggest that there is a move towards what can be called 
“normalisation” of the relations with the regime in the North. It further discusses the 
human rights conditionality of Turkey since the Union has declared that the full 
execution of the Strasbourg Court judgments on Turkey’s violations in the “Areas” is 
part of its accession conditionality. It is argued, finally, that it is only in the framework 
of a comprehensive settlement that the fundamental rights protection issue could be 
effectively addressed. For this reason, the assessment of the relevant provisions of 
the Annan Plan is critical. 
 
3.2 Fundamental rights protection in the Union legal order92 
The original EEC Treaty contained no system of fundamental rights protection. In the 
light of that, the Court resisted implying that it and the other EEC institutions were 
responsible for the protection of these fundamental rights. Awareness of the dangers, 
however, of the absence of human rights safeguards in EEC law led to a softening of 
the ECJ case law towards the end of the 1960’s. In Van Eick,93 the ECJ held that the 
disciplinary procedures for the staff of the Community institutions were ‘bound in the 
exercise of [their] powers to observe the fundamental principles of the law of 
procedure.’ In Stauder,94 on the other hand, the Court went a step further to declare 
that in cases where there were two legitimate interpretations of a Community law 
provision, it would adopt the one that did not violate fundamental rights. 
Although the abovementioned cases stressed the consonance between Community 
law and established notions of fundamental rights, they did not grant these rights an 
organic status that would allow them to be used as a basis for steering the actions of 
the EC authorities and as a ground for judicial review. National courts were left to 
judicially review whether EC law was compatible with fundamental rights enshrined in 
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their constitutions and in the European Convention of Human Rights. Also, it was 
precisely this challenge, posed to the supremacy of Community law by the Member 
State jurisdictions which felt that EC legislation was encroaching upon important 
rights protected under national law, which led the Court of Justice to declare that the 
respect of fundamental rights consists of an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law.  
In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case,95 the Administrative Court in Frankfurt 
had found that an EC Regulation violated the provisions of the German Constitution 
which protected freedom of trade and required all public action to be proportionate. 
The said Regulation had awarded a German trading company a licence to export 
maize on condition that it set down a deposit which would be forfeited if it failed to 
export the maize within the time stipulated in the licence. The company failed to 
export the maize and, since the deposit was forfeited, it challenged the Regulation. In 
its judgment, firstly, the Court reaffirmed that the validity of such measures can only 
be judged in the light of Community law. As an independent source of law and 
because of its very nature, Community law cannot be overridden by rules of national 
law without being deprived of its character as and without the legal basis of the 
Community being called in question. More importantly, however, in paragraph four, it 
held that ‘respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected’ by the ECJ. Furthermore, although the protection of those 
liberties is inspired by the various constitutional traditions of the Member States, it 
should nevertheless be ensured within the EC framework.  
In Nold,96 the Court reaffirmed that the source of these general principles was not 
entirely independent of the legal cultures and traditions of the Member States. At the 
same time, it stressed that ‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can 
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law.’ 
Most importantly, in Rutili,97 the Court referred to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Since Rutili, the Court has 
indicated that this treaty has a particular status as a source of law.98 The particular 
status of that treaty within the Union legal order has been recognised expressis 
verbis in Article 6(2) EU which provides that the ‘Union shall respect fundamental 
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rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law.’ More recently, Article 6 EU of the Lisbon 
Treaty not only reiterates the aforementioned provision but goes a step further by 
providing for the accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights. 
It also provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights, approved in December 2000 
in Nice,99 ‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’ when the Lisbon Treaty is 
ratified by all Member States. The explicit reference to the system of the Convention 
of Human Rights in the Treaty on European Union and most recently in the Lisbon 
Treaty is of critical importance for the purposes of the present research since the 
decisions of the Strasbourg Court in cases concerning the Cyprus issue have altered 
the legal and political background of the conflict.  
 
3.3 The right to property and beyond… 
More significantly, for the purposes of the present research, the Luxembourg Court 
has recognised a number of categories of different rights, including civil rights, such 
as the right to respect for family and private life,100 freedom of religion,101 freedom of 
expression,102 the right to an effective remedy103 etc., economic rights such as the 
right to trade,104 the right to carry out the economic activity,105 and the right to own 
property. For the purposes of this research the focus will be on the latter, given the 
significant amount of case law concerning affected property rights of Cypriot citizens.  
The right to own property has been recognised by the ECJ in Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland – Pfulz.106 In that case, the Court had to provide a preliminary ruling on 
whether, among other things, the prohibition on granting authorisations for new 
plantings, according to Article 2(1) of the Council Regulation 1162/76,107 infringed the 
right to property. The Court, in its judgment, first explicitly referred to the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case by reiterating that the question of a possible 
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infringement of fundamental rights by an EC measure could only be judged in the 
light of EC law itself. Furthermore, it reaffirmed that fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the general principles of the EC law and that, in safeguarding those 
rights, the ECJ is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States; and that international treaties for the protection of human rights 
can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of EC law. 
Accordingly, in paragraph 14 of the judgment, it found that ‘the right to property is 
guaranteed in the Community legal order in accordance with the ideas common to 
the constitutions of the Member States, which are also reflected in the First Protocol 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.’  In other words, in 
that judgment, the Court of Justice recognised the right to property enshrined in the 
first Article of the first Protocol of the Convention as a fundamental right within the 
Union legal order. However, it is not only the case law of the Court of Justice that 
recognises the right to property as a fundamental right. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, albeit that it has not yet been put into force, represents the current state of 
Member States’ traditions in the area of fundamental rights. For the purposes of the 
present research, it must be noted that the wording of Article 17 is based on Article 1 
of Protocol No 1 of the ECHR. Thus, the analysis of the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and of several national courts on that Article, becomes 
crucial in cases concerning the Cyprus conflict and for the purposes of the present 
research. 
 
3.3.1 The European Court of Human Rights 
The judgment of the Strasbourg Court in Loizidou v. Turkey was the first important 
decision which significantly altered the status quo ante of the conflict. It was the first 
time that an international court recognised that Turkey has the overall effective 
control of northern Cyprus. In addition to that, given that the Court of Human Rights 
accepted the extraterritorial application of the human rights obligations, it gave the 
opportunity to thousands of Cypriots to claim damages from the Turkish Government 
for their properties that have been affected by the post-1974 situation.  
In that case, the applicant, a Greek Cypriot, had owned a property in the “Areas” 
North of the Green Line and alleged that the Turkish forces had prevented her from 
fully enjoying it. She alleged that Turkey was responsible for continuing violations of 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 and of Article 8 of the ECHR. Hence, pursuant to the 
decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Loizidou 
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v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections)108 which dismissed the preliminary objections of 
the respondent State concerning an alleged abuse of process, the ratione loci of the 
application and the territorial restrictions attached to Turkey’s Article 25 and 26 
declarations, the Strasbourg Court delivered its judgment on the merits of the case 
on 18 December 1996.109 
The Court held, by eleven votes to six, that the Turkish army exercises ‘effective 
overall control over that part of the island’ and that such control entails Turkey’s 
responsibility for the policies and actions of the “TRNC”.110 Hence, the denial of 
access to and the subsequent loss of control of the property was imputable to 
Turkey,111 and thus there had been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No 1.112 
Among other submissions, Turkey relied on Article 159 of the “TRNC” constitution 
which provides inter alia that ‘all immovable properties, buildings and installations’ 
abandoned upon the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on 13 
February 1975 or ‘which were considered by law as abandoned or ownerless’ or 
found within the area of military installations within the boundaries of the “TRNC” on 
15 November 1983 should be the property of the purported state.113 The Court, 
however, held that it could not attribute legal validity, for the purposes of the 
Convention, to an Article of the so-called “TRNC” constitution since ‘the international 
community does not regard the “TRNC” as a state under international law.’114 It 
should be noted, however, that ‘international law recognises the legitimacy of certain 
legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation, for instance as regards the 
registration of births, deaths and marriages, “the effects of which can be ignored only 
to the detriment of the inhabitants of the [t]erritory.”’115 Accordingly, the applicant 
                                                 
108
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Titina Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (Application No 
15318/89) (judgment 23 March 1995). 
109
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Titina Loizidou v. Turkey (Application No 15318/89) (judgment 18 
December 1996). 
110
 Ibid. at para 56. 
111
 Ibid. at para 57. 
112
 Ibid. at para 64. 
113
 Ibid. at para 35. 
114
 Ibid. at para 44. 
115
 Ibid. at para 45. Paragraph 45 relates to what is sometimes called the Namibia exception. 
That is the exception to the principle that the acts, including the laws of a state which lack 
international recognition, are of no effect. This exception may give effect to acts such as the 
registration of births, deaths and marriages, and perhaps other transactions between persons 
in the territory controlled by the unrecognised state. In its Advisory Opinion on the legal 
consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the International Court of Justice 
stated, in paragraph 125, quoted in part by the European Court: ‘In general, the non-
recognition of South Africa's administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the 
people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In particular, 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
97 
cannot be deemed to have lost her property as a result of the aforementioned Article 
of the “TRNC” constitution. She must still be regarded to be the legal owner of the 
land.116 According to the Court, neither the need to rehouse displaced Turkish 
Cypriot refugees in the years following the Turkish intervention in 1974, nor the fact 
that property rights were the subject of intercommunal talks involving both 
communities, ‘could justify the complete negation of the applicant’s property rights in 
the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation 
without compensation.’117 On the other hand, the Court unanimously held that there 
had been no breach of Article 8 because the applicant had not established that the 
property had been her home. 
With a later judgment,118 the Court determined the amount of the pecuniary 
compensation that had to be awarded to the applicant in accordance with Article (ex) 
50 of the ECHR. Initially, Turkey explicitly declared that it had no intention to and 
could see no legal obligation to execute the judgment. It was only in 2003, and after 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had set another deadline, that 
Turkey paid the just satisfaction ordered.119 In any case, the decision in Loizidou, 
apart from its immense importance for the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, 
consisted of a “green light” for thousands of Cypriots120 to claim damages for their 
properties, which either have been illegally expropriated by the de facto regime in the 
North or the access to which has been denied.121  
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At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus filed its fourth inter-State application since 
1974 against Turkey.122 That fourth application concerned four broad categories of 
complaints: alleged violations of the rights of Greek-Cypriot missing persons and 
their relatives; alleged violations of the home and property rights of displaced 
persons; alleged violations of the rights of enclaved Greek Cypriots in northern 
Cyprus; alleged violations of the rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Gypsy community 
in northern Cyprus. Finally, the legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
complained, under former Article 32(4) of the ECHR, that the respondent State had 
failed to put an end to the human rights violations found in the Commission’s 1976 
Report.123  
The Grand Chamber, in its judgment of 10 may 2001, followed the Loizidou decision 
to hold unanimously that it had jurisdiction to examine the preliminary issues raised 
in the proceedings before the Commission.124 Moreover, by sixteen votes to one, it 
held that Cyprus had locus standi to bring the application125 and that the facts fell 
within the “jurisdiction” of Turkey according to the meaning of Article 1 ECHR and 
thus entailed the responsibility of the respondent State under the Convention.126 By 
ten votes to seven, finally, it decided that, for the purposes of the then Article 26 (now 
35(1)) ECHR, the available remedies in the “TRNC” could be regarded as domestic 
remedies of Turkey.127 
With regard to the alleged violations of the rights of Greek-Cypriot missing persons 
and their relatives, the Court decided that the failure of the Turkish authorities to 
conduct an effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of Greek-Cypriot 
missing persons who disappeared in life threatening circumstances,128 considering 
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that there is an arguable claim that they were in Turkish custody at the time of 
disappearance,129 has consisted of a continuing violation of Articles 2 and 5. In 
addition, the Court found that there has been an Article 3 violation in respect of the 
relatives of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons. Those findings have been upheld in 
the very recent judgment of the Strasbourg Court in Varnava and Others v. Turkey.130 
It is important to note that reference to the findings of the Varnava judgment, with 
respect to the missing persons, has been made by the European Parliament 
Resolution of 15 March 2007 on missing persons in Cyprus.131 In that Resolution, the 
Parliament calls on all the parties concerned to cooperate sincerely for the speedy 
completion of the appropriate investigations into the fate of missing persons in 
Cyprus after the 1974 invasion.  It also calls all those who have information regarding 
the missing persons to pass it on to the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus 
without any further delay. More importantly, it asks the Council and the Commission 
to concern themselves actively with this problem and to take all necessary steps, in 
cooperation with the UN Secretary General, to bring about the implementation of the 
aforementioned judgment and the relevant UN and EP resolutions.  
Recently, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has commended the 
progress of the work of the Committee on Missing Persons. By June 2008, of the 
2,000 people that went missing in inter-communal violence after 1963 and mostly 
during the Turkish invasion in 1974, they have discovered 400 bodies and returned 
91 to their families. Further, the Parliamentary Assembly has, called all the parties 
concerned to grant full support to its activities. In this context, the Assembly has 
welcomed the ‘financial contributions to the Committee made by several Council of 
Europe member states, as well as by the European Union and the United States.’132 
More importantly, it has called upon Turkey to ‘co-operate effectively in the efforts to 
ascertain the fate of the missing persons in Cyprus and to fully implement the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey 
(2001) pertaining to the tragic problem of the missing persons and their families and 
abide by and fulfil, without any further delay, its obligations and duties stemming from 
the aforementioned judgment.’133 
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Furthermore, with regard to the alleged violations of the home and property rights of 
displaced persons, the Court followed, in essence, the Loizidou judgment. It found 
that there has been a continuing violation of Article 8 by reason of the refusal to allow 
the return of any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to their homes in northern 
Cyprus.134 In accordance with the judgment, there is also a violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek Cypriot owners of property in northern 
Cyprus are being denied access to and the control, use and enjoyment of their 
property as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights.135 
As far as the alleged violations of the rights of enclaved Greek Cypriots in northern 
Cyprus are concerned, the Court noted, in paragraph 245 of the judgment, that the 
restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of the respective population curtailed 
their ability to observe their religious beliefs, in particular ‘their access to places of 
worship outside their villages and their participation in other aspects of religious life,’ 
and thus consist of a violation of Article 9.136 The Court also found a violation of the 
Article 10 freedom of expression in so far as the school books, destined for use in the 
primary schools of the Greek Cypriot community living in the North, were subject to 
excessive measures of censorship.137 Furthermore, the Court found a violation of the 
right of education under Article 2 of Protocol No 1 since no appropriate secondary 
facilities were available to them.138 In a recent judgment, the Court of Human Rights 
held that the confiscation of educational material that a teacher was transferring to a 
Greek Cypriot enclave in the Karpas peninsula was a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention.139  
Unsurprisingly, the Court also affirmed that there are violations with regard to the 
property rights of the enclaved Greek Cypriots under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 given 
that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was not secured in 
case of their permanent departure from that territory and in case of death, the 
inheritance rights of relatives living in the South were not recognised. In addition, a 
multitude of adverse circumstances, such as restrictions to the freedom of 
movement, the absence of normal means of communication, etc.140 violated the right 
of that population to respect for their private and family life. Such circumstances were 
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the direct result of the official policy conducted by Turkey and its subordinate 
administration.141 Last but not least, the Grand Chamber held that the Greek Cypriots 
living in the Karpas peninsula have been subjected to discrimination amounting to 
degrading treatment.142 Such treatment is in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.  
Finally, with regard to the alleged violations in respect of the rights of Turkish 
Cypriots living in the “Areas”, including members of the gypsy community, the Court 
followed the decision of the Commission and thus it declined jurisdiction to examine 
those aspects of the applicant Government’s complaints under Articles 6, 8, 10 and 
11 of the ECHR, in respect of political opponents to the regime in the North. It also 
declined jurisdiction to examine the complaints under articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 
1, in respect of the Turkish-Cypriot gypsy community, which were held by the 
Commission to be outside the scope of the aspects of the case which were declared 
admissible.143 However, it found that there had been a violation of Article 6 on 
grounds that  the trial of civilians by court was authorised. 
Very recently, following its decision in Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court delivered some 
judgments that discuss human rights issues in northern Cyprus which are not related 
to the property aspect of the conflict. Apart from the Varnava judgment that deals 
with the very sensitive issue of the missing persons and the Foka judgment that 
discusses issues arising from the living conditions of the enclaved Greek Cypriots in 
the Karpas peninsula, both of which have been referred to above, the Court of 
Human Rights delivered two judgments, on 24 September 2008, that deal with 
incidents during the turbulent summer of 1996.  
In Isaak v. Turkey,144 Anastasios (Tassos) Isaak participated in a demonstration 
organised by the Cyprus Motorcycle Federation that took place at several points of 
the Green Line on 11 August 1996. Isaak was part of a group that arrived at 
Dherynia roadblock where they left their motorcycles and proceeded to enter the UN 
buffer zone. ‘The members of UNFICYP who testified about the events of 11 August 
1996 unanimously declared that Anastasios Isaak had been attacked and beaten to 
death by a group of counter-demonstrators and that some members of the “TRNC” 
police had either watched the scene passively or had participated in the beating.’145 
Such an attack on one isolated and unarmed demonstrator ‘could not, in itself, be 
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seen as a measure aimed at quelling the violence generated by the protest’146 and 
thus it was a violation of the right to life that could not be justified by any of the 
exceptions laid down in paragraph 2 of the Article 2 of the Convention. In the same 
case, a violation of Article 2 was also found in respect of the fact that Turkey ‘had 
failed to produce any evidence showing that an investigation had been carried out 
into the circumstances of Anastasios Isaak’s death. Nor had they alleged that, more 
than eleven years after the incident, those responsible for the killing had been 
identified and arraigned before a domestic tribunal.’147  
On 14 August 1996, after attending the funeral of Isaak, Solomos Solomou along 
with some other people, entered the UN buffer zone near the spot of the killing. He 
then crossed the barbed wire at the Turkish ceasefire line and entered the “TRNC” 
territory. He was pursued by an UNFICYP officer, who attempted to pull him back. 
After breaking free from the soldier, Solomos attempted to climb a pole where a 
Turkish flag was flying. Several UNFICYP officers ‘clearly stated that, from different 
positions, two soldiers in Turkish uniform and a man in civilian clothes standing on 
the balcony of the Turkish observation post had aimed their weapons at Solomos 
Solomou and had fired in his direction while he was climbing the flagpole.’148 The 
killing of an unarmed demonstrator, by agents of the respondent Government, when 
he crossed the ceasefire line ‘could hardly be described as a measure aimed at 
calming the violent behaviour of the other demonstrators, who were still in the UN 
buffer zone’.149 As such it was deemed to be a violation of Article 2 of the Convention 
that was not justified by any of the exceptions laid down in paragraph 2 of the said 
Article.150 Moreover, Turkey failed to produce any evidence showing that an 
investigation had been carried out into the circumstances of Solomou’s death.151  
Going back to the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence that deals with the property 
aspect of the Cyprus problem, one could not overstate the significance of the 
Loizidou judgment and the decision of the Court on the fourth inter-State application 
of the Cyprus Republic and the euphoria brought to the Greek Cypriot side. The 
Court, by the aforementioned decisions which have been subsequently upheld in 
                                                 
146
 Ibid. at para 117. 
147
 Ibid. at para 124. 
148
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Solomou and Others v. Turkey (Application No 36832/97) 
(judgment 24 September 2008) at para 71. 
149
 Ibid. at para 78. 
150
 Ibid. at para 79. 
151
 Ibid. at para 83. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
103 
Evgenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd. and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey152 and in 
Demades v. Turkey,153 rejected Turkey’s main arguments. According to those 
arguments, the regime in the North is an independent and separate State 
representing the right of self-determination and sovereignty of Turkish Cypriots in 
northern Cyprus and the property issue is political one that could only be resolved 
through the UN-sponsored inter-communal talks.  Instead, it was reaffirmed that 
Turkey has effective control of the areas to the North of the Green Line and had been 
found liable for a number of human rights violations arising from the post-1974 status 
quo, including expropriation of private properties for which thousands of Greek 
Cypriots could claim damages. 
The legal and political impact of those judgments for the conflict is obvious. 
According even to some very serious analysts, the legal dimension of the political 
problem of Cyprus was very closely to being solved in the aftermath of the 
aforementioned judicial decisions.154 The European Court of Human Rights, as an 
actor in this saga, however, does not act in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is 
influenced by the dynamics of the conflict. Thus, the 1,400 property cases pending 
before the European Court of Human Rights, brought primarily by Greek Cypriots 
against Turkey155 as a result of the Loizidou case law, threaten the Court with 
paralysis. The prospects of political stagnation, in the aftermath of the rejection of the 
Annan Plan, led the Court to alter, somewhat, its previously analysed stance in the 
Xenides-Arestis case and some very recent judgments.  
More analytically, on 30 June 2003, the “Parliament of the TRNC” enacted the “Law 
on Compensation for Immovable Properties Located within the Boundaries of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” which entered into force on the same day.156 
On 30 July 2003, under Article 11 of this “Law”, an “Immovable Property 
Determination Evaluation and Compensation Commission” was established in the 
“TRNC”. On 14 March 2005, however, in its decision as to the admissibility of the 
application of Mrs. Xenides-Arestis,157 the European Court of Human Rights held that 
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the aforementioned commission did not provide for an adequate or effective remedy 
under Article 35(1) of the ECHR. 
The Court had to reach that decision because the compensation offered by “Law no 
49/2003” in respect of the purported deprivation of the applicant's property was 
limited to damages concerning pecuniary loss for immovable property and no 
provision was made for movable property or non-pecuniary damages. More 
importantly, however, the terms of compensation did not allow for the possibility of 
restitution of the property withheld. Furthermore, the Court noted that the “Law” was 
vague as to its temporal application, that is, as to whether it had retrospective effect 
concerning applications filed before its enactment and entry into force, since it merely 
referred to the retrospective assessment of the compensation. In addition to that, the 
composition of the compensation commission raised concerns since, in the light of 
the evidence submitted by the Cypriot Government, the majority of its members were 
living in houses owned or built on property owned by Greek Cypriots. Finally, the 
Court also pointed out that the “Law” did not address the applicant’s complaints with 
regard to Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. 
On 22 December 2005, the Court delivered also its judgment in Xenides-Arestis v 
Turkey.  The Court unsurprisingly followed its decisions in Loizidou, Cyprus v Turkey, 
Evgenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd. and Tynvios and Demades and held that 
there were breaches of Article 8 and of Article 1 of Protocol No 1.158 However, the 
Strasbourg Court continued by referring to the widespread nature of the problem of 
Greek Cypriot property in northern Cyprus and to the fact that the Court had 
approximately 1,400 property cases pending, brought primarily by Greek Cypriots 
against Turkey. So, it held that Turkey should introduce a remedy that genuinely 
secures ‘effective redress for the Convention violations identified in the instant 
judgment in relation to the present applicant as well as in respect of all similar 
applications pending before the Court, in accordance with the principles for the 
protection of the rights laid down in Articles 8 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No 
1 and in line with its admissibility decision of 14 March 2005.’159 The reason for the 
need to provide such a remedy is that a ‘judgment in which the Court finds a breach 
imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation […] to select, […] the general 
and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order 
to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the 
                                                 
158
 Xenides-Arestis judgment, at paras 22 and 32. 
159
 Ibid. at para 39. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
105 
effects.’160 Such a remedy should be available within three months from the date that 
the judgment would be delivered and the redress should occur three months 
thereafter.161 
It is obvious from both the decision of the Court as to the admissibility of Mrs. 
Xenides-Arestis’ application, and its judgment in that case, that Turkey can and shall 
introduce an adequate and effective means for redressing the Greek Cypriot 
applicants’ complaints if it follows the indirect guidelines spelled out in the 
admissibility decision. Indeed, Turkey and the “TRNC” amended the “Law” 
concerning the “Immoveable Property Commission” and consequently the Court of 
Human Rights, in its judgment Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Just satisfaction), 
welcomed the steps taken by Turkey ‘in an effort to provide redress for the violations 
of the applicant’s Convention rights as well in respect of all similar applications 
pending before it.’162 The new “Immovable Property Commission”, which was 
established under “Law no 67/2005”, is composed of five to seven members, two of 
whom are foreign members, Mr Hans-Christian Krüger163 and Mr Daniel Tarschys,164 
and has the competence to decide on the restitution, exchange of properties or 
payment of compensation. There is even a right of appeal against the decision of the 
Commission, which lies with the “TRNC” “High Administrative Court”.165 The Court 
noted that ‘the new compensation and restitution mechanism, in principle, has taken 
care of the requirements of the decision of the Court on admissibility of 14 March 
2005 and the judgment on the merits of 22 December 2005.’166 Furthermore, in two 
judgments issued the same day, the Court of Human Rights reaffirmed its 
aforementioned finding about the “Immoveable Property Commission”167 and 
approved, for the first time, a friendly settlement between Turkey and an applicant 
entailing the payment of damages and exchange of property.168  
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The Strasbourg Court, in all those recent judgments, did not obviously deconstruct its 
own precedent by approving the illegal expropriation of the Greek Cypriot properties 
in northern Cyprus. Such a decision would have undermined the special character of 
the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre public) for the 
protection of individual human beings and its own mission, as set out in Article 19, ‘to 
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
Parties.’169 It would have also seriously questioned the effective protection of the 
fundamental rights of Union citizens in a territory that is part of the EU. Those 
judgments, however, allow Turkey to establish a “Property Commission” and thus 
resolve the property issue, which lies at the core of the Cyprus problem, outside the 
framework of a comprehensive political settlement. In other words, those decisions 
provide for a quasi-transitional legal mechanism for the resolution of the property 
aspect of the Cyprus conflict, even in the case that a comprehensive solution is 
never achieved and the status quo on the island remains in limbo.  
Apart from the obvious paradox entailed in a situation where a candidate State is 
responsible for the protection of the fundamental rights in an area that belongs to a 
Member State, one has to note the political connotations of such a restitution 
mechanism. Such a mechanism, together with a legal framework that would provide 
for direct trade relations, may lead to the “normalisation” of EU relations with the 
authorities in northern Cyprus or the “Taiwan-isation” of the regime in the North. As 
will be explained in the following CHAPTER, there is a danger that such a framework 
may upgrade the status of the Turkish Cypriot entity and thus create impediments to 
the quest for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue.  
On the other hand, the existence of dangers arising from the upgrading of the 
authorities in the North does not mean that the Turkish Cypriot population should 
remain “hostage” because of the failure of all the parties in the conflict to reach a 
solution. Indeed, it is interesting how the Court of Human Rights has allowed for the 
creation of such a restitution mechanism that resembles analogous transitional 
justice arrangements, in order to get around the political stagnation and provide for 
the effective protection of human rights. What should become clear from the analysis 
of the case law is that there is an imperative need for a more democratic procedure 
that would lead to a comprehensive settlement before judgments like the most recent 
ones of the Strasbourg Court lead to a stasis. 
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3.3.2 National Courts 
It is not only the international courts that have been faced with cases arising from the 
Cyprus issue. There is important case law coming from national courts as well. In the 
judgments of the Cypriot and UK courts, it will be observed, on the one hand, that 
they have been influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and, on the other hand, that the legal process can only provide incremental 
solutions to issues of grave political importance, such as the Cyprus conflict.  
In the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish intervention, the urgent need to rehouse 
displaced Greek Cypriot refugees has led the Government of the Republic to use the 
properties of the Turkish Cypriots that have gone to the North.170 Despite this 
established practice of the Cypriot State, in its groundbreaking decision Arif Moustafa 
v. The Ministry of Interior,171 the Supreme Court of Cyprus held that the applicant, a 
Turkish Cypriot citizen of the Republic, has the right to have his property returned to 
him since he has proved that his permanent residence is in the Government 
Controlled Areas. In other words, by that judgment, the Cypriot court overruled a 
well-established policy of the Republic of Cyprus.  In order to hold that decision, it 
based its judgment on the previously analysed judgment of the Strasbourg Court in 
Aziz v. Cyprus.172 
In all the aforementioned cases, the respondent was a State that is party to that 
conflict, namely either Turkey or Cyprus. In all those decisions, the Courts have 
reaffirmed their role as guardians of human rights, the “European public order” and 
even the bi-communal character of the Cypriot Constitution against State practices 
that are in breach of those norms. The situation is quite different when the courts are 
faced with cases where a Union citizen complains about a breach of his property 
rights, not by a state but by another Union citizen. This is the factual background of 
the Orams v. Apostolides173 case, which raises very interesting and important 
questions for the “European public order”174 and the Union legal order and is pending 
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at the moment before the Court of Justice. This case sheds light on the implications 
of the Cyprus conflict for the everyday life of a significant number of European 
citizens. 
In the Orams case, the facts are as follows.  Mr Apostolides, a Greek Cypriot, used 
to live in northern Cyprus, where his family owned land. As a result of the invasion he 
had to flee. In 2002, Mr and Mrs Orams, British citizens, purchased part of the land 
which had come into the ownership of Mr Apostolides from a Turkish Cypriot, who 
was the registered owner under the relevant “TRNC law”. The Orams purchased the 
land for £50,000 and they spent a further £160,000 improving the property. On 
Tuesday, 26 October 2004, Mr. Apostolides issued a specially endorsed writ in the 
District Court of Nicosia naming Mr and Mrs Orams as defendants. On 9 November 
2004, in the Nicosia District Court in Cyprus, Mr. Apostolides obtained a judgment in 
default of appearance according to which the Orams had to demolish the villa, the 
pool and the fencing, had to give Mr Apostolides possession of the land and had to 
pay damages. On 15 November 2004, an application was issued on the behalf of the 
Orams that the judgment should be set aside. Following a hearing, the Nicosia 
District Court held that Mr Apostolides had not lost his right to the land, citing 
Loizidou, and that the conduct of Mr and Mrs Orams towards the property amounted 
to trespass and thus that the application for setting aside the judgment should be 
dismissed. Mr and Mrs Orams appealed against the judgment of 19 April 2005 to the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus which, by its decision on 21 December 2006,175 rejected 
the appeal. In accordance with the procedure laid down in Regulation 44/2001,176 on 
21 October 2005, it was ordered that the judgments be registered and be declared 
enforceable in the UK. The Orams appealed against that order. 
In its decision, the Queen’s Bench division of the High Court of Justice, after referring 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Loizidou, Cyprus v. Turkey 
and Xenides-Arestis, turned to whether under the aforementioned EC Regulation the 
decision of the Cypriot court could be declared enforceable in the UK. The Court, 
first, affirmed that the order was in full accordance with the procedure of the 
Regulation and especially with Article 22(1) which provides that in proceedings which 
have as their object rights in rem in immoveable property, the courts of the Member 
State where the property is situated shall have exclusive jurisdiction. However, it still 
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held that the acquis, and therefore Regulation 44/2001, are of no effect in relation to 
matters which relate to the Areas not under the effective control of the Republic. The 
reason for that is the suspension of the acquis in accordance with Article 1(1) of 
Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003.  
Thus, according to the court, the Regulation is not enforceable pursuant to Article 1. 
As a result of that, Mr. Apostolides cannot rely on it to enforce the judgments, which 
he has obtained. According to the judgment, as Mr. Apostolides ‘could not rely on the 
acquis against his own Government in connection with his human rights arising from 
matters relating to the area controlled by the TRNC, he cannot rely on the acquis 
against’177 the Orams to enforce his judgments against them. The judge also affirmed 
that, according to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, the “TRNC laws” cannot be 
relied on by the appellants to deprive the respondent of his title. He pointed out that, 
in any event, relying on those “laws” would have involved a review of the judgment of 
the Nicosia District Court contrary to Article 36 of the aforementioned Regulation. 
According to the said Article, ‘under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be 
reviewed as to its substance.’ 
The judge points out that, by its answer to the given situation, the conflict, which 
would otherwise arise in cases between the de facto situation in Northern Cyprus 
and the enforcement of judgments against the new “owners” of Greek Cypriot 
property, who have assets elsewhere in the EU, is avoided. However, he also 
suggests that compensation could be obtained at a higher level of litigation according 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Despite those arguments, it 
is my position that the judge has erred in his decision by not applying the Regulation 
properly. Hence, it is quite probable that when the European Court of Justice, to 
which the UK Court of Appeal has referred for a preliminary ruling, delivers its 
judgment, the outcome will be different. 
Firstly, it should be noted that, by its decision, the High Court has failed to apply 
Regulation 44/2001 correctly. According to recital (10) of the Regulation, ‘for the 
purposes of the free movement of judgments, judgments given in a Member State 
bound by this Regulation should be recognised and enforced in another Member 
State bound by this Regulation.’ This is the reason why Article 33(1) provides that ‘a 
judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member State 
without any special procedure being required.’ In addition, Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Regulation provide for the reasons for which a national court of a Member State may 
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not recognise and enforce the judgment of the court of another Member State. 
Despite the fact that, as already mentioned, the judge admitted that the order was in 
full accordance with the procedure laid down by the Regulation, he refused to 
recognise the judgment on grounds not included in the Regulation.  
The High Court has refused to apply the Regulation because, pursuant to Article 1 of 
Protocol No 10, the acquis is suspended in northern Cyprus. Although it is 
undeniable that the Act of Accession provides for the suspension of the acquis North 
of the Green Line, it has to be stressed that the judgment was delivered by a court in 
the Government Controlled Areas, bound by that Regulation, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the issue in accordance with Article 22 of the Regulation. In 
essence, by not recognising the judgment of the Cypriot court on the ground that the 
acquis is suspended in the North, the UK court reviewed the judgment of a national 
court of another Member State in contradiction to Article 36 of the respective 
Regulation. It implied by its judgment that the Cypriot national court did not have 
jurisdiction to decide on proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in 
immoveable property in the North because of the de facto situation that has led to the 
suspension of the acquis. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the result of the ruling of the English court 
was that the violation of Mr. Apostolides’ property rights was not remedied on the 
ground that the acquis is suspended. Given that the EU is founded on, among other 
things, the principle of the protection of human rights and that, pursuant to Article 
6(2) EU, the EU respects ‘fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the’ ECHR, it would 
seem rather absurd to argue that, by Article 1(1) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the 
Act of Accession 2003, a legal obligation not to respect the fundamental rights of the 
EU citizens in those “Areas” has been created for the EU Member States. It is rather 
the case that the purpose of Protocol 10 was to prevent the Republic of Cyprus from 
being found in breach of Community law by reason of matters occurring in northern 
Cyprus and beyond its control. Such an interpretation is also supported by the 
principle of effectiveness of public international law, which is used in order to give 
effect to provisions in accordance with the intentions of the parties178 and rules of 
international law. If the latter interpretation of the suspension of the acquis had 
prevailed, the Regulation would have applied and thus the violation of the applicants’ 
property rights would have been remedied.  
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Even if it could be proved that the intention of the parties was to provide, for practical 
purposes, that the “Areas” should not be the subject of EC law for any purpose, and, 
as such, the application of the Regulation could rightly be denied on the ground of 
the suspension of the acquis, there is an opportunity for the European Court of 
Human Rights to review EU primary law and find it incompatible with the Convention 
as was the case in Matthews v. UK.179 According to the Court’s decision, ‘the 
Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international 
organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”’ and thus, 
Member States’ responsibility […] continues even after such a transfer.’180 It also 
noted that it was the respondent State ‘together with all the other parties to the 
Maastricht Treaty that is responsible ratione materiae under Article 1 of the 
Convention and, in particular, under Article 3 of Protocol No 1, for the consequences 
of that Treaty.’181 This would mean, in this case, that the Republic of Cyprus together 
with all the other Contracting Parties to the Act of Accession could be held 
responsible for those human rights violations that have taken place because of the 
application of Protocol No 10 which provides for the suspension of the acquis in the 
“Areas”.  
However, given that, by its decision, the High Court in essence reviewed the 
judgment of the Nicosia court, it should also be noted that it has failed to comply with 
well established rules of the legal order, established by the European Convention of 
Human Rights, and thus it has erred in its judgment as a matter of legal doctrine as 
well. More precisely, according to paragraph 3 of Resolution 1226 of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,  
‘[t]he principle of solidarity implies that the case-law of the Court forms part of the 
Convention, thus extending the legally binding force of the Convention erga omnes (to all 
the other parties). This means that the states parties not only have to execute the 
judgments of the Court pronounced in cases to which they are party, but also have to 
take into consideration the possible implications which judgments pronounced in other 
cases may have for their own legal system and legal practice.’182  
Applying this view to the facts of the given case, it would mean that the UK High 
Court of Justice should have taken the case law of the Strasbourg Court into serious 
consideration, according to which the property title of Mr. Apostolides is not 
invalidated by the “TRNC laws” and thus the appellants could not present themselves 
as lawful owners of the relevant property.  
                                                 
179
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Matthews v. United Kingdom (Merits) (Application No 24833/94) 
(judgment 18 February 1999). 
180
 Ibid. at para 32. 
181
 Ibid. at para 33. 
182
 Resolution 1226 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.  
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
112 
In other words, by its decision, the UK Court does not respect the “European public 
order”. The purpose of the High Contracting Parties in drafting the Convention was 
‘to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe.’183 That is 
why the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention ‘are essentially of an 
objective character’ - a character which also appears in the machinery provided in 
the Convention for its collective enforcement – ‘being designed rather to protect the 
fundamental rights of individual human beings from infringement by any of the High 
Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High 
Contracting Parties themselves.’184 This notion of “European public order” was 
reaffirmed both in the decision as to the admissibility of the applications of Loizidou 
and Papachrysostomou185 but also in the judgment of the Court as to the merits of 
the Loizidou case.186 In those instances, the Court pointed out ‘the special character 
of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre public) for the 
protection of individual human beings’ and its own mission, as set out in Article 19, 
‘to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
Parties.’ Hence, ruling in contrast with the well established principles of the 
Strasbourg Court case law, as laid down in Loizidou and the subsequent case law, 
the UK court contravenes the principles of the European public order.  
It is my opinion that the Court of Justice will not uphold the findings of the UK Court 
given the previously analysed problems it presents with regard to the effective 
protection of property rights of the Union citizens. In case, however, consensus 
emerges on the lack of enforceability of judgments that protect the property rights of 
Greek Cypriots in the North, there is an imminent danger that the property aspect of 
the Cyprus problem will remain largely unresolved since the rights of the “new 
owners” will be upheld. Decisions like in the Orams case make even more imperative 
the achievement of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue as soon as 
possible. 
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3.3.3 The European Court of Justice 
On 18 December 2008, Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion187 with 
regard to the questions referred by the UK Court of Appeal to the Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling. As shall be explained, the Opinion agrees with a significant part 
of the earlier criticisms towards the judgment of the High Court. First of all, Kokott 
opined about whether ‘the suspension of the application of the acquis 
communautaire in the northern area of Cyprus pursuant to Article 1(1) of Protocol No 
10 precludes the recognition and enforcement under Regulation No 44/2001 of a 
judgment relating to claims to the ownership of land situated in that area.’188 
The Advocate General started by distinguishing the territorial scope of the Regulation 
from the ‘reference area of proceedings or judgments in respect of which the 
regulation lays down provisions.’189 Under Article 299 EC, the territorial scope of the 
Regulation ‘corresponds to the territory of the Member States with the exception of 
certain regions specified in that provision.’190 Therefore, it applies in the UK and, 
subject to Protocol No 10, in the Republic of Cyprus.191 On the other hand, the 
reference area of the Regulation is broader in the sense that it ‘also applies to 
proceedings which include a non-member-country element.’192  
The dispute before the Court of Appeal does not involve the recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment of a court of a Member State in northern Cyprus nor does 
it entail the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a court situated in northern 
Cyprus. It is rather about the application in the UK for the enforcement of a judgment 
of a court situated in the Government Controlled Areas relating to claims to the 
ownership of land situated in the northern part of the island. Therefore, the territorial 
scope of the Regulation does not affect the case.193 Given that the recognition and 
enforcement of such a judgment does not give rise to ‘any unrealisable obligations 
for the Republic of Cyprus in relation to Northern Cyprus which bring it into conflict 
with Community law,’ then the objective of Protocol No 10 does not require the 
suspension of Regulation 44/2001.194 Overall, according to her Opinion, the 
suspension of the application of the acquis in northern Cyprus, ‘provided for in Article 
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1(1) of Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession of 2003, does not preclude a court of 
another Member State from recognising and enforcing, on the basis of Regulation No 
44/2001, a judgment given by a court of the Republic of Cyprus involving elements 
with a bearing on the area not controlled by the Government of that State.’195 
The Commission, however, has expressed doubts as to whether the case is a civil 
and commercial matter within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Regulation.196 
Although it is a dispute between private parties, the Commission sustains that it 
should be placed in the wider context of the Cyprus conflict.197 Therefore, the claim 
should be brought in front of the “TRNC” “Immovable Property Commission”.198 
Accordingly, the Commission submitted that ‘when applying Regulation No 44/2001, 
it should be borne in mind that an alternative legal remedy which would be in accord 
with the ECHR is available. Article 71(1) of the Regulation provides that it is not to 
affect any conventions which, in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or 
the recognition or enforcement of judgments. The compensation regime, introduced 
under the supervision of the European Court of Human Rights, can be construed as 
such a convention.’199 
The Advocate General has rejected this argument on the following grounds. First of 
all, Mr. Apostolides does not make any claim against a Government authority but a 
civil claim for restitution of land and further claims connected with loss of enjoyment 
of land against the Orams.200 ‘Those claims do not alter in nature as a result of the 
possibility that Mr Apostolides may have alternative or additional claims under public 
law outstanding against the TRNC authorities.’201 Secondly, although it would be 
possible to exclude such civil claims by means of a provision of national or 
international law and to confine the parties concerned solely to a claim for restitution 
or compensation against the State, the Republic of Cyprus has clearly not availed of 
that possibility.202 Thirdly, the Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) 
judgment,203 in which the European Court of Human Rights took a positive view of 
the compatibility of the compensation regime with the ECHR, gives no indication that 
the legislation in question validly excludes the prosecution of civil claims under the 
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law of the Republic of Cyprus.204 Finally, the “TRNC”’s compensation scheme and 
the judgments of the Strasbourg Court do not fall within the definition of Article 71(1) 
of the Regulation. 
Moreover, the Orams argued that Article 22(1) of the Regulation, under which in 
proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or 
tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Member State in which the 
property is situated have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, and this must 
be interpreted restrictively to the effect that courts of the Republic should not have 
jurisdiction for actions in connection with rights in land in northern Cyprus.205 The 
Advocate General also refused this argument and reiterated that Article 35(1), in 
conjunction with Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, does not entitle a Member 
State court to refuse the recognition and enforcement of a judgment given by the 
courts of another Member State concerning land, in an area of the latter Member 
State, over which the Government of that Member State does not exercise effective 
control.206 
The third question that the Court of Appeal referred to the ECJ concerns the public 
policy proviso in Article 34(1) of the Regulation. It asked whether the recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment must be refused on the basis of the proviso that a 
judgment cannot be enforced, in practice, in the State where the judgment was given 
since the Government of that State does not exercise effective control over the area 
of that State to which the judgment relates.207 On this point, Kokott noted that a clear 
link has been established between the public policy proviso and fundamental rights in 
the case law of the Court of Justice. More analytically, she referred to Krombach 
where the ECJ concluded that a court of a Member State is entitled to refuse 
recognition of a foreign judgment which was arrived at in manifest breach of 
fundamental rights since fundamental rights, as enunciated in the ECHR, form an 
integral part of the general principles of law.208 Nevertheless, she noted that in 
Orams the Commission did not contend that the judgment, whose enforcement was 
sought, infringes fundamental rights. Instead, in the Commission’s view, the “public 
policy” issue relates to the requirements of international policy regarding the Cyprus 
problem. ‘Those requirements have to a certain extent acquired legally binding status 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams (delivered on 
18 December 2008) at para 68. 
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 Ibid. at para 83. 
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 Ibid. at para 89. 
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 Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935 at paras 25 to 27 and 38 to 40. 
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in so far as they have become established in UN Security Council resolutions. That 
applies, for example, to the obligation on States to refrain from any action which 
might exacerbate the Cyprus conflict.’209  
However, as Advocate General Kokott rightly argued, it is doubtful that the 
preservation of peace and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, 
albethey noble causes, ‘can be regarded as a “rule of law regarded as essential in 
the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as 
being fundamental within that legal order” within the meaning of the Krombach 
case-law.’210 On the other hand, she mentioned that it ‘it is also by no means clear 
whether recognition of the judgment in the present context would be beneficial or 
detrimental to solving the Cyprus problem.’211 Therefore, a ‘court of a Member State 
may not refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgment on the basis of the public 
policy proviso in Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 because the judgment, 
although formally enforceable in the State where it was given, cannot be enforced 
there for factual reasons.’212 
It is true that if the Court of Justice follows the Opinion of the Advocate General, the 
viability of the post-2004 legal status of northern Cyprus will not be questioned since 
the threat that consensus on the lack of enforceability of judgments which protect the 
property rights of Greek Cypriots in the North will not emerge. Nevertheless, a close 
examination of the factual background of the Orams case, the decisions of the UK 
and Cypriot national courts and the opinion of Advocate General Kokott proves, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that it is only in the framework of a comprehensive 
settlement that a stable background will be created in order for the effective 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all EU citizens. The suspension 
of the acquis should be understood rather as a temporary solution. 
 
3.4 Human rights conditionality in Turkey’s Accession negotiations 
As mentioned before, the European Court of Human Rights has found Turkey 
responsible for the acts and omissions of its ‘subordinate local administration’ that 
violate the human rights in the North.  This has led to a paradox, according to which 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams (delivered on 
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a candidate State (Turkey) is responsible for the human rights situation in a territory 
that belongs to a Member State (the Republic of Cyprus). Unsurprisingly, this political 
anomaly is also reflected in the human rights’ conditionality element of Turkey’s 
accession negotiations.  
Human Rights conditionality is a crucial element in Turkey’s accession negotiations. 
Article 49 EU provides that ‘[a]ny European State which respects the principles set 
out in Article 6(1)’, one of which is the respect of human rights, may apply to become 
an EU Member State. This is verified by paragraph 4 of the Negotiating Framework 
for Turkey213 which sets out the method and the guiding principles of the negotiations 
in line with the December 2004 European Council conclusions.214 This paragraph 
provides that ‘[t]he Union expects Turkey to sustain the process of reform and to 
work towards further improvement in the respect of the principle[s] of […] respect of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including relevant European case law.’ The 
fact that ‘[t]he negotiations will be based on Turkey’s own merits and the pace will 
depend on Turkey’s progress in meeting the requirements for membership,’215 one of 
which is the respect of human rights as also echoed in the 2008 Accession 
Partnership216 (AP). There, the Turkish Republic is asked to ‘[c]omply with the ECHR, 
and ensure full execution of the judgments of the ECtHR.’ Although, such a phrase 
does not refer only to the cases arising from the factual background in Cyprus, it is 
beyond any reasonable doubt that it includes them.   
According to the sophisticated mechanism of the accession negotiations,217 the 
Association Council is the responsible institution to control how Turkey is responding 
to those human rights priorities which are linked to the Cyprus issue and have been 
characterised as short term priorities.218 The full execution of the relevant judgments 
of the Strasbourg Court, not only in accordance with the 2008 AP but also with Article 
46 of the ECHR on the binding force and execution of judgments, is the most obvious 
obligation of Turkey with regard to the respect of human rights in the “Areas”.219 This 
is particularly important when taking into account the most recent judgments of the 
Court of Human Rights allowing Turkey to establish a “Property Commission” in the 
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 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm 
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 J.A. Frowein, ‘The Binding Force of ECHR Judgments and its Limits’ in S. Breitenmoser, 
B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassoli, W. Stoffel, and B.W. Pfeifer (eds.), Human rights, democracy and 
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North. One may argue that it will be the first time that it is an obligation of a candidate 
State to establish such an institution for the effective protection of human rights in a 
territory that is part of the EU. Finally, it has to be mentioned that, in case of a failure 
to resolve any matter raised, the Association Council could even refer the issue to 
the ECJ in accordance with Article 25(2) of the Ankara Agreement. 
 
3.5 The protection of human rights in UCR220 
3.5.1 General provisions 
Obviously, one of the great values of any settlement that is even partially based on 
the principles of EU and international law, as it was the case for the Annan Plan, is 
that it may offer a more effective system of protection of EU citizens’ fundamental 
rights than the existing status quo. Recital v of the Annan Plan’s Foundation 
Agreement, which would have established a new state of affairs, underlined the 
commitment of the new State to international law, an integral part of which is human 
rights and the principles and purposes of the UN, one of which is to ‘reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights.’221 Recital vi went a step further by declaring that the 
UCR would have been committed to ‘respecting democratic principles, individual 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as each other’s cultural, religious, 
political, social and linguistic identity.’ This was echoed in Article 4, as well, where it 
was provided that ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be 
enshrined in the Constitution.’  Indeed, in accordance with Article 11(1) of the UCR 
Constitution, the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the ECHR 
and its Additional Protocols and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would 
have been an integral part of the Constitution since, pursuant to Article 4(3), the 
federal and the constituent States would have respected international law, including 
all treaties binding upon UCR, which would have prevailed over any federal or 
constituent state legislation. 
Apart from the quite detailed Catalogue of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which consisted of Attachment 5 to the Foundation Agreement, Article 4 
of the Foundation Agreement and Article 11 of the Constitution provided some 
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special protection of certain populations and rights. Such provisions have been 
mainly dictated by the experiences of the past. More specifically, it was mentioned 
that, in the new unified State, there would have been no discrimination against any 
person on the basis of his/her gender, ethnic or religious identity, or internal 
constituent State citizenship status.222 Moreover, the freedom of movement and of 
residence across the island may have been only limited where expressly provided by 
the Agreement, the Constitution or a constitutional law.223 Furthermore, the rights of 
the religious minorities, the Maronites, Latins and the Armenians, would have been 
safeguarded in accordance with international standards and especially with those 
foreseen under the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities. Such protection would have included the right to administer their own 
cultural, religious and educational affairs and to be represented in the legislature.224 
Finally, it is crucial to mention that the cultural, religious and educational rights of 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, living in specified villages225 in the other 
constituent State, and their right to be represented in the constituent State legislature 
would also have been protected.226  
Detailed bills of rights were also included in the constitutions of the two constituent 
States.227 It is interesting to point out, however, that although the constitutions of the 
two constituent States provided for the protection of the economic and social rights, 
the detailed catalogue of the federal Constitution did not include the latter. This would 
have led to a situation where the human rights of the second generation would have 
been justiciable in the judicial systems of the constituent states but not at federal 
level. Despite this important flaw, one could still argue that the Annan Plan provided 
a legal framework for the satisfactory protection of human rights and fundamental 
liberties. 
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 Articles 4(1) of the Foundation Agreement and 11(2) of the UCR Constitution. 
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 Articles 4(1) of the Foundation Agreement and 11(3) of the UCR Constitution. 
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 Articles 4(3) of the Foundation Agreement and 11(4) of the UCR Constitution. 
225
 According to Article 11(5) of the UCR constitution this covered: ‘Greek Cypriots residing in 
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 Articles 4(2) of the Foundation Agreement and 11(5) of the UCR Constitution. 
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 Part II of the Constitution of the Greek Cypriot State, Articles 10 – 41; Part II of the 
Constitution of the Turkish Cypriot State, Articles 10 – 73. 
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3.5.2 Provisions on Property 
Since 1963, 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots abandoned their 
properties and became refugees within their own country. Thus, the solution of the 
property issue, unavoidably, lies at the core of any attempt for the comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem. The UN Plan for a Comprehensive Settlement of 
the Cyprus Problem, in Article 10 of the Foundation Agreement, provided that the 
property claims would have been resolved in a comprehensive manner in 
accordance with international law, the respect for the individual rights of 
dispossessed owners and current users and the principle of bi-zonality. A specific 
institution, the Cyprus Property Board, would have been responsible for 
implementing the relevant provisions.228 The Board would have comprised229 of 
seven members, two hailing from each constituent State and three non-Cypriot 
members.  
More specifically, according to the Annan Plan,230 the only dispossessed owners that 
would have enjoyed an absolute right to reinstatement231 were the Greek Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus and the Evkaf.232 Any affected property233 owned by them, which 
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 Article 10(4) of the Foundation Agreement and Article 2 of Annex VII to the Agreement on 
Treatment of Property affected by Events since 1963. 
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 Article 2(2) of Attachment 2 on The Cyprus Property Board and Compensation 
Arrangements of Annex VII of the Foundation Agreement. 
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 Article 4 of Part I of Annex VII of the Foundation Agreement. 
231
 Reinstatement – restitution through the award of legal and physical possession to the 
dispossessed owner, so as to enable him/her to exercise effective control over such property, 
including use for his/her own purposes. (Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex VII of the 
Foundation Agreement) 
232
 Since 1571, the Islamic religious organisation has accumulated properties known as 
Evkaf. They are properties appropriated for, or donated to, charitable uses and to the service 
of God by a document called vakfieh. Nobody has the right to sell property designated as 
vakf. Evkaf properties can be rented for ten year, but a longer period requires the approval of 
the parliament. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognized and re-confirmed the 
legal rights of Evkaf, accepting the importance of the institution of Evkaf to the Turkish 
Community, its sanctity, and the need for the preservation and the protection of its properties 
under the laws and regulations of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber; available at 
http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/ottoman/evkaf.html 
233
 Affected property – immovable property in Cyprus which the owner, being a natural or 
legal person, left or of which s/he lost use and control as a consequence of intercommunal 
strife, military action or the unresolved division of the island between December 1963 and the 
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, and which has not since been reinstated to the 
owner (or his/her heir, personal representative or successor in title), and over which s/he has 
not regained use and control. Affected property shall not include any property which was 
voluntarily sold, transferred or otherwise permanently disposed of by the owner, to a natural 
or legal person who was able to gain effective control over the property, or for which due to 
compulsory acquisition compensation has been accepted. The onus of proof of any such 
voluntary transfer or lawful expropriation shall lie with the transferee or his/her successor in 
title. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, for the individual case in question, 
dispossession shall be presumed to have been unlawful and/or involuntary. People who are 
successors in title of dispossessed owners and have not been able to gain effective control 
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was used as a religious site in 1963 or 1974, would have been reinstated to them in 
the aftermath of the solution. The right to reinstatement of the affected property of the 
rest of the dispossessed owners, however, was subject to limitations. Those 
limitations were largely depending on whether the affected property in question was 
in an area subject to territorial adjustment or not. 
With regard to properties located in areas subject to territorial adjustment,234 the 
general rule was that they would be reinstated to dispossessed owners.235 An 
exception to that rule was the case when the current user236 of the affected property 
had made a significant improvement to the property,237 whose market value238 
                                                                                                                                           
over the relevant affected property shall be treated in the same manner as the dispossessed 
owners themselves would be. (Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex VII of the Foundation 
Agreement) 
234
 According to Article 9 of the Foundation Agreement, the map attached to ANNEX I and 
ANNEX VI, the administration of 7,5 per cent of the territory of Cyprus would be transferred 
under the supervision of the UN to the Greek Cypriot State in six phases over a 42 month 
period, beginning 104 days after the entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. Those 
areas, subject to territorial adjustment which are now either part of the “Areas” or the UN 
Buffer Zone and are legally part of the Greek Cypriot constituent State, would be 
administered during the interim period by the Turkish Cypriot constituent State. The six 
different phases are: 
• Phase 1 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after 104 days: including 
UNFICYP relinquishing authority over the Buffer Zone and the handover of Varosha 
and Kokkina. 
• Phase 2 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after six months: including 
the handover of Achna and Petra. 
• Phase 3 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after one year and three 
months, with enhanced UN supervision in the last three months: including the 
handover of the areas of Loutros/Galini and Tymvou. 
• Phase 4 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after two years and six 
months, with enhanced UN supervision in the last six months: including the handover 
of the areas of south Famagusta, Kalopsida/Acheritou, Lysi/Kontea, Avlona and 
Lymnitis/Soli. 
• Phase 5 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after three years, with 
enhanced UN supervision in the last six months: including the handover of the areas 
of Famagusta, Mia Milia, Gerolakkos, and Zodhia. 
• Phase 6 - Handover to the Greek Cypriot constituent State after three years and six 
months, with enhanced UN supervision in the last six months: being the final 
boundary line. 
235
 Dispossessed owner -a natural or legal person who, at the time of dispossession, held a 
legal interest in the affected property as owner or part owner, his/her legal heir, personal 
representative or successor in title, including by gift. (Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex VII of 
the Foundation Agreement) 
236
 Current user – a person who has been granted a form of right to use or occupy property by 
an authority under a legal or administrative process established to deal with property 
belonging to dispossessed owners, or any member of his/her family who has a derivative right 
to use or occupy such property, or his/her heir or successor in title. The definition does not 
include any person who occupies or uses a property without any legal, administrative or 
formal basis, nor any person using or occupying property under a lease contract from a 
private person, nor any military force, body or authority. (Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex 
VII of the Foundation Agreement) 
237
 Significant improvement – an improvement (including any new construction on vacant 
land) to an affected property, which was made between the time of dispossession and 31 
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exceeded the value of the actual property. In that case, the Property Board would 
have facilitated an amicable solution between the dispossessed owner and the 
current user. If such a solution could not be reached, the Board would have decided 
whether to grant reinstatement to the dispossessed owner immediately or to first 
grant a lease of one to twenty years to the owner of the significant improvement.239 
According to the UN estimations,240 60 per cent of displaced Greek Cypriots could 
obtain full restitution of their properties in accordance with the aforementioned 
provisions. The remaining 40 per cent of displaced Greek Cypriots and the Turkish 
Cypriot dispossessed owners were entitled to restitution of their former home and 
one third of their land or at least the equivalent of one donum.241 
More analytically, with regard to properties located in areas not subject to territorial 
adjustment, the Annan Plan did not provide, in principle, for an absolute right to 
reinstatement. Dispossessed owners, being natural or legal persons, could opt for 
compensation.242 In that case, they would have received full and effective 
compensation for their property on the basis of the value at the time of dispossession 
adjusted to reflect appreciation of property values in comparable locations.243 All the 
remaining dispossessed owners would have had the right to reinstatement of one-
third of the area of their total property ownership, and to receive full and effective 
compensation for the remaining two-thirds. However, they would have had the right 
to reinstatement of a dwelling they had built, or in which they lived for at least ten 
years, and up to one donum of adjacent land.244 On the other hand, a dispossessed 
                                                                                                                                           
December 2002, or based on a building certificate (proof of engineering approval for 
construction) issued prior to 31 December 2002, or any later improvement which has been 
deemed admissible for this purpose pursuant to regulations of the Property Board and of 
which the market value is greater than the value of the affected property in its original state. If 
the property was damaged after the time of dispossession but during the events of 1963 to 
1974, the market value of the improvement shall be compared to the value of the property in 
its state at the time the improvement was made. For the purposes of determining the 
ownership of the improvement, it shall not be considered as having attached to the land; the 
owner of the improvement is the natural or legal person who paid for the improvement or 
his/her heir, personal representative or successor in title. The burden of proof concerning the 
value, ownership and date of construction of any improvement lies on the owner of the 
improvement. (Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex VII of the Foundation Agreement) 
238
 Article 1 of Attachment 1 of Annex VII of the Foundation Agreement: Market value - the 
amount for which a property could be sold on the open market, based on an assessment of 
purchase prices or amounts paid for comparable properties in comparable locations at the 
time of assessment. 
239
 Article 3(4) of Attachment 4 to Annex VII of the Foundation Agreement. 
240
 Pfirter, op. cit., supra note 220, at 614. 
241
 Article 10(3)(b) of the Foundation Agreement. 
242
 Article 9 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
243
 Articles 10(3)(a) of the Foundation Agreement and 8 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
244
 Articles 10(3)(b) of the Foundation Agreement and 16 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
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owner whose property could not be reinstated, because it had been exchanged by a 
current user or bought by a significant improver etc., or the dispossessed owner had 
voluntarily deferred to a current user, would have had the right to another property of 
equal size and value in the same municipality or village. S/he would have also had 
the right to sell his/her entitlement to another dispossessed owner, from the same 
place, who could aggregate it with his/her own entitlement.245  
Current users, according to this sophisticated scheme, could even apply for, and 
receive title to the property they were using if they would agree, in exchange, to 
renounce their title to a property of similar value, in the other constituent State, of 
which they were dispossessed.246 With regard to persons who owned significant 
improvements to properties, the Annan Plan provided that they could apply for, and 
could receive, title to such properties provided they would pay for the value of the 
property in its original state.247 Finally, current users being Cypriot citizens which 
were required to vacate property which would be reinstated would not be required to 
do so until adequate alternative accommodation was made available.248 
According to Article 22 of Annex VII, it would have been a Property Court, composed 
of an equal number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot judges and three neutral 
judges, that would have conducted the final judicial review of decisions of the 
Property Board. More importantly, Article 5 provided that, since the Foundation 
Agreement would have provided a domestic remedy for the settlement of the 
property issue, the UCR, in accordance with Article 37 of the ECHR, would have 
informed the Strasbourg Court that it would be the sole responsible State Party and 
request the Court to strike out any proceedings currently before it. 
According to the aforementioned Article 37 ECHR, the Court of Human Rights may 
decide, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike an application out of its list of 
cases. In order to do that, it should be proved that the circumstances lead to the 
conclusion that either the applicant does not intend to pursue his application or the 
matter has been resolved or, for any other reason established by the Court, it is no 
longer justified to continue the examination of the application. On the other hand, the 
same provision allows the Court to ‘continue the examination of the application if 
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the protocols thereto so 
requires.’ Thus, one could convincingly argue that the Court could strike out all the 
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 Articles 10(3)(c) of the Foundation Agreement and 16 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
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 Articles 10(3)(d) of the Foundation Agreement and 12 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
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 Articles 10(3)(e) of the Foundation Agreement and 18 of Part I of ANNEX VII. 
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applications of Greek Cypriots on the ground that the Foundation Agreement 
provided for a restitution scheme and, thus, it is no longer justified to continue the 
examination of the applications.  
The question that should be addressed, however, is whether asking the Court to 
strike out the Greek Cypriot applications against Turkey could be seen as a 
hindrance to their right to apply to the Court under Article 34 ECHR claiming to be 
the victims of human rights violations. With regard to the right enshrined in Article 34, 
it has been stated by the Court that, after the amendments made to the Convention 
system by Protocol No 11, ‘the right of individual application is no longer dependent 
on a declaration by the Contracting States.’ ‘Thus, individuals now enjoy at the 
supranational level a real right of action to assert the rights and freedoms to which 
they are directly entitled under the Convention.’249  
Obviously, in the aftermath of a comprehensive settlement that would solve the 
property aspect of the conflict inter alia, an application made by the new State to 
strike out the Greek-Cypriot applications probably does not come stricto sensu within 
the meaning of a governmental action that would hinder the right of the individuals to 
apply to the Court. The reason for this is that the settlement plan itself would offer a 
more effective protection of the human rights, including the right to property, through 
a restitution mechanism although, as shall be seen in CHAPTER FIVE, not all 
dispossessed owners would have an absolute right to reinstatement if the future 
settlement is based on the principle of bi-zonality. On the other hand, is must be 
stressed that ‘the Convention right to individual application […] has over the years 
become of high importance and is now a key component of the machinery for 
protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.’250 In addition, the 
Court has emphasised ‘the special character of the Convention as an instrument of 
European public order (ordre public) for the protection of individual human beings’ 
and has described its own mission, as set out in Article 19, ‘to ensure the observance 
of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties.’251 Thus, the 
Strasbourg Court could judicially review the compatibility of any settlement and the 
relevant restitution mechanism in accordance with the European public order and its 
well established principles. Thus, any dispossessed owners that are not satisfied with 
                                                 
249
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey (Applications No 
46827/99 and 46951/99) (judgment 6 February 2003) para 106; Case of Mamatkulov and 
Abdurasulovic v. Turkey (Applications No 46827/99 and 46951/99) (Grand Chamber 
judgment 4 February 2005) at para 122. 
250
 Ibid. 
251
 Eur. Court H.R., Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (Application No 
15318/89) (judgment 23 March 1995) at para. 93. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNION CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
125 
the restitution mechanism could, in the aftermath of a settlement, apply to the 
Strasbourg Court and it is the responsibility of the Court to rule on the legality of the 
scheme. Although this would mean that the new unified United Cyprus Republic 
would have been held liable for human rights violations caused by Turkey, it still 
would have been an available means for the effective protection of the rights of the 
individuals. 
 
3.6 Remarks 
To sum up this part of the CHAPTER, it should be noted that, due to this international 
political problem, the protection of the fundamental rights of the Union citizens in 
northern Cyprus is far from satisfactory. Neither the present political status quo, nor 
the European courts offer much more than an incremental solution to the human 
rights issues arising from this historical, political and legal saga. On the contrary, if 
the political actors do not engage in successful negotiations, there is an imminent 
danger that the present unsatisfactory situation will be crystallised, despite the 
evolution of the case law and especially the case law of the Strasbourg Court. Even 
a comprehensive settlement plan, however, cannot restore the status quo ante 1963. 
Any solution based on the agreed principles will entail painful sacrifices by all the 
actors.  
What remains to be analysed, however, is how the Union, through the legislative 
device of the Green Line Regulation, has tried to facilitate the free movement rights 
of the Union citizens in an area where the acquis is suspended and how the Annan 
Plan would have altered such an exercise. The latter part of the analysis is important 
given that any possible future solution will include similar arrangements.  
 
4. CROSSING THE “LINE” 
4.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish military invasion, the Cypriot Government has 
declared the closure of all the ports of entry into the island situated in those 
“Areas”.252 Until April 2003, when the restrictions to the movement across the “Line” 
                                                 
252
 In the Letter dated 19 August 2005, from the Chargé d’ affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of Cyprus to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, it was stated: ‘On the 
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posed by the regime in the North were partially lifted, the Greek Cypriots did not have 
access to the northern part of their country and the Turkish Cypriots253 were isolated 
from the Rest of the World, with the exception of Turkey. Since the Turkish Cypriot 
community expressed their clear desire for a future within the EU at the referendum 
on 24 April 2004, the Union had to build on the already existing policy of the 
Republic, according to which the crossing of the Green Line by all EU citizens and 
third country nationals who legally reside either in the South or in the North and 
people who have entered the island through the Government Controlled Areas has 
been allowed, in order to facilitate the exercise of the free movement rights of all the 
Union citizens and lift the isolation of the Turkish-speaking Cypriots.254 It is important 
to note that such isolation ‘does not affect just the businessman trying to trade, but 
also the Turkish Cypriot teenager in the folk dance group, the young graduate or 
politician trying to make a career in the EU, the university student, the artist and even 
the Turkish Cypriot footballer (who could not participate in international contests).’255 
Indeed, the Green Line Regulation provides for the rules that apply to EU citizens 
and to third country nationals, including the special case of the “settlers”, in order for 
them to cross the line and have access to the southern Government-controlled part 
of the island and, from there, to other EU Member States and to the North of the UN 
Buffer zone. The abovementioned scope of the Green Line Regulation was required 
in order to address the lacuna in the EC legal order created by the suspension of the 
acquis and to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. As shall 
                                                                                                                                           
specific matter of airports and ports in the occupied area of Cyprus, it should be stressed that, 
following the Turkish military invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island, the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus declared all ports of entry into the Republic of Cyprus 
which are situated in those areas as closed. In particular with regard to airports, it should be 
noted that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus acted in accordance with the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which provides that “the contracting States 
recognise that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory”, including designation of official ports of entry. Moreover, according to 
International Civil Aviation Organisation decisions of 1974, 1975 and 1977, a country not 
exercising, temporarily, effective control over its territory by reasons of military occupation, 
does not lose its sovereign rights over its territory and the airspace above it. In that context, 
the two airports operating in the occupied area of the island – over which the Republic of 
Cyprus has temporarily no access or effective control and consequently is not in a position to 
impose the terms of operation and international safety standards – are illegal and pose 
potential safety concerns to civil aviation.’ Furthermore, with regard to ports, the relevant 
ports were declared closed as from 3 October 1974 by an order of the Council of Ministers 
which was communicated to the International Maritime Organisation on 12 December 1974 
for distribution to its Member States. 
253
 For the situation before April 2003, see inter alia Eur. Court H.R., Case of Djavit An v. 
Turkey (Application No 20652/92) (judgment 20 February 2003). 
254
 Recital (6) of the Green Line Regulation. 
255
 “Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation”, The Turkish Cypriots: The Excluded EU 
Citizens (Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation, 2006). 
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be seen, the framework provided by that Regulation has managed to effectively lift 
the isolation without recognising any other authority on the island apart from the 
legitimate Government of the Republic. It consists of a prime example of the 
“pragmatic approach” that the Union has adopted when dealing with this issues 
arising from this conundrum. 
The present section of the CHAPTER provides a legal analysis of the Green Line 
Regulation with regard to the crossing of persons. In order to draw a more accurate 
picture of the present status quo on the island, concerning the free movement of 
persons, it also refers to the provisions of Protocol No 3 of the Act of Accession, 
which provides for the terms of application of the acquis to the UK Sovereign Base 
Areas. However, given that this entire framework would have been completely 
altered if the new state of affairs was approved a week before Cyprus joined the 
Union, the final part of the CHAPTER analyses the relevant provisions of the Annan 
Plan. Apart from being intellectually stimulating, such an exercise is deemed 
necessary since it is probable that in any future settlement plan similar provisions will 
be included. 
 
4.2 Green Line Regulation’s provisions on crossing of persons 
Given the suspension of the acquis in northern Cyprus provided by Article 1 of 
Protocol No 10, Article 18 of the EC Treaty, according to which every EU citizen has 
the ‘right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject 
to the limitations and conditions laid down’ in the Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect,256 does not apply. Instead, the Council of the EU has 
unanimously defined the terms under which the provisions of EU law, with regard to 
free movement of persons, apply to the line in the Green Line Regulation. Since the 
Government of Cyprus has declared the closure of the ports of entry into the island, 
situated North of the Green Line, the Regulation not only provides the rules for 
access to the “Areas” for EU citizens and third country nationals but also for those 
lawfully residing in the North. The Regulation provides the terms under which those 
persons can move lawfully from Cyprus via the line to other destinations, and thus 
provides for the partial but effective lifting of their isolation.  
                                                 
256
 E.g. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of  the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC O.J. 2004, L 229/35.  
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Therefore, although in principle the line does not constitute an external border of the 
EU,257 special rules are established by the Regulation concerning the crossing of 
persons, the prime responsibility for which belongs to the Republic of Cyprus. While 
taking into account the legitimate concerns of the Republic’s Government concerning 
the recognition of any authority in the “Areas”, it was deemed necessary that those 
special rules should enable EU citizens to exercise their free movement rights within 
the EU. This was achieved by setting minimum rules for carrying out checks on 
persons at the line and at the same time by ensuring the effective surveillance of the 
line in order to combat illegal immigration of third country nationals, as well as any 
threat to public security and public policy.258 Hence, it was also deemed necessary to 
define the conditions under which third country nationals are allowed to cross the 
line.259 
More analytically, for the purpose of checks on persons, the term “line” means the 
line between the Government Controlled Areas and those areas in which the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.260 
According to Article 2(1) of the Green Line Regulation, the Republic has the 
responsibility to carry out checks on all persons crossing the line with the aim to 
combat illegal immigration of third country nationals and to detect and prevent any 
threat to public security and public policy. Such checks also should be carried out on 
vehicles and objects in the possession of persons crossing the line. All persons 
crossing the line should undergo at least one such check in order to establish their 
identity.261  
The line, however, can be crossed only at crossing points authorised by the 
competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus.262 Initially, in Annex I of the 
Regulation, which lays down a list of these crossing points, only the crossing points 
of Ledra Palace and Agios Dhometios were mentioned. However, Article 9 of the 
Regulation provides that the Commission, in agreement with the Government of the 
Republic, may amend the Annexes of the Regulation. Thus, on 18 April 2005, the 
Commission adopted an adaptation to Annex I by which the list of crossing points 
has been extended to include two additional crossing points: Astromeritis – Zodhia263 
                                                 
257
 Recital (4) of the Green Line Regulation. 
258
 Recitals (4) and (7) of the Green Line Regulation. 
259
 Recital (7) of the Green Line Regulation. 
260
 Article 1(1)(a) of the Green Line Regulation. 
261
 Article 2(2) of the Green Line Regulation. 
262
 Article 2(4) of the Green Line Regulation. 
263
 With active support from the Commission Services and after the positive opinion of the 
PHARE Management Committee on 7 July 2005, the crossing point of Astromeritis – Zodhia 
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and Ledra Street.264 While prioritising the abovementioned two crossing points, the 
Government of the Republic reiterated its request to the Commission for the inclusion 
of two further points in Nicosia265 in Annex I and three crossing points in the north-
west of the island.266 By the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1283/2005 of 3 August 
2005, amending Annex I to Green Line Regulation, the latter Cypriot proposal was 
adopted.267  
From all those crossing points, the opening of the one in Ledra Street has been 
considered crucial. The reason for this is that it would provide for a crossing point of 
the line inside the historical centre of Nicosia, which has been divided since 1963. 
During their meeting on 21 March 2008, the president of the Republic, Mr. 
Christofias, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Talat, agreed to open the Ledra 
Street crossing point as soon as possible. Indeed, two weeks later, on 3 April 2008, 
after 45 years of division, the two sides of the historical centre of the “Mediterranean 
Berlin” were connected to each other. 
With regard to third country nationals, Article 2(3) of the Green Line Regulation 
provides that they should only be allowed to cross the line provided they possess 
either a residence permit issued by the Republic or a valid travel document, and, if 
required, a valid visa for the Republic and as long as they do not represent a threat 
to public policy or public security.268 According to Article 1(2), the term “third country 
national” is defined as any person who is not a citizen of the Union within the 
meaning of Article 17(1) of the EC Treaty. Given the special historical and political 
circumstances that have arisen in the post 1974 status quo, the seemingly technical 
and neutral definition of “third country nationals” has some important political 
connotations. The Union tries to get around the thorny issue of “settlers” through 
those technical rules concerning the crossing of “third country nationals”. In other 
                                                                                                                                           
received Community co-financing via the savings from the 2003 pre-accession programme for 
Cyprus; Interviews with officials of the Cyprus Republic. 
264
 Commission Regulation (EC) 601/2005 of 18 April 2005 amending Annex I to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol No 10 to the Act of 
Accession, O.J. 2005, L 99/10. 
265
 Athinas Avenue – Omorfita and Kantaras Avenue – Mia Milea. 
266
 Kato Pyrgos – Karavostasi, Kokkina – Kato Pyrgos and Pachyammos – Kokkina. 
267
 At the moment the Annex I list of crossing points referred to in Article 2(4) contains seven 
crossing points: Agios Dhometios, Astromeritis – Zodhia, Kato Pyrgos – Karavostasi, Kokkina 
– Kato Pyrgos, Pachyammos – Kokkina, Ledra Palace and Ledra Street. 
268
 For a more detailed account of how those terms are defined for EC law purposes see the 
case law of the Court of Justice in the following cases: Case C-41/74 Van Duyn v. Home 
Office [1974] ECR 1337; Cases C-115 & 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgian State [1982] 
ECR 1665; Case C-36/75 Rutili v. Minister of the Interior [1975] ECR 1219; Case C-67/74 
Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Koln [1975] ECR 297; Case C-30/77 R. v. 
Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999. 
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words, the Council of the EU deals effectively with one of the most important aspects 
of the conflict which also has implications for the partial application of the acquis in 
northern Cyprus, without referring expressis verbis to it in a rather depoliticised 
manner. 
As previously mentioned in the present CHAPTER,269 the Republic of Cyprus does not 
consider those alien persons who have settled in the “Areas” illegally and without 
permission as legitimate claimants of the Cypriot citizenship and, thus, they do not 
have access to EU citizenship via the citizenship laws of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the Green Line Regulation, the “settlers” are deemed 
to be third country nationals that may cross the line if they comply with the 
aforementioned criteria provided in Article 2(3).  
With regard to the “threat to public policy” criterion, one has to note the criminal 
dimension of “settling”, which is recognised in the legislation of the Republic.270 As far 
as the “valid travel document” criterion is concerned, one should point out that the 
vast majority of “settlers” also hold the citizenship of the Turkish Republic. For 
Turkish nationals, a valid visa is required to visit the Republic. Given the well-known 
policy of Turkey not to recognise the Cyprus Republic, the practical impediments for 
Turkish citizens to access the Cypriot visa has become obvious. Thus, it could be 
argued that “settlers” holding Turkish nationality can enjoy the relevant rights with 
regard to inter alia access to the EU labour market and freedom of establishment, 
provided by the Ankara Agreement and the case law of the ECJ,271 in any EU 
Member-State but, in reality, not in the Government Controlled Areas of the Cyprus 
Republic.  
One has to note, however, that the situation on the ground with respect to “settlers” 
married to Turkish Cypriots is slightly different than the Union legislation suggests. 
                                                 
269
 See supra 2.2 Access to Union Citizenship. 
270
 See in general Ο Περί Αλλοδαπών και Μεταναστεύσεως (Τροποποιητικός) Νόµος του 
2004 [Aliens and Immigration (Amending) Act 2004)].   
271
 See inter alia Case C-12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund [1987] ECR 3719; Case 
C-434/93 Bozkurt v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1995] ECR I-1475; Case C-171/95 Tetik v. 
Land Berlin [1997] ECR I-329; Case C-36/96 Gunaydin v. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-
5143; Case C-98/96 Ertanir v. Land Hessen [1997] ECR I-5179. For a more detailed account 
of the rights deriving from the Ankara Agreement see in general M. Cremona, ‘Citizens of 
Third Countries: Movement and Employment of Migrant Workers Within the EU’ 2 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration (1995) 87; M. Hedemann-Robinson, ‘An overview of recent 
Legal developments at Community level in relation to third-country nationals resident within 
the European Union, with particular reference to the case law of the European Court of 
Justice’ 38 Common Market Law Review (2001) 525; S. Peers, ‘Towards Equality: Actual and 
potential rights of Third Country Nationals in the EU’ 33 Common Market Law Review (1996) 
7; H. Staples, The legal Status of Third Country Nationals Resident in the European Union 
(Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
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Although such individuals cannot claim the citizenship of the Republic, they may still 
lawfully cross the line. The customs authorities of the Republic of Cyprus have 
created another list including the names of those who can prove their marriage to a 
Turkish Cypriot on the basis of a marriage certificate. This practice started in 2003 
and continued even after the EU accession. This is also the case for the children of 
“settlers” married to Turkish Cypriots.272  
Overall, one has to emphasise that the Union has managed to “square the circle” in a 
seemingly technical and depoliticised way. It has facilitated the free movement rights 
of third country nationals, legally residing in the North or entering the island through 
the Government Controlled Areas, while at the same time it took into account the 
legitimate concerns of the Government of the Republic concerning the “settlers” 
without explicitly referring to them. 
Finally, apart from the “settlers”, the British Overseas Territories Citizens, by virtue of 
a connection with the UK Sovereign Base Areas, could also be deemed third country 
nationals for the purposes of the Green Line Regulation. As explained in the previous 
CHAPTER, this category of British Overseas Territories Citizens was the only one not 
entitled to become British citizenship, and thus Union citizenship, in accordance with 
the British Overseas Territories Act 2002. In practice, however, given that the British 
personnel working in the Sovereign Base Areas enjoy British citizenship and that all 
the Cypriot population in the Sovereign Base Areas are recognised as citizens of the 
Republic273 and thus are EU citizens since 1 May 2004, it must be mentioned that 
there is an extremely limited, if any, number of persons belonging to such a category 
which consequently are deemed third country nationals for the purposes of the 
Green Line Regulation. 
 
4.3 Protocol No 3’s provisions on crossing of persons 
For the purpose of checks on persons, as mentioned above, the Green Line means 
the line between the areas under the effective control of the Government of the 
Republic and those areas in which the Government does not exercise effective 
control. However, it does not include the line between the Government Controlled 
Areas and the UK Sovereign Base Areas. This is reaffirmed by Article 5(1) of 
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 Interviews with “TRNC” officials. 
273
 Appendix O of the Cyprus Agreements Declaration of Her Majesty’s Government 
Regarding the Administration of the Sovereign Base Areas; available in http://kypros.org/ 
Constitution/English/appendix_o.htm. 
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Protocol No 3 to the Act of Accession 2003, which provides that the Republic is not 
required ‘to carry out checks on persons crossing their land and sea boundaries with 
the Sovereign Base Areas and any Community restrictions on the crossing of 
external borders shall not apply in relation to such persons.’ 
Checks on persons at the boundary between the Eastern Sovereign Base Area and 
the areas not under effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
are carried out in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Protocol No 3.274 This Article 
provides that it is the UK, and not the Republic, which should exercise controls on 
persons crossing the external borders of the Bases, in accordance with the 
undertakings set out in Part Four of the Annex of the Protocol. Such controls shall 
include the verification of travel documents. As it is the case in the Green Line 
Regulation, all persons shall undergo at least one check in order to establish their 
identity.275  
Article 2 of the Annex provides that the UK allows the external borders of the Bases 
to be crossed only at crossing points. The term “external borders of the Sovereign 
Base Areas” means, however, the sea boundaries, the airports and seaports, but not 
the land or sea boundaries with the Republic of Cyprus. On the other hand, the term 
“crossing points” refers to any crossing point authorised by the competent authorities 
of the UK for the crossing of the external borders.276  
With regard to nationals of third countries, they shall only be permitted to cross the 
external border of the Sovereign Base Areas if they possess a valid travel document, 
they are in a possession of a valid visa for the Cyprus Republic, if so required, they 
are engaged in defence-related activity or are a family member of a person who is 
engaged in such activity, and they are not threat to national security.277 The UK may 
only derogate from these conditions on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national 
interest or in order to comply with the international obligations278 arising from the 
bilateral and multilateral agreements to which UK is a contracting party. 
Finally, Article 3 of the Green Line Regulation requires that the Republic carries out 
effective surveillance all along the line in such a way as to discourage people from 
circumventing checks at the relevant crossing points  Similarly, Article 5 of Part Four 
of the Annex of Protocol No 3 provides that the competent authorities of the UK 
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 Article 2(5) of the Green Line Regulation. 
275
 Article 4 of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3. 
276
 Article 1 of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3. 
277
 Article 3(a) of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3. 
278
 Article 3(b) of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3. 
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should use mobile units to carry out external border surveillance, between border 
crossing points and at crossing points outside of normal opening hours, in order for 
people to be discouraged from circumventing the checks at crossing points. The 
competent authorities of the UK and of the Republic of Cyprus should maintain 
constant close cooperation with a view to the effective implementation of checks and 
surveillance279 and, bearing in mind humanitarian considerations, with a view to 
devising practical ways and means of respecting the rights and satisfying the needs 
of asylum seekers280 and illegal immigrants in the Sovereign Bases.281 
 
4.4 Implementation of the Green Line Regulation 
Recital (6) of the Green Line Regulation recognises that the policy of the Republic, 
even before the adoption of that piece of legislation, has been to allow the crossing 
of the line by all citizens of the Republic, EU citizens and third country nationals who 
are legally residing in the northern part of Cyprus and by all EU citizens and third 
country nationals who entered the island through the Government Controlled Areas. 
In the first annual report on the implementation282 of the Green Line Regulation,283 
the Commission assured the Council that the crossing of persons is running 
smoothly and that thousands of Cypriots cross the line daily from either side.284 
According to the Report, ‘[t]here is free movement of EU citizens irrespective of their 
point of entry into Cyprus.’ In its more recent annual report, the Commission reported 
                                                 
279
 Article 6 of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas in 
Cyprus. 
280
 Article 7(a) of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas in 
Cyprus provides that ‘[a]n applicant for asylum who first entered the island of Cyprus from 
outside the European Community by one of the Sovereign Base Areas shall be taken or 
readmitted to the Sovereign Base Areas at the request of the Member State of the European 
Community in whose territory the applicant is present’. 
281
 Article 7(b) of Part Four of the Annex of Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus. 
282
 Article 11(1) of the Green Line Regulation reads as follows: ‘Without prejudice to Article 
4(12), the Commission shall report on an annual basis, starting not later than one year after 
the date of entry into force of this Regulation, on the implementation of the Regulation and the 
situation resulting from its application, attaching to this report suitable proposal for 
amendments if necessary’. 
283
 Communication from the Commission Report on the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its application; Brussels 
14.07.2005 COM(2005) 320 final (hereafter 2005 Commission’s Report). 
284
 In the 2006 Commission Report (Brussels, 25.9.2006 COM(2006) 551) it is reaffirmed that 
‘[t]he Regulation provides for a stable legal framework for the free movement of Cypriots and 
other EU citizens who daily cross the line at the crossing points. According to the available 
data 3,375,409 crossings of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots altogether were registered 
in the reporting period (1,195,594 of Greek Cypriots and 2,179,815 of Turkish Cypriots 
respectively). No incidents were reported as regards the daily crossing of people at the check 
points.’ 
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that during the period between 1 May 2006 and 30 April 2007: ‘... 788,823 [down 
from 1,195,594 mentioned in the 2006 Annual Report] Greek Cypriots crossed from 
the government controlled areas to the northern part of Cyprus and 1,348,215 [down 
from 2,179,815 in 2006] Turkish Cypriots crossed from the northern part of Cyprus to 
the government controlled area.’285 
The position of the Republic of Cyprus,286 however, is that the laws of Cyprus stand 
to the effect that, as regards persons, all arrivals via non-legal points of entry are 
subject to criminal sanctions. However, although the application of such sanctions 
stands suspended as regards EU citizens, the Government fully reserves its rights in 
this respect. In other words, although the Commission notes that, in practice, EU 
citizens can exercise their free movement rights even in cases when it is realised 
through illegal ports of entry, the Republic stresses that it only recognises the 
mechanism provided by the Green Line Regulation as lawful for the exercise of free 
movement rights. More importantly,  
in October 2006, the Parliament of the Republic of Cyprus adopted an amendment to the 
Penal Code which penalises any illegal use (including rent) of property with a sentence of 
seven years of imprisonment. Given that some 78% of the private property in the northern 
part of Cyprus is (originally) Greek Cypriot property, this amendment caused concern in 
the Turkish Cypriot community. The authorities of the Republic of Cyprus seem to follow a 
policy of not applying the amendment to ordinary Turkish Cypriot citizens resulting in a 
lack of legal certainty. The impact of this legislation on the crossings of Turkish Cypriots 
will have to be closely monitored.287 
With regard to the surveillance of the line, in its first report, the Commission noted 
that, despite the checks carried out by the Republic on persons crossing the line, it 
has become obvious that a ‘systematic illegal route through the northern part to the 
government-controlled areas exists.’ Hence, the Green Line cannot be regarded as 
being under effective surveillance. Moreover, illegal immigration of thousands of 
third-country nationals across the line, many of which have requested asylum in the 
Republic,288 has taken place. In the 2006 report, the Commission again voiced its 
concerns about these issues and pointed out that ‘the surveillance of the line 
conducted by the Republic of Cyprus […] needs further strengthening.’ Although the 
Republic of Cyprus has tried to reply to those criticisms289 by noting that such 
problems are inherent to that very special political anomaly, according to which an 
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 Brussels, 20.9.2007, COM(2007)553 at 2. 
286
 Interviews with officials of the Cyprus Republic. 
287
 Supra note 284 at 3. 
288
 In the period under report, there has been a significant increase of asylum applications. 
10,992 third-country nationals applied for asylum in the Republic of Cyprus according to its 
Ministry of Interior. It is estimated that at least 50 per cent of the asylum seekers crossed the 
line illegally. 
289
 See supra note 286. 
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EU Member State cannot exercise effective control over the whole of its territory, the 
2007 Report reveals the main cause of the reluctance of the Cypriot Government to 
fully meet its surveillance obligation. According to this Report, any measure which 
could possibly lead to the Green Line taking on the appearance of an external border 
is politically unacceptable. Despite the inability of the Republic to control its borders, 
which has caused concerns and has resulted in the suspension of the Schengen 
acquis, it remains clear that, without recognising any other authority on the island 
apart from the legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Green Line 
Regulation has partially but effectively lifted the isolation of a significant number of 
the inhabitants of an area where the ports of entry are all deemed closed under 
international law. 
 
4.5  The exercise of free movement rights in a unified Cyprus 
The implementation of the Green Line Regulation, as presented in the Commission 
Reports, stands as an indisputable proof that the suspension of the acquis 
significantly limits the exercise of free movement rights of EU citizens and third 
country nationals in northern Cyprus. It is only in the framework of a comprehensive 
settlement that a full exercise of such rights could take place. However, even in that 
case, the relevant provisions of the Annan Plan show that derogations from the 
acquis are almost unavoidable since any settlement plan has to address the 
legitimate concerns of the two communities. 
Starting from the premise that permanent derogations to the acquis should be 
avoided as far as possible, the Commission had already made it known to the UN, 
during the preparatory phase of Burgenstock,290 that the exceptions on property and 
residence rights should be clearly framed as transitional. Largely, this scope was 
attained. Nevertheless, as any solution based on the principles of bi-zonality, bi-
communality and political equality of the two ethno-religious segments, the Annan 
Plan unsurprisingly entailed some derogations from the acquis. Such EU-related 
exemptions were laid down in the Draft Act of Adaptation on the terms of the 
accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union (DAA). If the new 
state of affairs was approved in the simultaneous referendums of 24 April 2004, this 
Regulation would have amended the Treaty of Accession on the basis of Article 4 of 
Protocol No 10 and it would arguably have consisted of primary law as shall be seen 
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 Last phase of the UN negotiations that led to the fifth and last version of the Annan Plan. 
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in CHAPTER FIVE. In any case, Hoffmeister contends that the adoption of that 
Regulation would have been the first step. As a second step, those ‘adaptations 
would have been formally incorporated into primary law in order to bring about legal 
security within the Union’s legal system.’291  
Such a development would have been in conformity with Article 6 of Annex IX of the 
Foundation Agreement of the Annan Plan. That provision obliged the Co-Presidents 
to send the attached to that Annex letter to the President of the European Council in 
case the plan was approved. With that letter, they would have requested inter alia the 
European Union to endorse the Foundation Agreement and to accommodate its 
terms in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded and adopt 
special measures for the Turkish Cypriot State. They would have also requested that 
the final outcomes would result in the adaptation of primary law and ensure legal 
certainty and security within the European Union legal system for all concerned.  
Thus, firstly, the Annan Plan provided for restrictions on the right to property and, 
thus, for derogations from the free movement of capital acquis.292 More specifically, it 
provided for restrictions on the right of natural persons, not permanently residing in 
the Turkish Cypriot constituent State for at least three years, and of legal persons to 
purchase immovable property in that State, without permission of the competent 
authority of that constituent State.  Those restrictions on the acquisition of property in 
the Turkish Cypriot constituent State should have lasted for 15 years or, alternatively, 
until the gross domestic product per capita in that constituent State remained below 
85 per cent of the gross domestic product per capita in the Greek Cypriot State.  The 
proposed authorisation procedure was deemed necessary because of the economic 
disparities between the Turkish Cypriot constituent State and EU Member States but 
also between the two communities. According to Recital xii, the purpose of that 
provision was to avoid unacceptable sudden price increases and a large scale buy-
out of land. In other words, that legislative act would have served as a safeguard 
clause, according to which the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot constituent State 
could deny the right of non-resident natural persons and legal persons to acquire 
property for a specific period of time, based on published, objective, stable and 
transparent criteria that would have been applied in a non-discriminatory manner.293  
Moreover, apart from restrictions on the right to acquire property in northern Cyprus, 
restrictions on residence rights were provided. According to recital vii of the DAA, the 
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 Hoffmeister, op.cit., supra note 79 at 189. 
292
 Article 1 DAA, Appendix D of the Annan Plan. 
293
 Article 1(2) DAA, Appendix D of the Annan Plan. 
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recognition of the particular national identity of Cyprus and the need for protection of 
the balance between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, the bi-zonal 
character of the UCR and the distinct identity and integrity of the constituent States 
necessitated certain safeguards and temporary restrictions on the residence rights of 
Cypriot citizens, as well as citizens of Greece and Turkey. Articles 2 and 3 provided 
for the terms that would have applied to the right to residence of the Cypriot citizens, 
Greek and Turkish nationals, other EU citizens and third country nationals, in the 
constituent States of the UCR. 
More analytically, Article 2, on the right of a Cypriot citizen to reside in a constituent 
State of which s/he would not have held the internal constituent State citizenship 
status, provided that the application of restrictions on such a right should not have 
been precluded in the form of a moratorium during the first five years of the life of the 
new unified State, notwithstanding existing provisions of Community law. Later on, 
between the sixth and ninth years, the percentage of people not holding the relevant 
constituent State citizenship status could not exceed six per cent of the total 
population of the respective municipality or village. This percentage would have been 
doubled between the tenth and fourteenth years. For the following five years, or until 
Turkey’s accession, the relevant percentage could have reached 18 per cent. Finally, 
after the nineteenth year, after the establishment of a new state of affairs, either 
constituent State could, with a view to protecting its identity, take safeguard 
measures to ensure that no less than two-thirds of its Cypriot permanent residents 
speak its official language as their mother tongue.  
Equally, Article 3 of the aforementioned proposed Regulation provided for the 
application of restrictions for 19 years, or until Turkey would join the EU, on the right 
of Greek and Turkish nationals to reside in Cyprus on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The restrictions would apply if the number of Greek and Turkish nationals would 
have reached five per cent of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding the 
internal constituent State citizenship status of the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot 
constituent State respectively. After that period, the UCR would have had the right, in 
consultation with the Commission, to pose safeguard measures in order to ensure 
that the demographic ratio between Cyprus’s permanent residents, speaking either 
Greek or Turkish as mother tongue, would not have been altered.  
Evidently, both provisions had the potential to be applied without any temporal 
limitation and could be read as permanent derogations from the free movement of 
persons acquis. It should be noted, however, that the Union has repeatedly 
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expressed its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement within the Union 
legal order. Furthermore, it is almost unavoidable that any settlement, based on the 
principle of bi-zonality, would entail derogations from the acquis, as shall be seen 
later. In any case, it should be pointed out that such restrictions are justified because 
of the experiences of the past and the ‘particular national identity’ of Cyprus as a bi-
communal and bi-zonal federal State. Also, the Union has undertaken to ‘respect [the 
Member States’] national identities inherent in their fundamental structures …. [and] 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State.’294  
On the other hand, such restrictions to fundamental freedoms are not 
unprecedented. In the previous enlargement, the Union accepted permanent 
restrictions on the right to residence in the Åland islands in order to protect the 
Swedish identity of those Finnish islands,295 while in the “Big-Bang” enlargement of 
2004 the EU agreed that permanent derogations from the freedom of capital acquis 
could apply in Malta.296 Obviously, the historical and political necessities that led to 
those derogations, as well as the extent of the restrictions, are completely different to 
those relevant for this case. One should note, however, the willingness and the 
capability of the Union to accommodate such restrictions, within its legal order, in 
order to respond to relevant political concerns. 
 
4.6  Remarks 
Overall, the Green Line Regulation framework, based on the post 2003 political 
situation on the island, has proved that it is an adequate means in order for Union 
citizens and third country nationals to have access to the “Areas” where the acquis is 
suspended and thus for the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community to be lifted. It 
still cannot be argued, however, that it foresees the full exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms of the EU citizens in the “Areas”. To that effect, there is no provision for 
services per se in the Regulation. Article 7 on ‘Taxation’ provides a layout for the 
supply of services to some extent but the Commission, in its 2005 Annual Report, 
reported of not having any knowledge of services supplied across the Line during the 
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 Treaty of Lisbon Article 4(2) TEU. 
295
 Protocol No 2 to the Act of Accession of Sweden, Austria and Finland, O.J. 1994, C 
241/21 
296
 Protocol No 6 to the Act of Accession 2003 on the acquisition of secondary residences in 
Malta, O.J. 2003, L 236/947.  
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first year of the operation of the Green Line Regulation,297 and the 2006 and 2007 
Annual Reports do not even mention the movement of services. 
On the contrary, one could assume that given inter alia the checks, the crossing 
points and the provisions on third country nationals, the Green Line is a de facto EU 
border. What is more problematic is the fact that the Annan plan, would have also 
failed to offer the possibility to all EU citizens to fully exercise the rights attached to 
the status of the Union citizen. This, however, should be read as an endogenous 
problem of any settlement based on the principle of bi-zonality and as a necessary 
sacrifice for the reunification of the island. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
It is evident that due to this unprecedented political anomaly for an EU Member 
State, the protection of the fundamental rights and the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms, attached to the Union citizenship concept, is problematic. The European 
Court of Human Rights may have found Turkey responsible for the acts and 
omissions of its ‘subordinate local administration’ that violate the human rights in the 
North, but this does not effectively address the lacuna within the “European public 
order”. Even the latest judgments of the Court that might allow for the establishment 
of quasi-transitional institutions, dealing with the property aspect of the Cyprus issue, 
point to the incremental solutions available through the judicial process rather than 
offer a comprehensive solution.  
On the other hand, the Union has managed to adopt a “pragmatic approach” when 
dealing with the Cypriot Gordian knot in order to facilitate the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms of the Union citizens in northern Cyprus, where EU law is 
suspended. Indeed, it has managed to effectively lift the isolation of the residents in 
an area where the ports of entry have been declared closed for 30 years. And it has 
done so, while taking into account the legitimate concerns of the Republic of Cyprus 
with regard to the “settlers”. This is particularly important considering that the 
situation concerning the access to the citizenship of the bi-communal Cyprus 
Republic, and thus to the EU citizenship of the residents in the North, is 
understandably less clear than in any other Member State given the two claims of 
legitimate rule on the island.  
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 2005 Commission’s Report at 5. 
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It is obvious that this lacuna in the Union legal order, created by the suspension of 
the acquis, could only be effectively addressed in the framework of a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus issue. The cleavages, however, between the two 
communities and the political concerns that have to be addressed in any settlement 
plan create serious doubts whether that lacuna will disappear whenever the Cyprus 
problem is resolved. It is more than probable that in any future settlement, based on 
the principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two ethno-
religious segments, similar derogations from the acquis will be provided. Despite 
that, the Union should remain willing to accommodate the solution even if there are 
restrictions to the fundamental freedoms. At the end of the day, the achievement of 
peace and stability in one of its Member States is a legitimate justification for such 
derogations.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
 
‘A time for drunken horses’ 
Bahman Ghobadi (2000) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The European Union’s “pragmatic approach” to aspects arising from the Cyprus 
problem in the aftermath of the Republic’s accession to the EU is particularly evident 
in the adopted and proposed legislation concerning the Union’s trade relations with 
northern Cyprus. After the rejection of the Annan Plan and the consequent 
suspension of the acquis in the North, the Union had to create a legislative 
framework which would enable it to create trade relations with the Turkish Cypriot 
community without recognising any authority on the island other than the only 
internationally recognised Government of the Republic. The lifting of the economic 
isolation of the Union citizens residing in an area where the ports of entry have been 
declared closed 30 years ago has been deemed necessary in the aftermath of the 
ECJ judgments in the Anastasiou saga.1  
In order to achieve the abovementioned scope, the EU in agreement with the 
Republic, has authorised the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, through the 
Green Line Regulation, to issue accompanying documents so that goods originating 
in the “Areas” may cross the line and be circulated into the EC market as Community 
goods. In effect, by the authorisation of a Turkish Cypriot NGO, the Union got around 
a fundamental recognition conflict in order to allow legal bilateral trade to take place 
                                                 
1
 Case C-432/92, Regina v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. 
Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and Others (hereafter Anastasiou I) [1994] ECR I-3116; Case C-
219/98 Regina v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and Others (hereafter Anastasiou II) [2000] ECR I-5241; Case C-140/02 Regina 
v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and 
Others (hereafter Anastasiou III) [2003] ECR I-10635. According to those judgments, since 
the authorities in the areas not under the effective control of the Republic could not issue valid 
movement certificates, furnishing evidence of the Cypriot origin of the relevant goods, Turkish 
Cypriot goods could be imported into the Community but were treated as goods from a 
country not associated with the EC.  
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both between the parties in dispute and between the “Areas” and EU Member States 
other than Cyprus.  
Although the Green Line Regulation regime has provided for a viable and working 
framework for the development of bilateral trade relations between the parties in the 
conflict and thus has brought the two ethno-religious segments closer, it has not 
become an effective device to enable goods originating in northern Cyprus to 
penetrate the EC market. This is the main reason why the Commission , at every 
occasion, stresses the need for the adoption of a regulation that would allow direct 
trade relations between the “Areas” and Union Member States other than Cyprus. 
The relevant proposal, however, presents some problems with regard to international 
and Union law. 
The scope of the present CHAPTER is to analyse the trade relations of the Union with 
northern Cyprus, first, before the accession of the Republic with a special emphasis 
on the ECJ jurisprudence, second, after 1 May 2004 through the examination of the 
Green Line Regulation regime and third, in the light of a possible future adoption of 
the Direct Trade Regulation. Such an exercise is deemed necessary in order, on the 
one hand, to assess the limits of the suspension of the acquis and, on the other, to 
examine the relevant Union policies. 
 
2. TRADE WITH THE “AREAS” BEFORE CYPRUS’S EU ACCESSION  
2.1 Introduction 
Before 1 May 2004, when Cyprus joined the EU,2 the Agreement of 19 December 
1972 Establishing an Association Between the European Community and the 
Republic of Cyprus (hereafter the Association Agreement)3 and the Protocols thereto 
provided for the bilateral legal basis of the relationship between Cyprus and the 
EEC/EU insofar as it concerned the dispute resolution, trade and accompanying 
provisions on services, persons and capital and other common provisions. It also 
provided for the bilateral legal foundation of the pre-accession strategy and the 
institutional basis for reviewing progress in the accession negotiations.  
                                                 
2
 For a more comprehensive analysis of the case law of the ECJ on the Cyprus issue until 
2001 see in general S. Talmon, ‘The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice’ 
12 European Journal of International Law (2001) 727. 
3
 O.J. 1973 L 133/2. 
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According to Article 2(1) of the Association Agreement, its original scope was the 
progressive elimination of trade obstacles through a process of reciprocal 
liberalisation of trade. This entailed the reduction of custom duties,4 the abolition of 
any measure or practice of an internal fiscal nature with direct or indirect 
discriminatory effect5 and the imposition of export duties at a level not higher than 
that applicable to products exported to the most favoured third country.6 Thus, the 
Association Agreement provided inter alia for a system of tariff preferences benefiting 
agricultural and industrial products from Cyprus.  
The preferential treatment was conditional on evidence being furnished that the 
products had originated in Cyprus in accordance with the 1977 Protocol concerning 
the definition of the concept of “originating products” and methods of administrative 
cooperation between the Community and national authorities on the one hand and 
Cypriot authorities on the other (hereafter Origin Protocol).7 Article 6(1) of the Origin 
Protocol required that evidence of the originating status of products was given by 
EUR.1 movement certificates which were to be issued by the ‘customs authorities of 
the exporting State.’8 
One of the most important questions arising from the de facto partition of the island 
was whether that system of tariff preferences could also be applied to products 
originating in northern Cyprus and exported to EU Member States. Neither the 
practice of the Member States nor of the Community institutions could offer a reliable 
answer to this critical issue for the trade relations between the then EEC and Cyprus. 
With regard to the practice of the Member States, not all of them were accepting 
certificates issued by Turkish Cypriot authorities. The Commission stated, in the 
course of the proceedings of Anastasiou I, that ‘several’9 Member States recognised 
the certificates of origin and at least ‘some’ recognised the phytosanitary 
certificates.10 It added, however, that Member States were accepting those 
certificates provided that they were not issued in the name of the “Turkish Federated 
State of Cyprus”, the “Turkish Republic of Cyprus” or other equivalent designation, 
                                                 
4
 Art. 3 and Annexes I and II to the Association Agreement. 
5
 Art. 4 of the Association Agreement. 
6
 Art. 7 of the Association Agreement. 
7
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/77 on the conclusion of the Additional to the Agreement 
Establishing an Association Between the Community and the Republic of Cyprus ([1977] OJ L 
339/1) has approved the Origin Protocol. 
8
 Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of the Origin Protocol. 
9
 Besides the UK, the following Member States were mentioned: Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
10
 Advocate General Gulmann’s Opinion in Anastasiou I, at para 22.  
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which would question the sovereignty of the only internationally recognised 
Government on the island.11 
In addition to the non-uniform position of the Member States, the practice of the 
Community institutions was also inconsistent. In the aftermath of the “TRNC” 
“declaration of independence” in 1983, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
addressed a “note verbal” in which it stated that only certificates issued by its 
authorities satisfied the requirements of the Association Agreement. The Council, 
however, responded by reiterating the position that the Association Agreement was 
to benefit the whole population of the island in accordance with Article 5.12 Since the 
Council failed to provide more precise guidance for dealing with the certificates 
issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the Commission’s line of conduct equally 
failed to be consistent. On the one hand, it furnished the competent authorities of the 
Member States with specimen seals, signatures and stamps used by the Turkish 
Cypriots.13 On the other hand, the Director-General of DG-VI (Agriculture), Guy 
Legras, sent a letter to the Permanent Representatives of the Member States, on 
December 1989, stating that ‘[i]n the case of Cyprus, Article 12(1)(b) [of the Plant 
Health Directive] should be interpreted as meaning that the only authorities 
empowered to issue certificates are those so authorised on the basis of the laws or 
regulations of the Republic of Cyprus’14 since the only internationally recognised 
Government on the island is that of the Republic. For that reason, goods 
‘accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate within the meaning of Directive 
77/93/EEC originating from the northern part of the island’ could be regarded as 
complying with the conditions of the Directive only if ‘the certificate [was] issued in 
the name of the “Republic of Cyprus” by the competent authorities of that Republic.’15  
This letter forced two Dutch companies, which imported and marketed citrus fruit 
originating in the areas not under the effective control of the Republic within the 
Member States under phytosanitary certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities, to bring an action under Article 173(2)EEC (now 230(4)EC)16 for the 
annulment of the decision said to be contained in this letter and under Article 
                                                 
11
 Talmon, op.cit., supra note 2, at 731. 
12
 Ibid. at 732. 
13
 Advocate General Gulmann’s Opinion in Anastasiou I at para 19. 
14
 Case C-50/90 Sunzest (Europe) BV and Sunzest (Netherlands) v. Commission (hereafter 
Sunzest) [1991] ECR I-2917, at para 5.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Article 230(4)EC provides that: ‘Any natural or legal person may, under the same 
conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a 
decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.’ 
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215(2)EEC (now Article 288(2)EC)17 for compensation for the damage resulting from 
the Commission’s unlawful conduct. The European Court of Justice in Sunzest 
referred to its decision in IBM v. Commission18 and reiterated that only measures 
‘producing legal effects of such a kind as to affect the applicant’s interests by clearly 
altering his legal position constitute acts or decisions open to challenge for 
annulment.’19 The letter was not capable of producing legal effects since the 
application of the Community provisions, in respect of the protective measures 
relevant to that case, is a matter solely for the national bodies designated for that 
purpose. No provision of the Plant Health Directive20 confers power on the 
Commission to adopt decisions on its interpretation. Thus, the letter did not constitute 
a decision against which an action for annulment could be brought.21  
Although, in Sunzest, no answer was given to the question whether products 
originating in northern Cyprus could come under the ratione materiae of the 
Association Agreement, the Court decided upon this issue in the Anastasiou saga. In 
those three judgments, the Court of Justice did not just decide whether the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities could be considered as ‘customs authorities of the exporting 
State’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Origin Protocol but also whether the 
criteria for the issue of phytosanitary certificates, provided by the Plant Health 
Directive, could be met in northern Cyprus.  
 
2.2 Anastasiou I22 
In 1992, SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and 12 Greek Cypriot producers and exporters 
of citrus fruit and the national marketing board for potatoes in the Republic of Cyprus 
                                                 
17
 Article 288(2)EC provides that: ‘In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall 
in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States make 
good any damages caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties.’ 
18
 Case C-60/81 IBM v. Commission [1981] ECR 2639. 
19
 Case C-50/90 Sunzest at para 12. 
20
 Council Directive 77/93/EEC of 21 December 1976 on protective measures against the 
introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against 
their spread within the Community O.J. 1977, L 26/20, which has been subsequently 
substituted by the Council Directive 2000/29/EC O.J. 2000, L 169/1. 
21
 Case C-50/90 Sunzest at paras 13 and 14. 
22
 For a more detailed account of that case see in general M. Cremona, ‘Case C-432/92, R.  
v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and 
Others, Judgment of 5 July 1994’ 33 Common Market Law Review (1996) 125; N. Emiliou, 
‘Cypriot import certificates: some hot potatoes’ 20 European Law Review (1995) 202; P. 
Koutrakos, ‘Legal issues of EC-Cyprus Trade Relations’ 52 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2003) 489. 
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instituted proceedings against the UK Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 
the High Court of Justice. They asked the Court to judicially review the practice of the 
UK authorities of accepting origin certificates and phytosanitary certificates issued by 
authorities of the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and not by 
the competent authorities of the Republic as required by EC law. The High Court of 
Justice referred five questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation 
of the Association Agreement and the Plant Health Directive. The English Court 
essentially asked whether, in the light of the above provisions, the UK authorities 
could legally permit the importation of products accompanied by ‘movement and 
phytosanitary certificates issued by authorities other than the competent authorities 
of the Republic of Cyprus.’23 
The UK, supported by the Commission, stressed the need for a pragmatic 
interpretation of the relevant provisions in the light of their scope and the unique 
situation in Cyprus rather than insistence on the technical requirements of the 
legislation. This is the reason why they argued that the relevant certificates issued by 
the authorities in northern Cyprus should be accepted as valid. To support their 
position, they sustained that the Association Agreement was concluded to apply to 
the whole territory of the Republic of Cyprus as envisaged in the Cyprus 
Agreements. They then relied upon the non-discrimination clause laid down in Article 
5 of the Agreement to argue that to view the movement certificates issued by the 
authorities in northern Cyprus as invalid would be tantamount to depriving the 
population residing in the North from the benefits of the Agreement. Conversely, the 
acceptance of the certificates would not amount to recognition of the “TRNC”24 but 
represented the ‘necessary and justifiable corollary of the need to take the interests 
of the whole population of Cyprus into account.’25 The Commission, in support of this 
point, referred to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
Namibia in 1970.26   
The Court of Justice, having determined the direct effect of the 1977 Origin 
Protocol,27 held that, although in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish intervention the 
                                                 
23
 Anastasiou I at para15.  
24
 On the issue of acceptance of certificates issued by unrecognised authorities, see Talmon, 
op.cit., supra note 2 at 742-749. 
25
 Anastasiou I at paras 31-34. 
26
 ICJ Reports 1971, at 16. The thrust of this Opinion of the ICJ was that, following the illegal 
administration of Namibia by South Africa, the sanctions imposed on the latter should deprive 
the population of the former of any advantages derived from international cooperation. 
27
 Anastasiou I at para 27. The Court citing Case C-12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch 
Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719 set out its standard conditions for the direct effect of Community 
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Republic of Cyprus cannot fully exercise its powers in northern Cyprus, and thus 
problems in connection with the application of the Association Agreement have been 
raised, ‘a departure from the clear, precise and unconditional’ and as such directly 
effective provisions of the Origin Protocol was not justified.28 Turning to the 
substance of the case, the Court stressed that the system, whereby movement 
certificates were regarded as evidence of the origin of products, was founded on the 
‘principle of mutual reliance and cooperation between the competent authorities of 
the exporting and importing States.’29 It also stated, in paragraph 39 of the judgment, 
that the relationship between the competent authorities of the exporting State and 
those of the importing State should be based on ‘total confidence in the system of 
checking the origin of products as implemented by the competent authorities of the 
exporting State.’ ‘[T]he importing State [must be] in no doubt that subsequent 
verification, consultation and settlement of any disputes in respect of the origin of 
products or the existence of fraud will be carried out efficiently with the cooperation of 
the authorities concerned.’ However, the non-recognition of the de facto regime in 
the North ‘neither by the Community nor by the Member States’30 excluded the 
possibility of mutual reliance and recourse to administrative cooperation between the 
authorities of northern Cyprus and those of the Member States at the level envisaged 
under the 1977 Protocol. In those circumstances, the acceptance of movement 
certificates not issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus would 
constitute, in the absence of any possibility of checks or cooperation, a denial of the 
very object and purpose of the system established’ by the Origin Protocol.31 
Moreover, the Court of Justice rejected the argument of the Commission regarding 
the interpretation the non-discrimination clause of Article 5. It stated that acceptance 
of certificates issued by the authorities in the areas not under the effective control of 
the Republic would be tantamount to an alteration of the obligations under the 
Association Agreement and the Protocol. In support of this argument, it referred to 
Article 3 of the Agreement, according to which the Community is under a duty to 
refrain from jeopardising the achievement of the aims of the Agreement. This entails 
that no means of proof of the origin of the products, other than that expressly 
                                                                                                                                           
agreements with non-Member States (para 23). It also took the view that earlier cases also 
supported the direct effect of rules of origin, following the Advocate General in citing Case C-
218/83 Les Rapides Savoyards and Others v. Directeur des douanes et droits indirects [1984] 
ECR 3105 and Case C-12/92 Criminal proceedings against Huygen and Others [1993] ECR I-
6381.  
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 Anastasiou I at para 37. 
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 Ibid. at para 38. 
30
 Ibid. at para 40. 
31
 Ibid. at para 41. 
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provided for in the Origin Protocol, could be unilaterally adopted by the Community. 
‘Any alternative means of proof must be discussed and decided upon by the 
Community and the Republic of Cyprus within the framework of the institutions 
established pursuant to the Association Agreement and then applied in a uniform 
manner by the two Contracting Parties.’32 
Interestingly enough, the Court did not address at all the argument of the Greek 
Government that the acceptance of certificates issued by authorities in northern 
Cyprus would equate to violating a number of UN Security Council Resolutions which 
call upon all members of the international community not to recognise the regime in 
the North. Nevertheless, the strict interpretation of the 1977 Protocol was essential in 
order to ‘ensure uniform application of the Association Agreement in all Member 
States.’33  After all, the existence of different practices among the Member States 
‘creates uncertainty of a kind likely to undermine the existence of a common 
commercial policy and the performance by the Community of its obligations under 
the Association Agreement.’34 According to Koutrakos, the approach outlined above 
illustrates that the Court seeks to ensure the uniformity and effectiveness of EC law 
while at the same time ‘intervening as little as possible in an issue which is highly 
charged in political terms.’35 Such an approach is ‘consistent with the case-law in 
other areas of trade policy with significant foreign policy overtones, namely economic 
sanctions against third countries and exports of dual-use goods.’36 
With regard to phytosanitary certificates, although the interpretation of the Plant 
Health Directive did not involve the specific obligations towards a third country 
contained in an international agreement, the Court gave importance to the need for 
certainty and uniformity. More specifically, it held that the system of protection 
against the introduction of harmful organisms laid down in the Plant Health Directive 
was based essentially ‘on a system of checks carried out by experts lawfully 
empowered for that purpose by the Government of the exporting State and 
guaranteed by the issue of the appropriate phytosanitary certificate.’37 The 
cooperation, which was necessary to achieve the objective of the Directive, could not 
be established with authorities who were ‘not recognised either by the Community or 
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 Ibid. at para 46. 
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 Ibid. at para 54. 
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 Ibid. at para 53. 
35
 Koutrakos, op.cit, supra note 22, at 493. 
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by the Member States.’38 Consequently, the term “authorities empowered”, appearing 
in Article 12(1)(b) of the Plant Health Directive, was to be interpreted ‘as referring 
exclusively, with regard to imports of products from Cyprus, to the authorities 
empowered by the Republic of Cyprus to issue phytosanitary certificates.’39 
Finally, the Court dealt with the possibility, addressed by the UK Court’s third, fourth 
and fifth questions, that it is not practically possible for Turkish Cypriot exporters to 
obtain certificates issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, and 
that there are significant barriers to exporting their products via the Government 
Controlled Areas. The Court, in paragraph 66 of its judgment, merely referred to 
these as “hypothetical circumstances” which do not justify any alteration to the 
conclusions it has reached. 
On those grounds, the ECJ held that the Origin Protocol and the Plant Health 
Directive had to be interpreted as precluding the acceptance, by the national 
authorities of Member States, of movement and phytosanitary certificates issued by 
authorities other than those of the Republic of Cyprus, when citrus fruit and potatoes 
were directly imported from northern Cyprus.40 Without valid movement and 
phytosanitary certificates, Turkish Cypriot goods could still be imported into the EC 
but were treated as goods from a country not associated with the EC, thus exposing 
them to import duties ranging from three per cent to 32 per cent.  
 
2.3 Anastasiou II 
In the aftermath of Anastasiou I, exporters, who had until then been shipping citrus 
fruit from the northern part of Cyprus to the UK under phytosanitary certificates 
issued by “TRNC” officials, concluded an agreement with a company established in 
Turkey. This agreement provided that the ship carrying the citrus fruit from northern 
Cyprus would dock in the Turkish port of Mersin for less than 24 hours, where 
Turkish officials would inspect the cargo on board the ship and issue a Turkish 
certificate, before it continued its voyage to the UK.41  Anastasiou and Others applied 
for an order restraining the Minister from allowing citrus fruit, imported in those 
circumstances, into the UK. It was the appeal against a Court of Appeal judgment 
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that made the House of Lords refer five questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of the Plant Health Directive.  
Thus, in Anastasiou II, the Court was asked whether EC law permitted a Member 
State to allow plants originating in a non-member country into its territory where the 
required certificates that accompanied those plants were issued by the authorities of 
another non-member country, from which the plants were transported to the EC, and 
not by the authorities of the non-member country of origin.42 Moreover, the House of 
Lords asked whether the reasons why a phytosanitary certificate was not issued in 
the plants’ country of origin had to be taken into account by an importing Member 
State in determining whether the relevant certificate met the requirements laid down 
by the Directive.43 
Anastasiou and others and the Greek Government argued that the Plant Health 
Directive required that phytosanitary certificates should always be issued by the 
competent authorities of the country of origin of the products. Even though, where 
there were certain special requirements that could be fulfilled without difficulty 
elsewhere, additional certificates could be issued by the authorities of a consignor 
country other than the country of origin.44 This argument was not accepted by the 
Court. 
Interestingly enough, the judgment of the ECJ starts off with a reference to the thrust 
of Anastasiou I. In paragraph 22 of its judgment it reiterated that the system provided 
by the Plant Health Directive ‘is based essentially on a system of checks carried out 
by experts lawfully empowered for that purpose by the Government of the exporting 
State and guaranteed by the issue of the appropriate phytosanitary certificate.’ It also 
stressed the need for cooperation between the authorities of the exporting State and 
those of the importing State.45 Those considerations, however, do not necessarily 
‘imply that the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not 
admit into its territory produce that is accompanied not by a phytosanitary certificate 
from the country of its origin but only by a certificate issued by a non-member 
consignor country.’46 
In support of this argument, it held that by requiring phytosanitary certificates to be 
issued by the ‘authorities empowered for this purpose’ in the exporting country, 
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Article 12(1)(b) in no way stated that the authorities in question had to be those of the 
country in which the goods originated.47 Moreover, Annex V to the Directive, which 
covers the products in question, clarified that the certificate could be issued by the 
authorities of either the country of origin or the consignor country.48 Furthermore, 
Article 9(1) of the Plant Health Directive, according to which phytosanitary certificates 
related to products which are subject to special requirements should be issued in the 
country of origin, provides for an exception in cases where the phytosanitary 
requirements could be satisfied elsewhere.49 
The Court further stressed that the objective of the Directive, which was to protect 
the territory of the Community from the introduction and spread of organisms harmful 
to plants, could also be attained without requiring plants originating outside the 
Community to undergo a certification procedure in their country of origin.50 The Court 
assumed that the special requirements, to which the phytosanitary certificates should 
attest, could be satisfied in any country where they have remained ‘for such time and 
under such conditions as to enable the proper checks to be completed.’51 
On those grounds, the ECJ decided that, in the absence of a certificate issued by the 
relevant authorities of the country of origin, the Plant Health Directive permitted 
Member States to admit plants originating in a non-member country into their 
territory, and accompanied by a certificate issued in a non-member country from 
which they did not originate, provided that three conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, the 
plants have to be imported into the territory of the country where checks had taken 
place before being exported from there to the EC. Secondly, they have to remain in 
that country for such time and under such conditions as to enable the proper checks 
to be completed. Thirdly, they should not be subject to special requirements that 
could only be satisfied in their place of origin.52 It also held that it was not for the 
Member States concerned ‘to take account of the reasons for which a phytosanitary 
certificate’ had not been ‘issued in the country of origin of the plants in determining 
whether the certificate’ complied with the requirements of the Directive.53  
The Court did not rule, however, on the question whether the special requirements 
applicable to the citrus fruit at issue in the main proceedings could be fulfilled at 
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places other than the fruit’s place of origin. That question, thus, remained for the 
House of Lords to decide.  
 
2.4 Anastasiou III 
When the House of Lords resumed its consideration of the case, Anastasiou and 
Others argued before that the citrus fruit at issue in those proceedings was indeed 
subject to the special requirement, laid down in item 16.1 of Annex IV, Part A, 
Section I of Plant Health Directive. According to that special requirement, the 
packaging of the citrus fruit at issue should bear an appropriate origin mark, which, in 
their submission, could be satisfied only in the country of origin. Thus, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was not entitled to accept the phytosanitary 
certificate issued by the Turkish authorities.  
Consequently, the House of Lords referred two questions to the Court of Justice for 
preliminary ruling.54 First, it wished to ascertain whether the Plant Health Directive 
could be interpreted as allowing a phytosanitary certificate to be issued by the 
authorities of a non-member country, which was not the plants’ country of origin, 
when the plants were subject to the special requirement that their packaging had to 
bear an appropriate origin mark. Second, it asked whether the amendments made to 
items 16.2 and 16.3 of Plant Health Directive by Commission Directive 98/2/EC55 
affect that interpretation.56 
By referring to its judgments in Anastasiou I and Anastasiou II,57 the ECJ reaffirmed 
that phytosanitary certificates issued by a non-member country, other than the 
country of origin, did not benefit from a presumption of accuracy comparable to that 
attaching to certificates in the plants’ country of origin.58 On the other hand, it 
stressed that the only special requirements that could be fulfilled, at places other 
than that of origin, within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the Plant Health Directive, 
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 Anastasiou III at para 23. 
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 Commission Directive 98/2/EC of 8 January 1998 amending Annex IV to Council Directive 
77/93/EEC on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms 
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were requirements which could be met under conditions for ensuring plant health as 
satisfactory as those at the plants’ place of origin.59  
Having noted this, the Court pointed out, in paragraph 56 of its judgment, that the 
analysis of items 16.1 to 16.4 highlights the importance of the special requirement ‘to 
affix an appropriate origin mark to the packaging of products where they come from a 
country known to be free from harmful organisms.’ Since Cyprus is considered to be 
one of those countries, the only special requirement that is applicable to the citrus 
fruit in question is the one laid down in item 16.1, according to which, on the one 
hand, the produce should be free from peduncles and leaves and, on the other, an 
appropriate origin mark should be affixed to its packaging.60 
With regard to the former, the Court admitted that it can be satisfied on the basis of a 
special inspection even in a non-member country other than the one from which the 
products originate.61 As far as  the latter is concerned, however, the Court noted that 
such a special requirement consists of the only guarantee for the importing Member-
States that the produce is a priori free from the relevant harmful organisms and, 
accordingly, it may be exempted from the requirements for an official statement in 
the country of origin, laid down in items 16.2 to 16.4.62 Consequently, it would be 
paradoxical if such a mark, that is intended to certify the origins of the products, 
‘could be issued outside the country of origin, after the plants have been imported.’63 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice rejected the argument put forward by the UK 
Government and the company Cypfruvex, according to which the special 
requirement relating to an appropriate origin mark could be fulfilled in a non-member 
country, other than the country of origin, on the basis of a check as to the mark’s 
validity by the inspector empowered in that other country to draw up the 
phytosanitary certificate.64 It held that such an analysis of item 16.1 was contrary to 
the purpose of that item which requires the actual performance of that marking 
requirement. Moreover, the inspector responsible for issuing the phytosanitary 
certificate in the non-member country is not in the same situation as his/her 
counterpart in the country of origin for the purpose of detecting any falsification of the 
origin mark designed to derive improper advantage from a satisfactory phytosanitary 
finding as to the country of origin since s/he would only be able to act on the basis of 
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invoices or transport or dispatch documents. More importantly, the Court referred to 
its decision in Anastasiou I by ruling that the cooperation which the competent 
authorities of the importing Member State established with those of a non-member 
country, other than the country of origin, could not be under conditions as satisfactory 
as direct cooperation with the competent authorities of the country of origin.65 Finally, 
the ECJ decided that the aforementioned interpretation of item 16.1 was not 
invalidated by the amendments which Directive 98/2/EC made to items 16.2 and 16.3 
of the Plant Health Directive.66 
On those grounds, on 30 September 2003, the Court of Justice decided that the 
special requirement that an appropriate origin mark be affixed to the plants’ 
packaging, laid down in item 16.1, could be fulfilled only in the country of origin of the 
plants concerned and that the amendments which Directive 98/2/EC made to items 
16.2 and 16.3 of the Plant Health Directive did not affect that interpretation. 
Consequently, the phytosanitary certificate required in order to bring those plants into 
the Community should be issued in their country of origin by, or under the 
supervision of, the competent authorities of that country.67 Thus, the relevant 
authorities of the Republic of Cyprus were the only competent authorities for affixing 
an origin mark to the plants’ packaging.  
 
2.5 Remarks 
In all three cases, the Court’s effort to avoid any interference with the situation in 
Cyprus is all too apparent. In order to achieve this, the ECJ approaches the relevant 
legislation, as if it were to be applied in vacuum, focusing on its technicalities. 
Politically speaking, the Court, in essence, banned direct trade between EU and the 
secessionist entity in the North but left the option of indirect trade through Turkey 
open for products that do not have to comply with certain special requirements. From 
a legal point of view, however, it is rather difficult to explain why direct reliance upon 
the authorities of a non-recognised entity would affect the objective of the system 
established under the Plant Health Directive, whereas indirect reliance would not. 
In any case, although those judgments concern only citrus fruits, the Anastasiou 
decisions have resulted in an even greater economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
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community given the limited exporting capacity of the entity called “TRNC”68 and that 
following the Turkish military invasion, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
declared all ports of entry into the Republic closed, which are situated in the areas 
not under its effective control. It has lately been suggested69 that the ECJ, by ‘its 
doctrinal reasoning, has established the judicial foundations towards the 
regularisation of the trading relationship between the northern part of Cyprus and the 
EU, guided by the existing political framework of the EU in this matter and by the 
rules of the Internal Market.’70 In other words, it has been supported that the Court of 
Justice, when ruling on Anastasiou, in essence was calling on the communities and 
the Union to establish a different trading relationship and was advocating greater 
economic and European integration of the Turkish Cypriot community. Although this 
social constructivist reading of the case law of the Court is very interesting, it is rather 
improbable that this was the ECJ’s intention, given the submissions of the parties in 
the proceedings and the time at which Anastasiou III was handed down.  
Instead, it is far more probable that the ECJ, taking into account international law 
concerns and the wider political effects that a different decision would have triggered, 
limited the right of trade of the Turkish Cypriots even though their future status as EU 
citizens, at the time of Anastasiou III, was certain. In other words, a decision that 
would have upheld the Turkish Cypriot practice would have equated an “upgrade” of 
the status of the regime in the North. At a time when the negotiations of the Annan 
Plan were taking place, that would have been far from constructive.  
In the aftermath of the Anastasiou saga and the rejection of the Annan Plan, it was a 
matter for the Union political institutions to lift the economic isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots. This is why the purpose of the Green Line Regulation, with regard to the 
crossing of goods, was to provide for a legal formula according to which goods 
originating in the “Areas” would cross the line and be circulated, not as third country 
goods following the decisions in the Anastasiou saga, but rather as Community 
goods.  
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3. GREEN LINE REGULATION’S PROVISIONS ON CROSSING OF 
GOODS71 
3.1 Goods arriving from northern Cyprus 
Given the situation of economic isolation that was supported by the Anastasiou case 
law of the ECJ and the failure to reach a comprehensive settlement, the EU was 
determined to set the rules in order to regularise trade between the two parties in the 
conflict and between northern Cyprus and other EU Member States via the line. This 
scope should have been achieved, however, without recognising any other authority 
on the island apart from the Cypriot legitimate Government. The main tool for tackling 
this fundamental recognition conflict, for allowing the Turkish Cypriot goods to cross 
the line and also to penetrate the EC market as Community goods via the line, is the 
authorisation of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, with the agreement of 
the Government of the Republic, to issue accompanying documents. In other words, 
the authorisation of a local agency which could act as a formal agent acceptable to 
both sides, for the purposes of certification, is introduced by the Green Line 
Regulation in order to solve this Gordian knot. 
The Green Line Regulation, together with the Commission Regulation on the 
implementation of Article 4 of the Green Line Regulation,72 set out a special regime 
for the crossing of goods over the Green Line. More analytically, recital (4) of the 
Regulation reaffirms that, since the Green Line does not constitute an external 
border of the Union, special rules concerning the crossing of goods need to be 
established, the prime responsibility for which belongs to the Republic. According to 
Article 4(1) of the Green Line Regulation, goods may be introduced in the 
Government Controlled part of the island on the condition that they are wholly 
obtained in the “Areas” or have undergone their last, substantial, economically 
justified processing or working, in an undertaking equipped for that purpose, in those 
“Areas” within the meaning of Articles 23 and 24 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code.  
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According to Recital (4) and Article 4(9) of the Green Line Regulation and Article 4(1) 
of Commission Regulation 1480/2004, the movement across the line of live animals 
and animal products is prohibited until sufficient information is available with regard 
to the state of animal health,73 with the exception of fresh fish and honey.74 Hence, 
the term “goods wholly obtained” in those Areas as defined in Article 23 of 
Regulation 2913/92 means, for the purposes of the Green Line Regulation, mainly 
mineral products extracted in those areas, vegetable products harvested therein and 
goods which are produced therein exclusively from the formerly mentioned goods or 
from their derivatives, at any stage of production. 
On the other hand, the ECJ has adequately defined the term “last, substantial, 
economically justified processing or working” in Brother International v. Hauptzollamt 
Giessen.75 In that judgment, it ruled that the mere assembly of previously 
manufactured parts originating in a country, different from that in which they were 
assembled, is sufficient to confer on the resulting product the origin of the country in 
which assembly took place, provided that, from a technical point of view and having 
regard to the definition of goods in question, such assembly represents the decisive 
production stage during which the use to which the component parts are to be put 
has become definite and the goods in question have been given their specific 
qualities. If the application of that criterion, however, is not conclusive, it is necessary 
to examine whether all the assembly operations in question result in an appreciable 
increase in the commercial, ex-factory value of the finished product. 
The goods, which cross the line only at the crossing points listed in Annex I76 and the 
crossing points of Pergamos and Strovilia under the authority of the Eastern 
Sovereign Base Area,77 are subject to the requirements and undergo the checks as 
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required by EC legislation as set out in Annex II of the Regulation.78 According to 
Annex II, the goods crossing the line are subject to veterinary, phytosanitary and 
food safety requirements and checks as set out in measures adopted under Article 
37 and/or Article 152(4)(b) of the EC Treaty. In particular, relevant plants, plant 
products and other objects should have undergone phytosanitary checks by duly 
authorised experts to verify that the provisions of EU phytosanitary legislation79 are 
complied with before they cross the line to the areas under the effective control of the 
Republic of Cyprus.  
More importantly, they should be accompanied by a document issued by the Turkish 
Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which was duly authorised by the Commission in 
agreement with the Government of Cyprus80 by Commission Decision 
2004/604/EC.81 The accompanying document, according to Article 2(1) of 
Commission Regulation 1480/2004, contains all the particulars necessary for 
identifying the goods to which it relates and, in particular, a description of the goods, 
the item number, marks and numbers of goods, if any, the number and kind of 
packages, the volume and value of the goods, the name and the address of the 
producer of the goods and the name and the address of the consignor and the 
consignee. It also ensures the compliance with the Community rules of origin and 
unambiguously certifies that the goods to which it relates originate in the areas not 
under the affective control of the Republic. After the goods have crossed the line, the 
competent authorities of the Republic check the authenticity of the accompanying 
document.82 The only exception to this rule is provided by Article 4(10) of the Green 
Line Regulation. According to this provision, and in derogation from the standard 
rules, no accompanying document is needed for the supply of the Turkish Cypriot 
population of the village of Pyla located within the UN Buffer zone, according to 
Article 4(10).83 
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their spread within the Community, O.J. 2000 L 169/1. 
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 Article 4(5) of the Green Line Regulation. 
81
 Commission Decision 2004/604/EC of 7 July 2004 on the authorisation of the Turkish 
Cypriot Chamber of Commerce according to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
866/2004, O.J. 2004 L 272/12. 
82
 Article 4(6) of the Green Line Regulation. 
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 In the 2007 Commission Report (Brussels, 20.9.2007 COM(2007) 553) (hereafter 2007 
Commission’s Report), the occasional practice of the ‘authorities of the Eastern Sovereign 
Base Area of asking for accompanying documents in the case where goods were destined for 
the traditional supply of the Turkish Cypriot population of the village Pyla’ was reported as an 
example of a barrier to the free movement of goods. 
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Article 4(2) of the Green Line Regulation provides that goods which are wholly 
obtained in northern Cyprus, or have undergone their last, substantial, economically 
justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose in that 
area, are not subject to customs duties or charges having equivalent effect when 
they are introduced in the Government Controlled Areas. Despite the amendments 
introduced by Council Regulation 293/200584 agricultural products were largely 
excluded by the abovementioned duty-free regime during the first four years of the 
existence of the Green Line Regulation. Given that the enhancement of trade and 
economic interaction on the island was deemed necessary,85 the duties on 
agricultural products originating in the “Areas” have been removed thus avoiding 
cumbersome procedures according to Article 1 of Council Regulation 587/2008 
which has amended Article 4(2) of the Green Line Regulation.  
To allow for that amendment, the safeguard clause contained in the Green Line 
Regulation has been strengthened. Thus, Article 11(4) now provides that in the event 
of an emergency related with a threat or risk to public or animal and plant health the 
appropriate procedures, as set out in the Union legislation in Annex II of the 
Regulation, apply. ‘In the event of other emergencies, in particular those caused by 
irregularities, trade distortions or fraud, or where other exceptional circumstances 
arise which require immediate action, the Commission may, in consultation with the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus, apply forthwith such measures as are strictly 
necessary to remedy the situation.’ Finally, the Council, by qualified majority, may 
amend, qualify or annul the measures taken by the Commission. 
                                                 
84
 Council Regulation (EC) No 293/2005 of 17 February 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 
866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession as regards 
agriculture and facilities for persons crossing the line, O.J. 2005, L 50/1. In the Council 
Document 6290/05 of 14 February 2005 it is noted that the Council, in its meeting on 17 
February 2005, was invited to adopt the Regulation 293/2005 and to insert in its minutes the 
unilateral statement by the Republic of Cyprus set out in the Annex of that document. 
According to that declaration: ‘In agreeing to the amendment of Article 4(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 866/2004, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus reiterates its 
position that, as sovereign authority, entitled to exercise lawful jurisdiction over the entire 
territory of the Republic of Cyprus, it is the sole competent authority to designate the points of 
entry to and exit from the territory of the Republic. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
recalls that all ports, harbours and airports situated in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus 
in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control have 
been declared closed in accordance with the rules of international law confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice. Thus, ports, harbours and airports that have not been expressly 
declared open and duly authorised by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus as points of 
entry and exit for passengers and goods, may not lawfully used for inward or outward 
movement of goods.’ 
85
 Recitals (3) and 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 587/2008 of 16 June 2008 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of 
Accession concerning rules on goods, services and persons crossing the Green Line in 
Cyprus, O.J. 2008, L 163/1. 
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It is important to note that, according to Article 4(7), goods that lawfully cross the line 
should be treated as not being imported to the EC by the competent authorities of the 
Republic of Cyprus within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Council Directive 
77/388/ECC86 or as being subject to excise duty within the meaning of Council 
Directive 92/12/EEC,87 provided the goods are destined for consumption in the 
Republic of Cyprus. In November 2006, following a proposal of the Government of 
the Republic, the Value Added Tax Committee88 even endorsed a simplified scheme 
applicable to Turkish Cypriot traders established in northern Cyprus who sell goods 
directly to end consumers in the Government Controlled Areas. According to this 
scheme, Turkish Cypriot traders can account for VAT directly at the line and they do 
not have to be registered for VAT purposes in the Government Controlled Areas.89 
This situation is comparable to the former Protocol on German Internal Trade which 
allowed goods from Eastern Germany to enter into Western Germany without 
complying with ordinary EU formalities for third country goods.90  
On the other hand, the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus should inform 
the Commission of cases of reasonable doubt as to the compliance of the goods with 
the origin criteria. In such cases, the authorities should allow the goods to cross the 
line under the aforementioned conditions set out in Article 4(2) of the Green Line 
Regulation, subject to any precautionary measures judged necessary while awaiting 
the results of subsequent verification. In case, however, it is established that the 
documents have been issued without the conditions having been properly fulfilled, all 
duties and taxes due on the release of the goods into the EC customs territory for 
free circulation shall be due at the rate applicable to third countries in the absence of 
any preferential treatment.91 
Moreover, where goods consist of plants, plant products and other objects covered 
by Part B of Annex V to Directive 200/29/EC, which contains mainly plants and plant 
products that are potential carriers of harmful organisms of relevance for the entire 
Community, independent phytosanitary experts, appointed by the Commission in 
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 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform 
basis of assessment, O.J. 1977, L 145/1. 
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 Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for 
products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such 
products, O.J. 1992, L 76/1. 
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 Art. 398 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax (prior Art. 29(2) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC) O.J. 2006, L 347/1. 
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 2007 Commission’s Report, p. 9. 
90
 Bundesgesetzblatt 1957 II, p. 984. 
91
 Article 2(4) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. 
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coordination with the TCCoC shall inspect the goods at the stage of production and 
again at harvest and at the marketing stage.92 When the above experts establish that 
the relevant plants and plant products or other objects in the consignment comply 
with the relevant requirements and checks, as set out in Annex II of the Green Line 
Regulation, they fill in the “Report of phytosanitary inspection”,93 which is added as a 
supplement to the accompanying document.94 They consequently seal the means of 
transportation in such a way as to prevent any opening of the consignment until it 
crosses the line95 and, upon arrival in the Government Controlled Areas, the 
competent authorities examine the consignment.96 It is the competent authorities of 
the Republic of Cyprus and of the Eastern Sovereign Base area that should ensure 
that goods crossing the line comply with the EC rules on health, safety, 
environmental and consumer protection and on the prohibition on the bringing in of 
counterfeit and pirated goods.97 
In addition, in accordance with Article 4(11) of the Regulation, goods that comply with 
all the abovementioned conditions have the status of Community goods within the 
meaning of article 4(7) of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 and as such they can be 
released for free circulation into the customs territory of the EC. In other words, 
goods that would have been treated as third country goods if the Green Line 
Regulation was not in place, provided that they comply with the rules set by that 
Regulation, are considered EC goods.  
It should be noted, however, that in the event of goods originating in northern Cyprus 
being transferred to other Member States, their previous entry into the Government 
Controlled Areas is treated as having been an importation of goods in accordance 
with Article 7 of Council Directive 77/388/EEC.98 For such importation, the owner of 
the goods or any other person designated or accepted as being liable by the 
Government of the Republic is liable for the payment of import VAT in accordance 
with Article 21(4) of that Directive.99 
                                                 
92
 Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. It also provides special rules for the 
cases of potatoes and citrus fruit. 
93
 Annex III of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. 
94
 Article 3(2) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. 
95
 Article 3(3) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. 
96
 Article 3(4) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. Where applicable, the “Report of 
phytosanitary inspection” is replaced by a plant passport, issued in conformity with the 
Commission Directives 92/105/EEC (O.J. 1993, L 4/22) and 93/51/EEC (O.J. 1993, L 
205/24). 
97
 Article 4(2) of Commission Regulation 1480/2004. 
98
 O.J. 1977, L 145/1. 
99
 Article 6 of Commission Regulation 1480/2004.  
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Finally, with regard to the crossing of goods, Article 6(1) provides that although 
Council Directive 69/169/EEC,100 which deals with harmonisations of provisions 
relating to exemption from turnover tax and excise duty on imports in international 
travels, does not apply in the special case of the Green Line, goods contained in the 
personal luggage of persons crossing the line are exempt from turnover tax and 
excise duty101 provided they do not have any commercial character and their total 
value does not exceed 260 euro per person.102 The Government of the Republic may 
derogate from the abovementioned provision, for a period no longer than three 
months, in order to address serious disturbances in a specific sector of its economy 
caused by the extensive use of the provision by persons crossing the line.  
 
3.2 Temporary introduction of goods 
Another issue of significant importance that was hindering the economic interaction 
between the two ethno-religious segments has been that, until June 2008, the Green 
Line Regulation did not allow transactions that entailed the temporary crossing of 
goods, such as the ones necessary for either the provision of a service, or in order 
for goods to be repaired or exhibited. Thus, in such cases, the Republic of Cyprus 
used to apply a system of ad hoc derogations. However, such a scheme was neither 
in line with the Regulation nor was it transparent.103 Hence, de lege ferenda, this 
issue has been dealt with in Regulation 587/2008, which amended the Green Line 
Regulation to the effect that a new Article 4a has been added. 
The main scope of the introduction of this new Article has been to encourage the 
provisions of services by companies established in northern Cyprus across the 
Green Line and also to facilitate participation by those companies in trade fairs or 
similar events in the Government Controlled part of the island. At the same time, this 
provision allows goods destined to be prepared in southern Cyprus to cross the 
line.104 Thus, according to Article 4a(1) of the Green Line Regulation, apart from 
goods that are subject to veterinary and phytosanitary requirements, the personal 
                                                 
100
 Council Directive 69/169/EEC of 28 May 1969 on the harmonisation of provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to exemption from turnover tax and 
excise duty on imports in international travels, O.J. 1969, L 193/73. 
101
 Article 6(2) further provides that ‘[t]he quantitative limits for exemptions from turnover tax 
and excise duty shall be 40 cigarettes and 1 litre of spirits for personal consumption.’ 
102
 Article 3 of Council Regulation 587/2008 increased the ceiling from EUR 135 to EUR 260 
in order to encourage economic development of the “Areas”.  
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 2007 Commission’s Report, p. 9. 
104
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effects of persons crossing the line, means of transport, professional equipment, 
goods to be destined to be repaired and goods to be exhibited or used at a public 
event may be temporarily introduced into the Government Controlled Areas for a 
period up to six months. If those goods are not returned to northern Cyprus after the 
expiry of that period they are subject to confiscation by the relevant customs 
authorities.105 
With regard to the crossing of the personal effects of persons crossing the line and 
the means of transport, the relevant rules provided by Commission Regulation 
2454/93106 apply in the event of temporary introduction in northern Cyprus.107 For the 
rest, namely professional equipment, goods destined to be repaired and goods to be 
exhibited, they should be accompanied by a declaration by the person introducing 
them stating the purpose of their introduction.108 In addition, the goods should be 
registered by the relevant customs authorities of the Republic or the UK Sovereign 
Base Area both when they enter and when they leave the Government Controlled 
Area and the Eastern Sovereign Base.109  
 
3.3 Goods sent to northern Cyprus 
Article 5 of the Green Line Regulation provides for the rules that apply with regard to 
goods sent to the areas not under the effective control of the Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus. According to paragraph 1 of that Article, goods which are 
allowed to cross the line should not be subject to export formalities. However, the 
necessary equivalent documentation should be provided upon request, in full respect 
of the internal legislation, by the authorities of the Republic. The breakaway State in 
the North, however, has passed a “law” which makes any flow of trade from South to 
North subject to reciprocity on the basis of a so-called “Charter on limitation of export 
from the TRNC region to South Cyprus and of import from South Cyprus to the 
TRNC”. Furthermore, according to that “law”, which offers a clear depiction of the 
competing claims of authority on the island, the Republic of Cyprus has informed the 
Commission that no goods are accepted to cross the line to the “Areas” unless 
accompanied by a certificate from the Cyprus Chamber Of Commerce and Industry. 
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 Article 4a(4) of the Green Line Regulation. 
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 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community 
Customs Code O.J. 1993 L 253/1.  
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 Article 4a(5) of the Green Line Regulation. 
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In other words, ‘the Turkish Cypriot Community applies a licensing system which, in 
principle, “mirrors” the restrictions of the Green Line Regulation.’110  
In addition, with regard to agricultural and processed agricultural goods, it is critical to 
note that no export refund is paid when crossing the line.111 Moreover, Article 5(3) 
provides that the supply of goods is not exempt under Article 15(1) and (2) of 
Directive 77/338/EEC, which deal with the supply of goods dispatched or transported 
to a destination outside the Community. In other words, under the aforementioned 
provisions, crossing the line with regard to goods sent to the “Areas” is not 
considered as an export to a destination outside the Community. Finally, in 
accordance with Article 5(4), the movement of goods, the removal or export of which 
from the customs territory of the EC is prohibited or subject to authorisation, 
restrictions, duties, or other charges on export by EC law, is also prohibited. 
 
3.4 Implementation of the Green Line Regulation with regard to the 
crossing of goods 
Article 11 of the Green Line Regulation provides that the Commission should report 
to the Council on an annual basis on the implementation of the Regulation and ‘the 
situation resulting from its application.’ According to that Article, particular emphasis 
should be given to the application of Article 4 on goods crossing the line to northern 
Cyprus and the patterns of trade between the Government Controlled Areas and the 
Areas not under the effective control of the Republic. To this date, the Commission 
has drafted three Reports.112 It is critical to study those reports in order to 
pragmatically assess the partial application of the free movement of goods in 
northern Cyprus. 
During the first three years of the life of the Green Line Regulation framework, an 
undeniable increase in the total value of goods which actually crossed the line has 
taken place. During the last reported period (2006-2007), the total value of goods 
that crossed the line was more than three million euros whereas before 2004 the 
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 2007 Commission’s Report, p. 6. 
111
 Article 5(2) of the Green Line Regulation. 
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 Apart from the 2007 Commission’s Report, there have been: Communication from the 
Commission Report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 
2004 and the situation resulting from its application, Brussels 14.07.2005 COM(2005) 320 
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crossing of goods was virtually nonexistent.113 Nevertheless, although the TCCoC 
has been working effectively and professionally because of the support inter alia 
offered by Member State experts, mobilised through TAIEX, the volume and the 
value of goods crossing the line has remained limited.114 This is caused, to a 
considerable degree, by restrictions in the Green Line Regulation itself.115 A recent 
World Bank study has shown that the fact that the Green Line Regulation does not 
allow the crossing of products, brought into the areas not under the effective control 
of the Republic from other EU Member States or Turkey, to the Government 
Controlled Areas significantly reduces benefits to producers, service providers and 
consumers on both sides of the line.116 
Apart from that, the Commission services have also noted, in all three reports, the 
existence of many obstacles to trade across the line despite the fact that the 
authorities of the Republic have only rather exceptionally refused the crossing of 
goods.117 For example, Turkish Cypriot commercial vehicles and, in particular, lorries 
and buses cannot move freely through the island. The Republic of Cyprus does not 
accept roadworthiness certificates of commercial vehicles and professional driving 
licences issued by the authorities of the regime in the North.118 Moreover, the 
Commission reported complaints from Turkish Cypriot traders regarding delays in the 
clearing of goods and that the authorities of the Republic request additional 
documentation other than the obligatory accompanying documents.119 Finally, 
difficulties for Turkish Cypriot traders to stock their products in shelves of 
supermarkets in southern Cyprus and to advertise them in parts of the press in the 
Government Controlled Areas are considered to be some other obstacles to trade.120 
More importantly, however, it should be noted that, during the four years of the life of 
the regime established by the Green Line Regulation, only in two cases were goods 
which had crossed the line subsequently subject to an intra-community transaction 
with another Member State.121 This proves, in the most emphatic way, that the 
mechanism provided by the Green Line Regulation has not become an effective 
                                                 
113
 2007 Commission’s Report, p. 11. 
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device to enable goods, originating in the areas not under the effective control of the 
Republic, to penetrate the EC market. In other words, although the existing regime 
provides a workable basis for allowing the passage of goods and, as such, it has 
rightly attracted the attention of experts working on problems in the Caucasus,122 it 
needs to be strengthened. 
Such a finding, however, should not overshadow the significant success of the EU in 
creating a legislative framework that enables trade relations between the two parties 
in conflict but also between the Union and an area where the acquis is suspended. 
The Green Line Regulation has managed to partially but effectively lift the economic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and has brought the two ethno-religious 
segments closer, while taking into account the legitimate concerns of the 
Government of the Republic. Again, as it is the case with regard to the rules 
concerning the crossing of persons, the Union, in a seemingly neutral, depoliticised 
and technical way, has facilitated the exercise of a fundamental freedom of Union 
citizens without recognising any other authority on the island apart from the Cypriot 
Government. 
 
4. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECT TRADE 
REGULATION 
4.1 The proposal 
Following the outcome of the referendums on the Annan Plan, and in view of the vote 
of the Turkish Cypriot community, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
reporting on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, expressed his hope that the 
Members of the UN Security Council ‘can give a strong lead to all States to 
cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary 
restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and 
impeding their development.’123 Consequently, the EU Council, on 26 April 2004, 
invited the Commission ‘to bring forward comprehensive proposals’ given its 
declared determination to bring an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and to facilitate the reunification of the island by encouraging the 
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 M. Watson, ‘Growing Together? – Prospects for Economic Convergence and Reunification 
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Europe (October 2007). 
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economic development of the Turkish Cypriots. Particular emphasis should be 
placed, according to the Council, on the economic integration of the island and on 
improving contact between the two communities and with the EU. Thus, the 
Commission services drafted a proposal for a Council Regulation on special 
conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control124 and a 
proposal for an instrument of financial support, since the Council ‘recommended that 
the 259 million euro already earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of 
a settlement now be used for this purpose.’125 
The latter proposal, which in view of the political situation and with a view to 
allocating the financial support in the most efficient and rapid way, provided for the 
rules according to which the earmarked financial assistance of the 259 million euro 
would be supplied directly to the beneficiaries, was welcomed and eventually 
adopted by all the Member States. On 27 February 2006, the Council adopted the 
Council Regulation 389/2006 establishing an instrument for encouraging the 
economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community in order for the remaining 
139 million euro of the money earmarked for northern Cyprus not to be lost. Despite 
the fact that it would have consisted of a decisive step for the economic integration of 
the isolated Turkish Cypriot community in the EU by offering a preferential regime for 
products originating in the “Areas” entering the Customs Territory of the EU directly, 
and not via the line, the former proposal met fierce opposition by the Republic and 
hence it has not yet been adopted. The “decoupling” of the two Regulations was a 
declared goal and policy of the Republic during those two years of negotiations. 
The initial Commission proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation provided for specific 
conditions for direct trade between northern Cyprus and EU Member States. It 
offered a preferential regime for products originating in northern Cyprus and entering 
the Union Customs Territory.126 It provided inter alia detailed rules concerning the 
documents that would certify the origin of goods and which would be issued by the 
TCCoC authorised by the Commission,127 phytosanitary inspection,128 food and 
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product safety, taxation issues, communication obligations, and safeguard measures 
in the event of ineffective cooperation, irregularities or fraud.129 It proposed that the 
preferential regime should take the form of a tariff quota system130 which would be 
established with a view to encouraging economic development while avoiding the 
creation of artificial trade patterns or facilitating fraud.131  
Thus, if the proposal were to have been adopted without any amendments, the direct 
trade between northern Cyprus and the Union Member States would function as 
follows. Certain goods arriving from the “Areas” would be exempt from custom duties 
and charges having equivalent effect. The TCCoC would issue the necessary 
certificates of origin. Independent experts would be charged to carry out 
phytosanitary inspection and reporting so that plants and other products covered by 
EC Directive 2000/29/EC could also enter the common customs territory. Once those 
northern Cypriot products enter into another Member State they could be released 
for free circulation into the customs territory of the Community.132  
No party to the conflict, including the Republic of Cyprus, has disputed the political 
value of the proposed Regulation. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that a direct 
trade regime would bring the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the Union in 
accordance with the guidelines of the European Council, and would also help to 
bridge the economic cleavages between the two ethno-religious segments on the 
island. To that effect, in a recent report the International Crisis Group has pointed out 
that the adoption of such a regime ‘would give an important signal that the [peace] 
talks are in earnest and will end with a federal partnership between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot States’ and ‘would also encourage the Turkish Cypriot side to build 
its capacity for dealing with reunification.’133 The Government of the Republic, 
however, has been particularly concerned about the legal basis of the proposal and 
whether the arrangements provided by it will effectively mean the indirect recognition 
of any authority in the “Areas” other than the internationally recognised Government. 
Thus far, the kind of compromise which allowed for the enactment of the Green Line 
Regulation has not been possible. 
 
                                                 
129
 Article 7 of the proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation. 
130
 Article 4 of the proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation. 
131
 Recital (4) of the Preamble of the proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation. 
132
 Article 1 of the Proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation. 
133
 International Crisis Group ‘Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition’, Europe Report N°190 – 
10 January 2008, p. 11. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
169 
4.2 Legal Assessment 
In order to assess the aforementioned concerns of the Government of the Republic, 
the following legal issues will be addressed with regard to the design of a proposal 
for a Direct Trade Regulation: First of all, what is the appropriate legal basis for such 
a Regulation? Secondly, does the proposal present problems with regard to either 
international law or EC law and especially the principle of loyal cooperation, in view 
of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has declared the closure of 
ports in northern Cyprus? And thirdly, is Article 2(2) of the proposal legally correct, 
insofar as it would allow for the Commission, on its own and without the agreement 
of the Government of the Republic, to designate the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce or other body as a competent authority for implementation purposes? 
Firstly, as far as the legal basis of the Regulation is concerned, note that ‘the choice 
of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution’s conviction 
as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are 
amenable to judicial review… Those factors include in particular the aim and content 
of the measure.’134 In the case of the Commission proposal for a Direct Trade 
Regulation, according to Recital (3), its aim is to ‘facilitate trade between [the] areas 
and Member States other than Cyprus.’ In addition, the essential content of the 
proposal is the free circulation of products originating in northern Cyprus and are 
transported directly therefrom into the Community customs territory with ‘exemption 
from customs duties and charges having equivalent effect within the limits of annual 
tariff quotas’ determined by the Commission135 in accordance with Article 1(1) of the 
proposal. Finally, the proposal is based on Article 133 EC.  
The critical question here is whether the proposed Regulation foresees the partial 
“withdrawal of the suspension” of the acquis. If that is the case, Article 1(2) of 
Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003 provides for a specific legal basis and 
procedure for withdrawing the suspension. According to this, ‘[t]he Council, acting 
unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the 
withdrawal of the suspension’ of the acquis. As already mentioned in CHAPTER TWO, 
the term acquis is neither a terminus technicus nor is it defined by Union legislation. 
It has been defined, however, by the Commission in texts adopted during the course 
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of or at the end of each enlargement process.136 For example, in a common 
declaration on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) annexed to the Act 
on the conditions of accession of Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway the Union 
has noted the confirmation by these States ‘of their full acceptance of the rights and 
obligations attaching to the Union and its institutional framework, known as the 
acquis communautaire, as it applies to present Member States. This includes in 
particular the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties, including 
those of the Treaty on European Union.’137 More recently, the Commission defined 
the term acquis in its opinion on the accession of Cyprus and the other nine then 
candidate States to the Union. Acquis comprises the Treaty on European Union and 
all its objectives, all decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on European Union and the 
options taken in respect of the development and strengthening of those Communities 
and of the Union.138  
Hoffmeister argues that since the proposed Direct Trade Regulation does not provide 
for a mechanism that would equate the application of articles 28-30 EC to northern 
Cyprus it does not constitute acquis in accordance with the aforementioned 
definition. To that effect, he refers to the fact that the regime does not cover all goods 
but exempts a substantial part. Moreover, the covered goods would be subject to 
tariff quotas, constituting an entry regime like the one in place for other privileged 
access of third country products, and would be only released for free circulation in 
the internal market after clearance by the respective Union Member State. Finally, 
the strong safeguard provision of Article 7 of the proposal and the fact that the 
Government of the Republic would not be responsible for the functioning of the 
regime demonstrate that its application would not mean the extension of the 
application of Articles 28-30 to the “Areas”. Thus, the Regulation, if adopted, would 
not partially withdraw the suspension of the acquis. 
More importantly, Hoffmeister claims that even if it were to ‘constitute acquis, […] it 
would not apply “in” northern Cyprus.’ ‘Rather the Member States would apply it 
when dealing with goods from northern Cyprus.’139 Thus, he agrees with the 
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submission of the Commission, in its explanatory memorandum of the proposal,140 
that Article 133 EC should be the legal basis for a regulation which regulates entry 
into the EU customs territory. In the memorandum, the Commission points out that 
there are precedents for cases where Article 133 has been used as a basis for 
regulating customs duties on imports from Member States’ territories that are outside 
the EC customs territory such as Gibraltar and Ceuta and Melilla.141  
The “Areas”, however, are outside the EC customs territory not by virtue of Article 
299 EC but because the acquis has been suspended pursuant to Article 1 of Protocol 
No 10 of the Accession Treaty. This is important especially because paragraph 2 of 
this Article provides, as already mentioned, a special legal basis for withdrawing the 
suspension of the acquis. The essential content of the proposal provides, in Article 
1(1), that products which ‘originate in the Areas and are transported directly 
therefrom, may be released for free circulation into the customs territory of the 
Community with exemption from customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect within the limits of annual tariff quotas...’ On the other hand, according to 
Article 3(1)(a)EC, ‘the activities of the Community shall include… the prohibition, as 
between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the 
import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect.’ 
Thus, the application of the Regulation would amount to a partial withdrawal of the 
suspension of the acquis. Given also that nothing in Article 1(2) of Protocol No 10 
prevents the Council from withdrawing the suspension of the acquis partially, or in 
stages, the correct legal basis for the adoption of the Commission Proposal for a 
Direct Trade Regulation could be Article 1(2) of Protocol No 10, which also has the 
value of lex specialis, and not Article 133 EC.  
Alternatively, one could argue that, since the EC Treaty does not provide the 
necessary powers for the necessary action by the EC in order to address that lacuna 
in the EC legal order and to attain, in the course of the common market, the objective 
of harmonious, balanced and economic development of economic activities and the 
raising of the standard of living and quality of life for the Turkish Cypriot community, 
Article 308 EC is a more appropriate legal basis. This argument, however, is far less 
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convincing given that Article 1(2) of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus has the value of 
primary law and of lex specialis in relation to the EC Treaty.  
To sum up this point, the appropriateness of article 133 EC as the legal basis for the 
Direct Trade Regulation is closely connected to whether the Union foresees the 
withdrawal of the suspension of the acquis through the proposed regime. Although 
the case could be argued from all sides, it is my opinion that if the Direct Trade 
Regulation comes into force, part of the free movement of goods acquis will be 
extended to northern Cyprus. Hence, for all the aforementioned reasons, the Union 
should consider Article 1(2) of Protocol No 10 as the appropriate legal basis.  
Although, prima facie, the debate over the appropriate legal basis may seem too 
legalistic, in reality it is a political one. It is very important for the Republic that the 
Union recognises, even indirectly, that it is the same political anomaly that has led to 
the drafting of Protocol No 10 that also leads to the adoption of such a special 
measure. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the political reason for the 
Commission to suggest Article 133 EC is that it would allow the Union to adopt such 
a measure through a QMV procedure.  
Second, the question arises whether the proposal presents problems with regard to 
international law or EC law and especially the principle of loyal cooperation, in view 
of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has declared the closure of 
ports in the “Areas” North of the Green Line. Whereas the Green Line Regulation 
provided for the export of goods across the Green Line and therefore through Cypriot 
territory within the control of the Republic, the proposed Regulation would allow for 
the export of goods directly through those closed ports. The critical issue here is the 
need for the consent of the Republic of Cyprus. The International Court of Justice 
has confirmed the rule of international law according to which every State is entitled 
to ‘regulate access to its ports.’142 Thus, the Government of the Republic was entitled 
to declare the closure of the ports in the “Areas” and every State has a duty under 
international law to respect this decision. Since the Commission proposal for a Direct 
Trade Regulation does not require the consent of the Government of the Republic in 
order for goods to be exported from ports and airports in the “Areas”, given the QMV 
procedure, this may lead to an adoption of a regulation that is not compatible with 
international law. In other words, the Union cannot establish trade relations with the 
areas North of the Green Line, thereby disregarding the decision of the Cypriot 
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Government to close the ports outside its control. If closing the ports could be 
disregarded, the Government would be exposed to a risk of incurring international 
liability for acts that it cannot control. 
On the other hand, creating an incentive for Turkish Cypriots to use ports/airports 
closed by the Government is not illegal under international law. Otherwise, every 
State accepting products arriving from northern Cyprus would bear international 
responsibility just by operating its customs regime.143 Such a thesis has not been 
supported by any practice. Even the Court of Justice in Anastasiou I did not hold that 
allowing privileged trade with northern Cyprus would undermine the decision of the 
Cypriot Government to close relevant ports and airports. However, the proposed 
Regulation would go further by establishing a regime that would facilitate the use of 
those ports. The crucial point here is that international law requires the consent of the 
Government of the Republic for the use of ports/airports in the North for the purposes 
of this Regulation, and that such consent is the necessary and sufficient condition in 
order to ensure the full compatibility of the proposed Regulation with international 
law. In any case, it is noted that the consent of the Republic should be supplemented 
by a revision of its order declaring its ports closed, communicated to the International 
Maritime Organisation on 12 December 1974.  
As for EC law, there is also a specific duty of loyal cooperation between the 
Community and the Member States enshrined in Article 10 EC. Cremona144 argues 
that ‘the duty of cooperation is a constitutional principle developed in the context of 
mixed agreements but of broader application and deriving from the requirement of 
unity in the international representation of the Community.’ Such a duty is of general 
application and does not depend either on whether the Community competence 
concerned is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter into obligations 
towards non-member countries.145 The Court held, in its judgment in Case C-339/00 
Ireland v. Commission,146 that ‘the duty to cooperate in good faith governs relations 
between the Member States and the institutions’147 and has emphasised that this 
obligation ‘imposes on Member States and the Community institutions mutual duties 
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to cooperate in good faith.’148 Hence, it could be argued that insofar as the proposal 
ignores the sovereign right of the Government of Cyprus to declare the closure of the 
ports in the “Areas”, its adoption, without the consent of the Republic, would be prima 
facie contrary to Community law and especially the duty of loyal cooperation. As 
expressed more directly in the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘The Union shall respect [the 
Member States’] national identities inherent in their fundamental structures… it shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State.’149This argument, however, should not be read as being in favour of the 
“resurrection” of the Luxembourg Compromise. This is because, in the present case, 
the exercise of QMV to outvote one of the Member States would not just be contrary 
to one of its essential interests. The opening of the ports of entry of northern Cyprus, 
without the consent of the Republic, would be, on the one hand, contrary to 
international law and, on the other, it would question the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus given the de facto division of the island. 
On the other hand, it can also be suggested150 that, since Article 3 of Protocol 10 
explicitly provides that measures promoting the economic development of northern 
Cyprus are permitted, it would be odd if the implementation of this Article by the 
adoption of a Direct Trade Regulation could constitute, at the same time, a breach of 
loyalty vis-à-vis Cyprus. However, it is not the implementing measure per se that 
presents problems with regard to this principle but rather the legal architecture of the 
proposed Regulation. If the Government of Cyprus gives its consent to the opening 
of some ports/airports for such purposes, then the measure would be fully compatible 
with EU law. As argued, the duty of cooperation is a mutual one. Thus, while 
Community law cannot undermine a Member State’s sovereign rights, each Member 
State is under an obligation of Community law ‘to facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks’, including the implementation of Article 3 of Protocol 10 and ‘to 
abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of 
the Treaty.’151 A constructive approach from the Republic’s side, with regard to the 
adoption of measures with a view to the further economic development of northern 
Cyprus, seems, in my opinion, sufficient to satisfy the objective of the said Article 3.   
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Finally, with regard to Article 2(2) of the draft Regulation which would allow the 
Commission to designate the TCCoC or other body as a competent authority for 
implementation purposes of the future Direct Trade Regulation, without the consent 
of the legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the following has to be 
noted. As far as international law is concerned, the UN Security Council in Resolution 
541 (1983) called upon ‘all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the 
Republic of Cyprus’ and in Resolution 550 (1984) ‘not to recognise the purported 
State of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.’ Equally, as mentioned earlier, it 
is explicitly laid down in the Treaty of Accession 2003 and Protocol No 10 that the 
Republic includes the whole island with a single Government, even though the latter 
cannot exercise effective control over the whole country. Thus, the EU or its 
institutions cannot recognise any authority other than the Government of the 
Republic. Designating a body like TCCoC, without the agreement of the Government, 
would constitute the explicit recognition of another authority, which would be contrary 
to both international and EU law. In fact, Article 4(5) of the Green Line Regulation 
recognises this point by providing for an agreement between the Commission and 
the Government in order to authorise the TCCoC, as well as the subsequent 
Decision 2004/604/EC by which the TCCoC was duly authorised, after the 
Government had given its agreement to that authorisation. Moreover, it is inherent to 
the system of the EC Treaty and the division of powers between the Community and 
the Member States that each Member State has the right to determine the competent 
authority which is responsible for the implementation of any act of the EC law in its 
own territory. 
The legal debate concerning the Direct Trade Regulation, intellectually stimulating as 
it may be, is nevertheless a political debate in disguise, as is the case for all the 
debates on legal issues rising from the Cyprus conflict. The lifting of the economic 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community is one of the most important bargaining 
chips in the hands of the Greek Cypriot community, which cannot accept that it might 
lose it without gaining any benefit, through a QMV procedure. The Union has 
acknowledged this reality. This is the reason why the Luxembourg Presidency invited 
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities for three rounds of confidential 
talks in 2005. The central idea was to allow for direct trade only through the port of 
Famagusta, which would be administered by the Commission services,152 upon the 
authorisation of the Republic of Cyprus. Such an arrangement would have been in 
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conformity with the Green Line regime since the EU got around the recognition 
conflict by means of the authorisation of the TCCoC by the Republic. In return, the 
Turkish Cypriots would sign a moratorium for the protection of Greek Cypriot property 
in the North and would engage to discuss the return of Varosha153 and the Green 
Line Regulation should be amended to the effect that more goods would come under 
the ratione materiae of the preferential arrangement available under former Article 
4(2), as it was the case for citrus fruit under Commission Regulation 1624/2005.154 
During the second half of 2006, Finland, having assumed the presidency of the 
Council of the EU, made a series of proposals with regard to the adoption of the 
Direct Trade Regulation. According to the Finnish proposals, Turkish Cypriots would 
have been allowed to carry out trade with the EU though the EU-controlled port of 
Famagusta. Varosha, on the other hand, would be opened for resettlement under the 
UN control for two years. In exchange, Turkey would have opened its ports for use 
by Greek Cypriot vessels by implementing the Ankara Agreement, together with its 
additional protocols.155 Unfortunately, no such deal was struck.  
It remains to be seen whether the Direct Trade Regulation will be adopted and, if it is 
adopted, whether it will provide an effective device that would bring an end to the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, and thus facilitate the reunification of the 
island. It is definitely the case, however, that such an adoption would bring the 
Turkish Cypriot community closer to the EU by enhancing the right to trade of some 
EU citizens that have been isolated because of this political Gordian knot. 
 
4.3 “Taiwan-isation”? 
An issue that is often connected with the possible future adoption of a Direct Trade 
Regulation and the lifting of the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community 
is what has been described as the “Taiwan-isation” of northern Cyprus.156 This 
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neologism refers to the upgrade of the regime in the North to a de facto, not 
internationally recognised, State entity that would enjoy the possibility of developing 
economic relations and cooperation with other States without being a de iure State 
and without maintaining full diplomatic relations with other internationally recognised 
States. The term appeared for the first time in the history of international relations in 
the aftermath of the historical UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 on 25 October 
1971.157 According to this Resolution, the General Assembly decided to recognise 
the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China to the UN 
and as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and to expel the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek (Republic of China (Taiwan)) from the place ‘they 
unlawfully occup[ied] at the United Nations and in all the organisations related to 
it.’158 
Following this Resolution, the vast majority of UN Members withdrew their 
recognition of the Government of Taiwan as the lawful Government of China, 
recognised the Government of People’s Republic of China as the lawful 
representative of China and broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.159 Despite 
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this, the Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) is not isolated from the rest 
of the world. Apart from the 24 States that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 
the vast majority of the other States continue to maintain informal but strong relations 
with it, unlike the situation concerning the relations of the regime in northern Cyprus 
and the rest of the world. 
For example, after breaking off diplomatic relations with Taiwan Japan founded a 
private “company” called “Interchange Association” with an office in Taipei. Equally, 
Taiwan founded a private “company” called “Association of East-Asian Relations” 
with offices in many Japanese cities. Although, formally speaking, the two companies 
are private, in reality, they function as informal consular authorities, are funded by 
their Governments and their staff consisted of governmental officers that appear to 
be on leave from their offices.160 On the other hand, the US has gone a step further 
by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act.161 The scope of this legislative act is to ‘help 
maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific’ ‘by authorising the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the 
United States and the people on Taiwan.’ With such a legal formula, the US 
Government managed to establish relations with Taiwan without recognising it as a 
State.  At the same time, it founded the American Institute of Taiwan162 which, 
although it appears to be a non-profit organisation, is the authorised agency through 
which any agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan is entered into, performed or 
enforced. More importantly, section 4(c) of the Act approves the continuation in force 
of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, 
entered into by the US and the Government of Taiwan before the “de-recognition” of 
it as the lawful Government of China. Finally, the Act recognised the capacity of 
Taiwan to sue and be sued in US courts.163 In that way, the US Government has 
recognised the de facto sovereignty of Taiwan.164  
Both those paradigms of informal relations with the regime in Taiwan carefully do not 
question the de jure sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China on Taiwan. Most 
States follow the Japanese paradigm. At the same time, the internationally 
recognised Government of China accepts the informal existence of mainly 
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commercial and economic relations of Taiwan with the rest of the world. To this 
effect, it encourages the use of terms like “Taipei, China” or “Taiwan, China” that 
imply that Taiwan is part of China.165 
The most important proof, however, that Taiwan is not isolated from the rest of the 
world is its WTO membership. According to Article XII of the WTO Agreement, the 
WTO membership not only includes States but also includes separate customs 
territories possessing full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial 
relations and in other matters covered by the WTO Agreement. Even the Explanatory 
Notes attached to the WTO Agreement stipulate that the terms “country” or 
“countries”, as used in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, are to 
be understood to include any separate customs territory Member of the WTO and the 
term “national” shall be read as pertaining to that customs territory, unless otherwise 
specified. Thus, the separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, commonly referred to as Chinese Taipei, became the 144th WTO Member on 
January 2002. 
The question, thus, that should be addressed for the purposes of the present 
research is whether the adoption of such a direct trade regime would launch the 
“Taiwan-isation” procedure of northern Cyprus. In other words, are we close to the 
creation of such flexible inter-State mechanisms as the ones described above that 
could circumvent the fact that the regime in northern Cyprus is not internationally 
recognised?  
Legally speaking, even if the Commission proposal for a Direct Trade Regulation was 
adopted without any amendments and thus without taking into account the legitimate 
concerns of the Republic, it would nevertheless not alter the status of the authorities 
in the North to such an extent as to amount stricto sensu to a “Taiwan-isation” of 
northern Cyprus. Firstly, such a Direct Trade Regime would not mean that “TRNC” 
would be recognised as a State by the Union Member States, a development that 
would go further than the meaning of “Taiwan-isation”. Equally, the adoption of such 
a regulation would not effectively amount to a full membership of the illegal de facto 
State entity to an international organisation as it is the case for Taiwan and WTO. It 
would not even create a new institutional structure that would play the role of a 
consular authority as it is the case for the Japanese “Interchange Association”, the 
“Association of East-Asian Relations” of Taiwan and the American Institute of 
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Taiwan. It would just create direct trade relations between the Union and one part of 
the EU where the acquis is suspended. Thus, is the academic and political debate 
about the “Taiwan-isation” of the North totally unfounded? 
First of all, it should be understood that a structural stalemate à la Taiwan is a status 
quo that would not arise ex nihilo. It presupposes a rather long process, during which 
the breakaway State in the North will continue to be internationally unrecognised 
while the international community will gradually lift the restrictions and the isolations 
on the North, which eventually would “taiwan-ise” the “TRNC”. In such a case, the 
international recognition of “TRNC” from some Muslim or Central Asian Turkic 
speaking countries should not be ruled out.  
Secondly, it can be observed that, during the last years and especially in the 
aftermath of the referendums for the Annan Plan, the status of the regime in the 
North has been somewhat upgraded. Turkish Cypriots have two elected 
representatives with the right to speak, though not vote, in the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly. In a recent Resolution, the Assembly asked the Republic 
‘not to oppose increased international contacts of Turkish Cypriots in the areas of 
culture, education, sport and youth exchanges, insofar as these contacts are not 
misused for political purposes or incompatible with the reunification of the island.’166 
The Turkish Cypriot community has quasi-diplomatic representation in Brussels and 
lobbying rights in the European Parliament. At the same time, several States 
maintain a representation in northern Cyprus, namely Australia, France, Germany, 
the UK and the US. They have been very careful to avoid any implied recognition of 
the secessionist entity by never claiming that their offices are embassies or 
consulates.167 On the other hand, the EU does not have any form of representation in 
the North.168 Furthermore, in July 2004, the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference upgraded the status of the Turkish Cypriot observer delegation from that 
of a “community” to a “State”, based on the Annan Plan. In October 2007, Syria, 
once an advocate of Greek Cypriot interests in the Arab and Islamic worlds, allowed 
a ferry link from Turkish Cypriot Famagusta to Lattakia, closed since the 1970s, to 
                                                 
166
 Resolution 1628 (2008) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at para 
11.2.2. 
167
 For instance, the Australians refer to their office as “Australian place”, whereas the 
Germans refer to their location as the “Information Office of the German Embassy”, clearly 
indicating that it is merely an information office linked to the official embassy in the 
Government Controlled part of the island. M. Brus, M. Akgün, S. Blockmans, S. Tiryaki, T. 
van den Hoogen, W. Douma, A promise to keep: Time to end the international isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots (Tesev Publications, 2008) at 32. 
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 Ibid. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
181 
resume twice weekly.169 More importantly, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Xenides-Arestis and subsequent case law, as already mentioned in the previous 
CHAPTER, has allowed Turkey and its ‘subordinate local administration’ to set up a 
local remedy for addressing Greek Cypriot property claims in the North.  
All the aspects referred to above and pointing to the upgrade of the “TRNC”, 
combined with the effective lifting of the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community through the existing Green Line framework and the possible future 
adoption of the Direct Trade Regulation, point to the fact that, at the moment, the 
process that would lead to the “Taiwan-isation” might have started. This could lead to 
a normalisation of the relations between the two ethno-religious segments on the 
island and between the regime in the North and the Union Member States but, at the 
same time, there is a significant danger that such a development may lead to an 
absolute political stasis to the quest for a comprehensive settlement to the conflict. 
According to conflict resolution theory, negotiation occurs along the bargaining range 
or the range in which the win-sets of the principal parties overlap. This includes all 
points of agreement which both parties prefer to their “security point” or their “Best 
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA).170 In our case, the lifting of the 
economic isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community through a direct trade regime, 
combined with all the already mentioned aspects of the recent upgrade of the regime 
in northern Cyprus, would raise their BATNA and thus the negotiation for a solution 
would become more difficult. Moreover, if, in return for the adoption of such regime, 
the return of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots is agreed, as the proposal of the 
Luxembourg Presidency was providing in 2005, the Greek-Cypriot BATNA will also 
be raised.171 On the other hand, it may be the case that such an agreement between 
the two parties would offer the necessary impetus for launching a successful 
procedure for a comprehensive settlement.  
In any case, a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the legal 
differences between the status of the regime of northern Cyprus in the aftermath of 
the adoption of a Direct Trade Regulation and that of Taiwan and, on the other, the 
political danger that the adoption of such a measure may entail. Finally, one has to 
point out that, although a comprehensive settlement should be the ultimate goal of 
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 International Crisis Group, op.cit., supra note 133, at 25. 
170
 N. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution (Ashgate, 2004); R. Fisher and 
W. Ury, Getting to a Yes – Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In (Random House, 
1991). 
171
 Ελευθεροτυπία [Eleftherotypia -Freedom of Press] reports on 25, 26, 27 and 28 February 
2006. 
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both communities, the Turkish Cypriots should not remain “hostages” of the failure to 
achieve one. At the end of the day, despite having expressed their clear desire for a 
future within the EU in the referendums of 24 April 2004, the exercise of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms is restricted due to the suspension of the acquis. It 
is an obligation of the Union to facilitate such an exercise as much as possible. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
As it has become obvious from the analysis of the provisions of the Green Line 
Regulation with regard to the crossing of goods, the mechanism set by that legislative 
device is an important step for bringing the two communities closer but it is far from a 
panacea. It is apparent that the Union has managed to partially lift the economic isolation 
of the Turkish Cypriot community while taking into account the legitimate concerns of the 
Republic that no other authority in the North be recognised. The Green Line Regulation, 
albeit a prime example of the pragmatism that the Union has shown when dealing with 
aspects of the conflict, has not proved particularly successful in enabling goods, 
originating in the areas not under the effective control of the Republic, to penetrate the 
EC Market. It may be the case that a future adoption of a Direct Trade Regulation172 or a 
significant amendment to the legal framework of the Green Line Regulation, broadening 
its scope, will further the economic integration of the island. Such devices, however, can 
only offer partial solutions to the Cyprus issue and it is only under certain conditions that 
their adoption may entail a political stasis. The ultimate objective of the two communities 
must be the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem through the reunification 
of the island under the aegis of a democratic and independent State in order to 
effectively address the various problems created by that political Gordian knot. The 
Union should be determined to play a positive and more active role in bringing about a 
just and lasting settlement within the UN framework and in line with EU principles and 
should remain willing to accommodate the terms of such a settlement. 
  
                                                 
172
 Paragraph 11.2.1 of Resolution 1628 (2008) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe calls upon the authorities of the Republic to ‘lift objections to the adoption of the 
Council of the European Union’s Direct Trade Regulation put forward by the European 
Commission allowing free direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and the EU through their 
own ports.’ 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TAKING CYPRUS’S EU MEMBERSHIP INTO ACCOUNT 
FOR A FUTURE SETTLEMENT PLAN 
 
‘April is the cruellest month, breeding 
Lilacs of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain.’ 
The Burial of the Dead 
The Waste Land, T.C. Elliot (1922) 
 
‘ESTRAGON: Let's go.  
VLADIMIR: We can't.  
ESTRAGON: Why not?  
VLADIMIR: We're waiting for Godot.  
ESTRAGON: (despairingly). Ah!’  
Waiting for Godot, Samuel Beckett (1952) 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The first unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement on the Cyprus problem that 
would accommodate the different concerns and demands of the two main ethno-
religious communities on the island, their motherlands and the UK dates back to the 
1930’s. However, it was not until the end of the 1950’s that the parties to that conflict 
agreed that the status of Cyprus should be a bi-communal, independent Republic. 
The Cyprus Agreements that established the Republic of Cyprus reflect the political 
compromise between the different interests, concerns and demands of Greece, 
Turkey and the UK. Those different positions, with regard to the solution of the 
Cyprus issue, were clearly expressed during the second half of the 1950’s when, on 
the one hand, the struggle against the British colonial powers for Enosis had taken 
place and on the other the first shy suggestions for Taksim were expressed.  
Both communities, even after the birth of the Republic, were looking at the Zurich-
London Agreements as just a step towards the accomplishment of their aspirations. 
Thus, inevitably, the constitutional structure of the Republic that was demanding the 
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cooperation between the two segments was questioned from the very first years of 
its life. In the aftermath of the 1963 inter-communal conflict, which caused the 
establishment of the Green Line, the two communities together with the three 
Guarantor States and the UN started negotiating again in order to find a viable 
solution for Cyprus while disorder and anarchy prevailed on the island. Such efforts 
were intensified after the 1974 Turkish invasion.  
The Atcheson Plan, the Gobbi Initiative, the First and Second Sets of Ideas, the Galo 
Plaza’s plan are some of the past proposals for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. 
Most of them, and especially the plans drafted by the UN, were largely based on the 
principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two communities. 
All those principles also appeared , unsurprisingly, in the most holistic UN attempt for 
a solution of this ancient saga, the Annan Plan, the final version of which was 
presented to the two communities on 31 March 2004, a month before the Republic’s 
accession to the EU. The new state of affairs envisaged by the Annan Plan, 
however, was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots at the referendums of 
24 April 2004. A week later, Cyprus as a whole became one of the ten new EU 
Member States although the acquis can be applied only in the Government 
Controlled Areas.  
Interestingly enough, although, as mentioned in a previous CHAPTER, the “carrots and 
sticks” available in the negotiation process for the EU accession have been used by 
the UN in order to secure the consensus of the parties for a solution, the signing of 
the Act of Accession 2003, itself, had a very different impact to the dynamics of the 
conflict. During the last phases of the negotiations for the Annan Plan and the 
referendum campaign, some of the most prominent Greek Cypriot advocates of “No” 
have argued that the certain future EU accession of the Republic would increase the 
leverage of the Greek Cypriot community and thus that the prospects for a 
settlement, that would better address their interests and concerns, would be more 
possible after 1 May 2004. The then President of the Republic, Papadopoulos, in his 
dramatic speech on 7 April 2004, asked the Greek Cypriots to say ‘a resounding NO 
on 24 April,’1 pointing out that if the Greek Cypriots would reject the Plan it would be 
the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus and not the United Cyprus 
Republic that would ‘become a full and equal member of the European Union.’2 In the 
last phrase of his speech, however, he went a step further by referring to the need ‘to 
rally together for a new and more hopeful course for the reunification of our country 
                                                 
1
 Press Release, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 7 April 2004. 
2
 Ibid. 
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through the European Union.’3 At the same time, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot 
community was expressing their clear desire for a future within the EU at massive 
demonstrations and then at the referendum. Overall, one could argue that at that 
moment both communities were hoping that the accession to the Union would have a 
“catalyst effect” in order for a settlement to be achieved. The difference was that the 
Turkish Cypriots were hoping for this to happen through the Annan Plan on 24 April 
2004 while the Greek Cypriots were convinced that the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU would catalyse a settlement that would better serve their interests at a later time.  
However, it is not only officials coming from both sides of the Green Line that have 
been referring to the need for a “European approach/solution” to the Cyprus issue 
before and mainly after Cyprus’s EU accession. Well known academics have also 
tried to trace a “European approach/solution” to the Cyprus problem.4 Although such 
terminology covers quite different notions, it could be argued that the “European 
approach/solution” discourse mainly refers to two distinct but interconnected 
understandings of the role of the EU in such a conundrum. According to the first, 
since Greece and Cyprus, as a whole, are Union Member States and Turkey is a 
candidate State, the EU should probably replace the UN as the principal locus and 
actor in any new initiative to move towards a solution.5 On the other hand, any future 
solution should be in ‘strict compliance with European constitutional principles and 
the acquis communautaire, and international human rights and minority protection 
standards derived from international law and from the European Convention on 
Human Rights and other European instruments.’6 
Undoubtedly, the “European approach/solution” discourse has often been used by 
the elites of both communities in order to cover their maximalist demands, as already 
mentioned in the introduction of the thesis. It is still necessary, however, to examine 
the aforementioned propositions in the light of Union law given that the Republic’s 
EU membership is the new and very important variable introduced to the conflict that 
should be taken into serious consideration. With regard to the first thesis, this 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 See inter alia A. Auer, M. Bossuyt, P. Burns, A. De Zayas, S. Marcus-Helmons, G. 
Kasimatis, D. Oberdoerfer and M. Shaw, A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus 
settlement in the light of international and European law (Paper of the International Expert 
Panel, committed by the Committee for a European solution in Cyprus, presented to 
Members of the European Parliament, 12 October 2005); Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: 
A European Approach Workshop organised by the Hauser Global Law School Program 
and the Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice at 
New York University School of Law (Villa La Pietra, Florence 18-19 October 2006). 
5
 One of the main themes of the NYU conference; supra note 4. 
6
 Auer et al., op.cit., supra note 4, at para 26. 
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CHAPTER argues that the Union does not have the competence under the present 
and the future (after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) institutional and legal 
framework to become the principal locus and actor in a possible future initiative. 
Even in the case that it had such competence, there would be political constraints to 
such an initiative. As far the second is concerned, it is supported that there are 
possible tensions between the Union legal order and the principles upon which the 
two communities have agreed that any future settlement should be based. This does 
not, automatically mean that the agreed framework should be amended. The Union 
has expressed its willingness and its capability to accommodate a solution that would 
entail derogations from Community law in order for a viable solution to the Cyprus 
problem to be achieved.   
 
2. THE UNION AS A PRINCIPAL LOCUS AND ACTOR IN A FUTURE 
INITIATIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
Since 1 May 2004, Cyprus is a Member State of the European Union. On 3 October 
2005, Turkey’s accession negotiations began. Those developments cannot be 
deemed as a trivial change of context in considering any future solution. The Union 
cannot merely overlook the Cyprus issue as if this were an extraneous problem. The 
implications of the conflict for the political life and the legal order of the EU oblige the 
Union to play a really ‘positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement’7 in 
a future initiative since all the parties in the conflict are either EU Member States or 
candidate States. Thus, in the aftermath of the complex political environment that the 
Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan and the accession of the Republic of 
Cyprus created, some politicians and academics suggested that the Union should 
replace the UN as the principal locus and actor in a possible future initiative, as 
already mentioned in the previous section of this CHAPTER. In other words, they were 
calling the Union to engage in principal mediation i.e. to adopt a structural role in 
negotiations by negotiating directly with the conflict parties, thus replacing the UN. 
From an international law point of view, it is critical to note that Chapter VI and 
especially Article 33 of the UN Charter do not prevent the Union from replacing the 
UN and the Secretary General as the principal locus and principal actor in any 
                                                 
7
 European Commission, Agenda 2000 Strengthening the Union and preparing enlargement 
(July 15 1997); available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm 
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possible future initiative for a solution. However, as a matter of political prudence and 
expedience, it is questionable whether the Union should undertake such a role. First 
of all, the Union has a much stronger contractual nexus with the Republic and 
Greece than with the other parties to the conflict and, thus, it is not an impartial 
mediator. Due to the Union membership of those two actors in the conflict, it is seen 
by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as promoting the interests of the Greek Cypriots. 
Secondly, the well established policy of Turkey not to recognise the Cyprus Republic 
and the issue of representation of the Turkish Cypriots in a negotiation, under the 
auspices of a forum that the Republic of Cyprus is a Member State, significantly limit 
the possibilities that the Union can successfully replace the UN in the role of the 
principal mediator. However, it is not only those political constraints that prevent the 
Union to engage in principal mediation. Its present and future institutional and legal 
framework also do not provide for relevant competence. Neither Protocol No 10 on 
Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, nor the EC Treaty, nor the EU Treaty envisage 
that the Union could play such a role. As already mentioned in CHAPTER FOUR, given 
that every legal debate on any issue arising out of this age-old dispute is political in 
disguise, it is important to examine the legal constraints that prevent the EU from 
replacing the UN as a principal mediator because it is more than probable that, 
should the Union ever try to assume such role, the parties in the conflict will use 
those legal constraints against the procedure. In any event, it is not uncommon for 
the parties in the conflict to use every forum as another arena for their political battle, 
a platform for seeking international and local endorsement of their political 
arguments. 
 
2.2 Protocol No 10 
Cyprus became a Member State of the Union on terms provided in Protocol No 10 of 
the Act of Accession.8 Back in 2003, the EU Member States and the acceding States 
felt that it was necessary to reaffirm their commitment to a comprehensive settlement 
of the Cyprus problem in the preamble of the Protocol and to declare their strong 
support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General. They considered, however, that 
they should provide for the suspension of the acquis in the areas not under the 
effective control of the Republic until such a settlement is reached. Although the 
Protocol refers to the fact that measures which would promote civil peace and 
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 See 7.1 of CHAPTER TWO. 
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reconciliation should not be precluded, no other role was envisaged for the EU in the 
event of future negotiations.  
Thus, Article 1 of the abovementioned Protocol provides that the application of the 
acquis shall be suspended in those “Areas”.9 The Council, however, acting 
unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the 
withdrawal of the suspension.10 Article 2 of the Protocol provides for the legal basis 
of the Green Line Regulation. According to this Article, the Council, acting 
unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, shall define the terms 
under which the provisions of EU law shall apply to the Green Line.11 Moreover, in 
the event of a settlement, the Protocol provides for the Council to unanimously 
decide on adaptations of the terms concerning the accession of Cyprus, with regard 
to the Turkish Cypriot community. This provision clearly depicts the willingness of the 
Union to accommodate the terms of a solution of the Cyprus issue in the Union legal 
order.12 As shall be seen in the second part of this CHAPTER such an enabling clause 
provides for a simplified procedure for the amendment of the Act of Accession and, 
thus, the relevant Council acts that would accommodate the terms of a future 
comprehensive settlement may consist of primary law. 
More importantly for this part of the CHAPTER, Article 3 provides that nothing in the 
Protocol should be read as precluding measures adopted with a view to promoting 
the economic development of those “Areas” and that such measures shall not affect 
the application of the acquis in any other part of the Republic. Although this provision 
cannot constitute a legal basis for continued support, it clarifies that the division of 
the island should not rule out the economic assistance from the Union to those 
areas. Indeed, on 27 February 2006, the Council unanimously adopted Regulation 
389/2006 which establishes an instrument for encouraging the economic 
development of the Turkish Cypriot community (Financial Aid Regulation).13 The legal 
basis for this Regulation was Article 308 EC although there is a reference to Article 3 
of Protocol No 10 in the Preamble. 
                                                 
9
 Article 1(1) of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. 
10
 Article 1(2) of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. 
11
 Article 2(1) of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. 
12
 Article 4 of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 2003. If the April 2004 referendums had 
approved the new state of affairs, envisaged in the Annan Plan, the Council of the European 
Union, having regard to Article 4 of Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of the Act of Accession 2003, 
would have unanimously adopted the Draft Act of Adaptation of the Terms of Accession of the 
United Cyprus Republic to the European Union as a Regulation, which consists of Appendix 
D of the Annan Plan.  
13
 O.J. 2006, L 65/5.  
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Pursuant to this Regulation, the Community can provide ‘assistance to facilitate the 
reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish 
Cypriot community with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the 
island, on improving contacts between the two communities and with the EU, and on 
preparation for the acquis communautaire.’14 The assistance can be used for the 
promotion of social and economic development including restructuring; the 
development and restructuring of infrastructure;  reconciliation, confidence building 
measures, and support to civil society;  bringing the Turkish Cypriot community 
closer to the Union, through inter alia information on the European Union’s political 
and legal order; promotion of people to people contacts and Community 
scholarships; preparation of legal texts aligned with the acquis for the purpose of 
these being immediately applicable upon the entry into force of a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem; and preparation for implementation of the acquis 
in view of the withdrawal of its suspension in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No 
10 to the Act of Accession.15 It is important to note that those objectives should be 
realised without the recognition of any other authority. Very recently, the Greek 
Cypriots withdrew six cases filed under the Papadopoulos administration and two 
cases filed under the Christofias administration, over Commission aid programs in 
the North, after winning a change in the labelling of Turkish Cypriot participation in a 
way that avoided any hint of recognition of any other authority on the island.16  
The aforementioned objectives of the aid programme, that have been realised 
through two Commission Decisions,17 point to the limits of the Union’s role in the 
reunification of the island under Article 3 of Protocol No 10. The EU may facilitate the 
reunification of the island but Article 3 does not provide for a competence in order for 
the EU to become the “broker” in a future initiative. On the other hand, it should be 
pointed out that the term ‘measures with a view to promoting the economic 
development of’ the “Areas” has been defined rather widely. It includes the 
strengthening of the civil society and the support of reconciliation and confidence 
building measures including support to the Committee of Missing Persons; the 
facilitation of contacts between the Turkish Cypriot community and the EU through a 
                                                 
14
 Article 1(1) of the Financial Aid Regulation. 
15
 Ibid. at Article 2. 
16
 International Crisis Group ‘Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet’, Europe Report N°194 
– 23 June 2008, 2. The cases had severely hampered the European Commission’s work, 
according to an EC official: ‘We had to use a lot of resources on this… many man hours… it 
was a diversion of focus, very counter-productive and took away time from where we could 
have been more productive and pro-active.’ 
17
 Commission Decision C(2006)5000 of 27.10.2006; Commission Decision C(2006)6533 of 
15.12.2006. 
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scholarship scheme, grants, etc.; and most importantly the preparation of legal texts 
as well as reinforcement to implement the acquis in view of the withdrawal of its 
suspension in accordance with Article 1(2) of Protocol N° 10 to the Act of Accession, 
under the guidance of the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument 
(TAIEX).18  
A recent World Bank study has referred to this last measure which is close to similar 
arrangements during previous and current accession negotiations. The study went a 
step further, however, by proposing that the ‘Turkish Cypriot community in close 
cooperation with the European Commission should implement reforms that would 
bring its foreign trade regime in line with the relevant provisions of the acquis 
communautaire.’ Secondly, it suggested that the Union should incorporate northern 
Cyprus ‘within its customs union with common arrangements for imports from other 
countries and common external tariff provided that the Turkish Cypriot community 
adopts the relevant provisions of the acquis communautaire.’19 It should be noted, 
however, that it is rather doubtful that under the present legal framework, including 
the wide scope of the Financial Aid Regulation, the Union has the competence to 
include an area where the acquis is suspended in its customs union. From a political 
point of view, it is rather improbable that such an initiative would get the consent of 
the Republic.  
In any case, for the purposes of the present part of the CHAPTER, it should be 
mentioned that the legal design of the very brief Protocol No 10 does not attribute 
any role to the Union in future negotiations to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue 
other than the one of an institution that, in the event of the settlement and with regard 
to the Turkish Cypriot Community, would facilitate such a settlement by adopting 
measures that would promote economic development in the “Areas” and by deciding 
on the withdrawal of the suspension and on the adaptations to the terms concerning 
the accession of  Cyprus to the Union. Such a design is justified by the fact that, at 
the time the Protocol was drafted, there was huge optimism for the prospects of the 
proposal of the UN Secretary General. On the other hand, the Protocol clearly 
                                                 
18
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Annual 
Report 2006-2007 on the implementation of Community assistance under Council Regulation 
(EC) No 389/2006 of 26 February establishing an instrument of financial support for 
encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community (Brussels, 
18.9.2007 COM(2007) 536). On the preparation of the legal texts see Commission Decision 
C(2006)2335/4 of 26.6.2006. 
19
 World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia 
Region, ‘Sustainability and Sources of Economic Growth in the northern part of Cyprus’, June 
8, 2006, at para 6.5. 
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reflects the pragmatic policy of minimum involvement that the Union has adopted, as 
seen throughout this research, with regard to the Cyprus problem mainly due to the 
sheer complexities of the issue. A provision that would authorise the Union to 
become the principal locus and actor, in order for a settlement to be reached, would 
not have been compatible with such a pragmatic policy of minimum involvement. 
Such a policy of minimum involvement is also foreseeable given the role of the EU in 
similar situations such as the conflict in Northern Ireland where the Union reduced its 
involvement to the funding of cross-border projects mainly through the INTERREG III 
programme.20 
 
2.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
The adoption of a legislative act that would allow the Union to engage in principal 
mediation in future negotiations to the Union could be prima facie legally based on 
the provisions for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Such an 
initiative would have as its objectives ‘to safeguard the common values and integrity 
of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter, to strengthen the 
security of the Union in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security […], to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’21 The Lisbon Treaty although formally 
abolishing the pillar structure, retains the distinctive nature of the CFSP and reaffirms 
in Article 21(2) TEU that the Union can pursue an action in order to ‘safeguard its 
values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; consolidate and 
support democracy the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law; preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security…’. 
Current Article 12 EU provides for a list of devices available to the Union in order to 
achieve the aforementioned CFSP purposes. The most relevant device, for the 
purposes of acting as the mediator in the Cyprus dispute, would be the possibility for 
joint actions. According to current Article 14(1) EU, joint actions address ‘specific 
situations where operational action by the Union is deemed necessary’ and ‘lay down 
the objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary 
their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.’ They have concerned 
                                                 
20
 T. Salmon, ‘The EU’s Role in Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Northern Ireland’, 7 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2002) 337; B. Laffan and D. Payne, ‘INTERREG III and 
Cross-Border Cooperation in the Island of Ireland’ in A. K. Bourne (ed.), The EU and 
Territorial Politics within Member States. Conflict or Co-operation? (Brill, 2004) 157. 
21
 Article 11(1) TEU. 
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inter alia activities such as support for peace and stabilisation processes through the 
convening of an inaugural conference,22 general support of a specific peace 
process23 and a contribution to a conflict settlement process24 and the appointment of 
a Special Representative.25 After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the joint actions 
will be replaced by decisions defining actions to be undertaken by the Union.26 In any 
case, both the provisions of the Treaties and the Union practice suggest that the role 
of the negotiator between the parties in a dispute could be attributed to the EU by a 
joint action or a decision defining an action in the future. 
It is doubtful, however, that such a joint action/decision will be adopted in the near 
future. From a political point of view, one has to note that it is improbable that the 
Republic of Cyprus would consent to an initiative that would deal with the Cyprus 
problem under the CFSP “label”. It is a well established policy of the Republic, 
accepted by the Union,27 that the Cyprus issue should not, formally at least, be dealt 
within the CFSP context. Including the Cyprus conflict in the CFSP agenda would be 
seen from the side of the Republic as inconsistent with its long-standing policy to 
“Europeanise” the conflict as much as possible and would question the political 
benefits of the accession. Such political concerns should be taken into consideration 
especially in a domain that unanimity is and will be necessary for the adoption of any 
decision. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community would also oppose such 
a development given that Greece and the Republic, as EU Member States, could 
influence any decision taken under the CFSP to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriot 
community. In other words, they rightly contend that, especially after the accession of 
the Republic to the EU, the Union cannot be a principal mediator as it is a party in the 
conflict. 
Apart from those political concerns, the adoption of such a joint action/decision may 
also be problematic from a legal point of view. If the Treaty on European Union is 
interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms, 
following the well established rule of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties, it would be difficult to justify the use of a CFSP device for an 
                                                 
22
 Joint Action 93/728 on the inaugural conference on the stability pact O.J. 1993, L339/1. 
23
 Joint Action 94/276 in support of the Middle East process O.J. 1994, L119/1. 
24
 Joint Action 2001/759 regarding a contribution from the European Union to the conflict 
settlement process in South Osetia O.J. 2001, L286/4. 
25
 Joint Action 2002/211 on the appointment of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina O.J. 2002, L70/7. 
26
 Article 25 TEU Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version). 
27
 It is not irrelevant that aspects concerning the Cyprus issue are mainly dealt with in the 
Council by an Ad hoc working party on the follow up to the Council conclusions on Cyprus of 
26 April 2004. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TAKING EU MEMBERSHIP INTO ACCOUNT FOR A FUTURE SETTLEMENT    
 
  
THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR FREEDOMS IN A (MEMBER) STATE OF SIEGE 
193 
area that is part of the Union and for mediation between two ethno-religious 
segments, the vast majority of the members of which are Union citizens. Although 
the application of the acquis is suspended in the areas not under the effective control 
of the Republic, Cyprus, as a whole, has acceded to the EU and the citizens of the 
Republic are EU citizens. Furthermore it should not be ignored that, until now, the 
Union has used either Protocol No 10 or Article 308 as the legal bases for legislative 
acts concerning this unique political situation. The reason for this, among other 
things, is that legislating on issues concerning the Cyprus problem is not considered 
to be foreign policy making. 
Arguendo, however, that the political concerns are accommodated and the Union 
decides to act on terms provided in a joint action/decision, it should be examined 
whether the Court could judicially review such a decision on terms previously 
analysed. Of course, one may wonder why an issue like the engagement of the 
Union to principal mediation in the Cyprus issue might be brought to the Court of 
Justice for judicial review. In such a hypothetical scenario, the reasons could be 
found in the tendency of the parties in conflict to consider every forum as yet another 
political arena referred to before.  
Prima facie, one should note that, despite the fact that according to current Article 46 
EU the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over decisions taken under CFSP, 
the Airport Transit Visas case,28 and more recently the Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) case,29 suggest that judicial review of CFSP decisions might be 
possible. Firstly, the Airport Transit Visas case concerned a Commission challenge 
to a Council joint action,30 regarding visas which had been adopted under the third 
pillar, on the basis of then Article K.3 EU. The objective of that joint action was the 
harmonization of Member States’ policies as regards the requirement of an airport 
transit visa in order to improve control of the air route. However, the Commission 
considered that such an act should have been adopted on the basis of then Article 
100c EC, concerning the determination of the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of a visa to cross the external borders of the Member States. Thus, 
although that case concerned the delimitation of competences between the first and 
third pillar, it has been suggested that there is no reason why the ECJ’s analysis 
                                                 
28
 Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council (Airport Transit Visas) [1998] ECR I-2763. 
29
 Case C-91/05 Commision v. Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)), judgment 
of 20 May 2008 [not reported yet]. 
30
 Joint Action 96/197 O.J. 1996, L 63/8. 
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should not be relevant also for demarcating the first from the second.31 This was 
recently verified in the SALW case.   
Despite the fact that, unsurprisingly, the Council and one of the Member States 
argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case, the ECJ held that it was 
its task to ensure that acts which, according to the Council, fell within the scope of 
Article K.3 did not encroach upon the powers conferred on the Community by the EC 
Treaty. Hence, the Court had jurisdiction to review the content of a joint action, 
adopted on the basis of the then Article K.3 EU, in the light of (then) Article 100c EC 
in order to ascertain whether the act affected the powers of the EC under that 
provision and to annul the act if it appeared that it should have been based on Article 
100c EC.32 This finding of the Court of Justice has been de facto upheld by the 
Lisbon Treaty. Article 24 EU provides that the ECJ can monitor compliance with 
Article 40 TEU, according to which the implementation of the CFSP should not affect 
‘the application of the procedures and the extent of powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in 
Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union’ and vice versa. 
On 20 May 2008, the Court of Justice delivered its much-awaited judgment in the 
SALW case. In that case, the Commission asked the Court to annul Council Decision 
2004/833/CFSP,33 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP,34 with a view to an EU 
Contribution to ECOWAS in the Framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons and to declare the aforementioned Joint Action illegal and hence 
inapplicable. The main objective of the contested Joint Action was to offer financial 
support and technical assistance to ECOWAS in order to help to consolidate its 
initiative concerning small arms and light weapons.35 However, in the Commission’s 
view, this Joint Action should not have been adopted and that project should have 
been financed from the 9th European Development Fund – “EDF” under the Cotonou 
Agreement.36 
The Court noted, in paragraph 32 of its judgment, that ‘under Article 47 EU, none of 
the provisions of the EC Treaty is to be affected by a provision of the Treaty on 
                                                 
31
 S. Peers, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy 1998’, 18 Yearbook of European Law 
(1998) 661. 
32
 Airport Transit Visas, at paras 13-17. 
33
 O.J. 2004, L 359/65. 
34
 Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution 
to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and 
repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, O.J. 2002, L 191/1. 
35
 Ibid., Recitals (3) and (4) of the Preamble. 
36
 SALW, at para 23.  
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European Union.’ Therefore, it reaffirmed that it is ‘the task of the Court to ensure 
that acts which, according to the Council, fall within the scope of Title V of the Treaty 
on European Union and which, by their nature, are capable of having legal effects, 
do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.’37 It 
then went on to clarify that ‘a measure having legal effects adopted under Title V of 
the EU Treaty affects the provisions of the EC Treaty within the meaning of Article 47 
whenever it could have been adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty, it being 
unnecessary to examine whether the measure prevents or limits the exercise by the 
Community of its competences.’38 Thus, it is irrelevant that the measure could have 
been adopted by the Community in an area that does not fall within its exclusive 
competence.39 The critical question is whether the contested measure ‘infringes 
Article 47 inasmuch as it could have been adopted on the basis of the provisions of 
the EC Treaty.’40 In the SALW case, given that the aim and the content of the 
contested measure ‘contained two components, neither of which can be considered 
to be incidental to the other, one falling within Community development cooperation 
policy and the other within the CFSP’,41 the Court decided that ‘the Council has 
infringed Article 47 EU by adopting the contested decision on the basis of Title V of 
the EU, since that decision also falls within development cooperation policy.’42 
Taking into account both the case law of the Court and the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it could be argued that the ECJ could judicially review a joint action/decision 
that would authorise the Union to become the principal mediator in a peace process, 
as long as it could be claimed that such an act should have been adopted by the 
Community or that it affects the exercise of other Union competences. As shall be 
seen in the following part of the CHAPTER, such an act could neither be adopted by 
the Community at present nor could it come under the scope of Articles 3 to 6 Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in the future. In summary, I would argue that 
the adoption of a joint action/decision by the Council, in order to authorise the Union 
to play the role of the honest broker in the Cyprus issue, is an ultra vires act since a 
CFSP device cannot be used for an area that is part of the Union and for attributing 
the role of the principal mediator in negotiations, between two ethno-religious 
communities the vast majority of the members of which are Union citizens, to the 
Union. Even if one interprets the scope of the CFSP less restrictively, to the effect 
                                                 
37
 Ibid. at para 32. 
38
 Ibid. at para 60. 
39
 Ibid. at para 61. 
40
 Ibid. at para 63. 
41
 Ibid. at para 108. 
42
 Ibid. at para 109. 
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that it covers the relations of the Republic with Turkey and thus the Cyprus conflict, 
this would still be not enough to solve the political and legal issues of the Turkish 
non-recognition policy of the Republic and the Turkish Cypriot representation 
referred to before. In any case, it should be noted that, from an EU law point of view, 
in the rather improbable case that the political concerns of the actors to that conflict 
are eased and the Union adopts a joint action/decision to that effect, the Court would, 
most probably, not find that such a decision encroaches on the powers of the 
Community or affects the exercise of other competences of the Union as shall be 
seen in the following section of the present CHAPTER. 
 
2.4 European Community – Other Union competences 
Unsurprisingly, international dispute resolution does not appear in the list contained 
in Article 2 of the EC Treaty as one of the goals that the Community should achieve 
by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4 EC. 
Equally, it does not appear in Title I of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which 
deals with categories and areas of Union competence. Article 5 EC also clarifies that 
‘[t]he Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.’43 Thus, one could rightly argue 
that prima facie the EC Treaty and the TFEU cannot provide for any legal basis in 
order for the Community to authorise itself as the principal actor in future 
negotiations. 
However, given that action to achieve the unification of Cyprus might be deemed 
necessary in order to fill the lacuna in the EC legal order and thus to also complete 
the operation of the common market in the “Areas”, it may be arguable that Article 
308 EC44 could provide the legal basis for the Community to play the role of the 
honest broker in future negotiations between the two communities. At the end of the 
day, the ethno-religious segments on the island are largely comprised of Union 
citizens. It should be noted, however, that the Lisbon Treaty has clarified that the 
                                                 
43
 Replaced in substance by Article 5 TEU Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version). 
44
 Article 308 EC provides ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and 
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures.’ 
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aforementioned Article45 cannot serve as ‘a basis for attaining objectives pertaining 
to the common foreign and security policy.’ More recently, the Court of Justice in 
Kadi reaffirmed that ‘recourse to that provision demands that the action envisaged 
should, on the one hand, relate to the “operation of the common market” and, on the 
other, be intended to attain “one of the objectives of the Community”.’46 ‘That latter 
concept, having regard to its clear and precise wording, cannot on any view be 
regarded as including the objectives of the CFSP.’47 As already mentioned, despite 
the fact that Cyprus, as a whole, has joined the Union, an act that would attribute the 
role of the “broker” to the EU in peace negotiations is considered as rather serving 
CFSP objectives.  
For the sake of argument, however, imagine that the Commission proposes a 
legislative act, under Article 308 EC after consulting the European Parliament, that 
authorises the Community to become the principal actor in the negotiations for the 
settlement of the Cyprus issue since, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, such an authorisation proved necessary to attain one of its objectives 
included in Article 2 EC, and that legislative act is unanimously approved by the 
Council. Even in this case, the 2/94 Opinion48 of the Court questions the legality of 
such a decision. 
On that occasion, the Council had requested the Opinion of the ECJ, both as regards 
the competence, under the EC Treaty, for the Community to accede to the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the compatibility of such an accession with 
substantive provisions and principles of EC law, in particular the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice and the autonomy of the Community legal order. For the 
purposes of the present research, it is important to note that, according to the Court, 
Article 308 could not serve as a basis for widening the scope of EC powers beyond 
the general framework created by the Treaty provisions, as a whole, and by those 
that defined the tasks and the activities of the EC.49 Article 308 cannot be used as a 
basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect, in substance, would be to amend 
the Treaty without following the procedure provided for that purpose.50 If that 
proposition applied to this case, it would mean that by attributing the role of the 
principal mediator to the Community, in a dispute resolution procedure, the scope of 
                                                 
45
 Article 352 TEU Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version). 
46
 Joined Cases 402/05 P and 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council of the European 
Union, judgment of 3 September 2008 [not reported yet], at para 200. 
47
 Ibid. at para 201. 
48
 Opinion 2/94, Accession to the ECHR, re [1996] ECR I-1759. 
49
 Opinion 2/94, at paras 27-30. 
50
 Ibid.  
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the EC powers would most probably be widened beyond the general framework 
created by the Treaty provisions and Article 308 should therefore not be used as a 
legal basis to that effect. 
 On the other hand, one has to note that accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights would have been, in substance, a Treaty amendment without 
following the procedure provided for by the Treaty. Thus, it is rather difficult to draw 
conclusions from this Opinion for the purposes of this research given that the 
constitutional significance of extending the scope of Community competence to 
include dispute resolution would have been much more trivial than the accession to 
the ECHR.  
In any case, I would argue that neither Article 308 EC (nor Article 352 TFEU) provide 
for a legal basis for authorising the Community, or later the Union, to play the role of 
the honest broker in future negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus issue. Such an 
argument is based on the competences attributed to the Community, the delimitation 
of Article 308 by the Lisbon Treaty and the Kadi judgment and the reasoning of the 
Court in its 2/94 Opinion. Even if one argues that a legislative act, adopted under the 
first pillar, which would attribute the role of the principal mediator to the Community in 
future negotiations of the Cyprus issue, could have as an objective the completion of 
the internal market rather than international dispute resolution, the question whether 
such a legislative measure would encroach on CFSP competences would still remain 
to be answered before Article 308 could be brought into play. The reason for this 
would be that although the stated objective may be the completion of the single 
market, the real aim and content of the act would most probably be dispute 
resolution.51 On the other hand, it may be the case that a Union legislative instrument 
may contain ‘two components, neither of which can be considered to be incidental to 
the other, one falling within Community’ competences and the other within the 
CFSP,52 however, as noted in several points of the present thesis, for the withdrawal 
of the suspension of the acquis which would lead to the completion of the single 
market, there is the special provision of Article 1(2) of Protocol No. 10. Thus, given 
the existence of a provision that is part of the Union primary law and has the value of 
lex specialis, it would be rather difficult to bring Article 308 into play, even in that 
case. 
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 SALW, at para 78. 
52
 Ibid. at para 108. 
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2.5 Ankara Agreement 
Arguably, the Union could attain the role of the negotiator for a solution to the Cyprus 
issue in the course of Turkey’s accession negotiations. According to paragraph 6 of 
the Negotiating Framework with Turkey,53 the advancement of the negotiations will 
be guided by Turkey’s progress in preparing for accession. This progress will be 
measured in particular against some requirements that are mentioned in that 
paragraph. One of them is ‘Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in 
line with the principles on which the EU is founded, including steps to contribute to a 
favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation 
of bilateral relations between Turkey and all Member States, including the Republic 
of Cyprus.’ The 2008 Accession Partnership (AP) with Turkey repeats verbatim that 
requirement.54  
Although the accession negotiations with Turkey will be conducted according to the 
Negotiating Framework, the current pre-accession strategy, as a whole, is based 
upon the evolution of the bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey under the 
Ankara Agreement. This scheme follows the paradigm of the fifth enlargement where 
the Europe or Association Agreements were reoriented under the reinforced pre-
accession strategy in order to provide a vehicle for accession.55 For the purposes of 
the present research, it is critical to note that the Agreement remains the bilateral 
legal basis of the relationship insofar as it concerns the dispute resolution, trade and 
accompanying provisions on services, persons and capital and other common 
provisions. It thus provides the bilateral legal foundation of the pre-accession 
strategy56 and the institutional basis for reviewing progress in the accession 
negotiations.57 Otherwise, the legal and financial instruments of the pre-accession 
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 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf 
54
 Council Decision 2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey and repealing Decision 
2006/35/EC, O.J. 2008, L 51/4. 
55
 For a more detailed analysis see K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements compared in the light 
of their pre-accession reorientation’, 37 Common Market Law Review (2000) 1173. 
56
 K. Inglis, ‘The instruments of the pre-accession strategy’ in A. Ott and K. Inglis, Handbook 
on European Enlargement, a commentary on the Enlargement Process, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 
2002) at 104. 
57
 See common Article 2 of Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, 
priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey 
O.J. 2001, L 85/13; Council Decision 2003/398/EC of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities 
and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, O.J. 2003, L 145/40; 
Council Decision 2006/35/EC of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey O.J. 2006, L 22/34; Council Decision 
2008/157/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
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strategy, mainly the APs and the National Plans for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAAs), run in a parallel and a mutually complementary manner, between the 
Union and Turkey.58 
The APs set out in a single framework both the pre-accession actions to be taken by 
the candidate countries as well as the policy and financial instruments to be taken by 
the EU to help the candidates in their preparations for accession. They are the key 
legal instruments in the administrative and political matrix of policy instruments that 
underpin the pre-accession strategy, which builds on the bilateral structures and 
achievements to date under the Ankara Agreement. Council Regulation 390/2001,59 
which has been modelled upon the Council Regulation 622/98,60 has been the basis 
for four APs with Turkey.61 Being unilateral decisions of the Council, the APs bind 
only the Council and the Member States. However, in response to the priorities and 
objectives laid down in those APs Turkey has adopted two NPAAs,62 under the 
guidance of the relevant AP, and, for the last three years, is in the process of 
adopting a third one. Thus, APs and NPAAs should be seen as mutually 
complementing measures that run in parallel to each other. It is also crucial to note 
that, according to common Article 2 of the three APs with Turkey, in the event of any 
failure of either the EU or Turkey to meet their AP objectives or the Association 
Agreement’s obligations, it is the Association Council in question that will step in to 
resolve the matter in line with the mechanism set up under Article 25 of the Ankara 
Agreement. According to that Article, the Contracting Parties may submit any dispute 
relating to the application or interpretation of the Agreement to the Association 
Council and then, the Association Council may either settle the dispute or submit it to 
the ECJ or any other existing court or tribunal.  
Hence, in accordance with this sophisticated scheme, the Association Council is the 
responsible institution to control how Turkey is responding to the priorities linked to 
                                                                                                                                           
Accession Partnership with Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC, O.J. 2008, L 51/4: 
‘The implementation of the Accession Partnership shall be examined and monitored in the 
bodies established under the Association Agreement and by the Council on the basis of 
annual reports by the Commission.’  
58
 Inglis, op.cit., supra note 56. 
59
 Council Regulation (EC) No 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the 
framework of the pre-accession strategy and in particular on the establishment of an 
Accession Partnership, O.J. 2001, L 58/1. 
60
 Council Regulation (EC) No 622/1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the 
framework of the pre-accession strategy , and, in particular, on the establishment of 
Accession Partnerships, O.J. 1998, L 85/1.  
61
 See supra note 56. 
62
 2001 Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis; 2003 Turkish National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (available at http://www.euturkey.org.tr). 
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the Cyprus issue that are contained in the Negotiating Framework and are echoed in 
the most recent Accession Partnership. Those priorities have been characterised as 
short-term.63 Consequently, one could rightly argue that Turkey’s continued support 
for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem has already 
become part of Turkey’s accession conditionality. This may allow the Union to 
become the mediator to this dispute at a later stage. In any case, the Association 
Council seems omnipotent to authorise the EU to that effect.  
On the other hand, one should stress that such a scenario is rather difficult to be 
realised. The reasons for that are mainly political. On the one hand, the well 
established policy of Turkey not to recognise the Cyprus Republic and, on the other, 
the issue of representation of the Turkish Cypriots in such a forum significantly limit 
the possibilities that the Association Council will become the locus for future 
negotiations for a settlement. Obviously, this is a reality for almost every forum, with 
the exception of the UN, where the two ethno-religious segments negotiate as 
communities.  
Despite this, it should be mentioned that the requirement that any settlement has to 
be in line with the principles on which the EU is founded seems to favour the future 
negotiating position of the Greek Cypriots in the inter-communal negotiations on a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and is in marked contrast to 
Turkey’s vision of ‘a new bi-zonal partnership State’ as envisaged in the Annan 
Plan.64 As already mentioned and as will become clearer in the second part of the 
present CHAPTER, the Annan Plan, as any solution that is based on the principle of bi-
zonality, entailed derogations from the acquis. Thus, it may be the case that a 
reference to the principles on which the Union is founded could mean that in a future 
proposal such derogations should be avoided given that Cyprus is now a Member 
State of the Union. This will be examined in greater detail in the second part of the 
present chapter. 
Apart from the aforementioned direct reference to the settlement of the Cyprus issue, 
the Negotiating Framework has acknowledged the cardinal importance of that 
international political problem for Turkey’s accession negotiations in three other 
respects. As is the case for the issue concerning the support to the UN efforts, all the 
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 Expected to be accomplished within one to two years; Part 3 of the Annex of the 2008 AP 
with Turkey; see supra note 57. 
64
 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Statement No 123. Regarding the Additional 
Protocol to Extend the Ankara Agreement to All EU Members, 29 July 2005, at para 1.  
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other references have also been echoed as short-term priorities in the most recent 
Accession Partnership with Turkey.65 
Thus, according to paragraph 4, the Union ‘expects Turkey to sustain the process of 
reform and to work towards further improvement in the respect of the principle[s] of 
[…] respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ including the full execution 
of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.66 This may be read inter 
alia as an indirect reference to the case law of the Court of Human Rights on issues 
arising from the conflict, as mentioned in a previous CHAPTER.    
Moreover, the Negotiating Framework67 has set the ‘fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations 
under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the 
Association Agreement to all new EU Member States, in particular those pertaining 
to the EU-Turkey customs union’ as a requirement against which Turkey’s progress 
in preparing for accession will be measured.68 Although Turkey signed the Additional 
Protocol on 29 July 2005, it issued a declaration, with which it clarified that its 
signature, ratification and implementation of the Protocol does not ‘amount to any 
form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol.’69  The EU, 
however, in its Counter-declaration of 21 September 2005, has made clear that the 
Turkish declaration ‘is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal 
effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol’ and that ‘[r]ecognition of all 
Member States is a necessary component of the accession process.’ Talmon rightly 
argues that the two declarations ‘do not qualify as reservations but are general 
statements of policy or, at best, interpretative declarations that do not have any effect 
on the substance of the Protocol and that are not binding upon the parties.’70 On the 
other hand, it should be noted that Article 1(3) of the Additional Protocol replaces 
Article 29 of the Ankara Agreement with the following text: ‘This Agreement shall 
apply to the territory to which the Treaty establishing the European Community 
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 See supra note 57. 
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 2008 AP with Turkey; see supra note 57.  
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 Hyphen 4 at para 6. 
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 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in paragraph 14.2 of Resolution 
1628 (2008) has also called upon Turkey to ‘actively seek the establishment of good-
neighbourly relations with the Republic of Cyprus, including lifting the ban against entering 
ports in Turkey imposed on vessels registered in the Republic of Cyprus and on vessels 
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 See supra note 63, at para 4. 
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 S. Talmon, ‘The European Union – Turkey Controversy over Cyprus or a Tale of Two 
Treaty Declarations’ 5 Chinese Journal of International Law (2006) 579. 
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applies under the conditions set out in that Treaty and to the territory of the Republic 
of Turkey.’ Hence, according to that provision, the Ankara Agreement applies to the 
territory to which the EC Treaty applies including Cyprus, as a whole, under the 
conditions set out in Protocol No. 10 i.e. the suspension of the acquis in northern 
Cyprus. This formula has allowed the Turkish Government to support that it has 
avoided any implicit recognition of the Government of the Cyprus Republic’s claim to 
act for the northern part of the island. Such recognition, however, seems to be a 
requirement for the accession of Turkey to the EU, according to the Counter-
declaration. 
Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the Negotiating Framework asks Turkey, in the period 
up to accession, ‘to progressively align its policies towards third countries and its 
positions within international organisations (including in relation to the membership 
by all EU Member States of those organisations and arrangements) with the policies 
and positions adopted by the Union and its Member States.’ Such a requirement is 
an indirect reference to the permanent Turkish veto to the Cypriot application to join 
international organisations and has been contained as a short-term priority in the 
2008 AP with Turkey.71 Although it would be possible for the EU to assess Turkey’s 
attitude with regard to the application to international organisations of third countries 
and Member States, such activity ‘cannot be interpreted as prejudicing the autonomy 
of decision-making of any of those international organisations or of their members, or 
of the Member States of the European Union.’72  
As it is evident, the Cyprus conflict is deeply embedded in the legal structure of the 
EU-Turkey relationship. In December 2006, Turkey’s failure to implement the 
relevant obligations under the Additional Protocol, i.e. to open its airports and 
seaports to Greek Cypriot traffic, caused Brussels to freeze opening eight of the 35 
negotiating chapters. The negotiations will officially come up for review in 2009 and 
Turkey has declared that it would open its ports only in the context of a 
comprehensive settlement deal.73 Thus, it is unavoidable that different aspects of the 
Cyprus problem, such as the non-recognition of the Republic, the full execution of the 
                                                 
71
 Turkey has blocked the membership of the Republic in the following organisations and 
treaties: Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Agreement, Open Skies Treaty, 
Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperations and Development, EU-NATO Cooperation (‘Berlin plus’ arrangements), 
European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts, European Conference of Ministers 
of Transport and Conference on Disarmament.  
72
 Presidency statement concerning paragraph 7 of the Negotiating Framework; Council 
document 12823/1/05 REV 1, (Brussels, 12 October 2005). 
73
 International Crisis Group, op.cit., supra note 16 at 18. 
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case law of the Court of Human Rights etc., are and will be discussed in the course 
of the accession negotiations. It is highly improbable, however, due to the political 
constraints, referred to before, that the Association Council will become the locus for 
a new initiative for the solution of this age-old problem.   
 
2.6 Remarks 
Overall, it has been shown that there are important legal constraints in the present 
and future Union institutional framework that would make the attribution of the role of 
the principal mediator to the Union quite problematic. In addition to this, although the 
Union has a great interest in a comprehensive solution on the island, politically 
speaking, it cannot be an official mediator, as it is a party to the conflict mainly by 
virtue of the membership of the Republic of Cyprus but also of Greece and the UK. 
Moreover, certain aspects of Turkey’s policies question the political prudence of such 
an initiative in the course of the accession negotiations. On the other hand, for the 
sake of argument, it has to be mentioned that, in case the two communities formally 
ask the Union to attain such a role, it would be rather difficult for the EU to reject 
such a request. In that improbable case, the legal basis issue could be settled by 
dealing with the Cyprus issue within the framework of the Association Council. The 
adoption of a joint action/decision, albeit an ultra vires act, may offer another 
alternative, given that the Court could not judicially review such decision. 
Alternatively, the Member States could draft and sign a special international treaty 
authorising an institution like the Commission to play such a role or appointing a 
special representative.  
On a more pragmatic level, however, given that both communities also insist on the 
central role that the UN has to play in future negotiations, the Union should be 
determined to assist in order for a solution, that would be as compatible as possible 
to the acquis, to be achieved and then to accommodate it within its legal order. In the 
meantime, the EU could provide for measures that could bring the two communities 
closer, such as the Green Line Regulation and the financial instrument. At the end of 
the day, this is exactly the framework of the present negotiations between the 
leaders of the two communities.  
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3. ACCOMMODATING A FUTURE SOLUTION WITHIN THE UNION LEGAL 
ORDER  
3.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned in CHAPTER ONE of the thesis and the introduction of the 
present CHAPTER the “European approach/solution” discourse also refers to the 
proposition that any future settlement should be in ‘strict compliance with European 
constitutional principles and the acquis communautaire.’74 “Strict compliance” with 
Union law, however, is difficult to be achieved, given the tensions between the acquis 
and a solution that will be based on the principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and 
political equality of the two communities, as agreed by them on numerous occasions 
and as described by the UN. The present part of the CHAPTER tries to sketch such 
possible tensions and argues that the Union could accommodate a settlement that 
would even contain derogations from EU law, in accordance with Protocol No 10 to 
the Act of Accession and the Union practice to accept territorial exceptions to the 
application of the acquis. Finally, it examines whether there are some provisions of 
Union law that could not be disregarded in the designing of a future settlement and 
thus strict compliance with them is a conditio sine qua non for the drafting of a 
settlement of the conflict. 
 
3.2 A bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 
Two years after the overwhelming rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot 
community and in the midst of a political stasis to the Cyprus issue, the then 
President of the Republic, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, decided to confirm their ‘commitment to the unification of 
Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality, as set out 
in the relevant Security Council Resolutions.’75 On 21 March 2008, the new President 
of the Republic, Mr. Christofias, and Mr. Talat reconfirmed that those principles that 
are contained in the 8th July Agreement will serve as a basis in their negotiations for 
                                                 
74
 Auer et al., op.cit., supra note 4, at para 26. 
75
 Agreement between the President of the Republic Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos and the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat (8 July 2006), at para 1, available at 
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/793035B13B07CD8FC225727C00353501?Open
Document 
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a solution to the Cyprus issue. Two months later, and after reviewing the results 
achieved pursuant to the March Agreement, the leaders of the two Cypriot 
communities released a press statement according to which ‘[t]hey reaffirmed their 
commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined 
by relevant Security Council resolutions.   This partnership will have a Federal 
Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot 
Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal 
status.’76 On 1 July 2008, the two leaders also agreed, in principle, on the issues of 
single sovereignty of the new federal State and citizenship.77 
The principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality, being the basic 
parameters of the settlement of the Cyprus issue, were first introduced by the High 
Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 between Makarios and Denktash and between 
Kyprianou and Denktash respectively and have been part of the narrative of the 
Cyprus conflict since then. The UN and the wider international community adhere to 
this formula as shall be seen later to a greater extent. Nevertheless, one has to 
mention the differences between how the two communities interpret those concepts 
and envisage the application of those principles. Such differences became clear 
once more on 3 September 2008 when the bi-communal negotiations were officially 
launched. In the Additional Comments to his Opening Statement, President 
Christofias stressed that the Greek Cypriot community has exhausted its limits with 
the major concession made by President Makarios in 1977, according to which the 
solution will be based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and thus they cannot 
go any further. ‘Neither a confederation, nor a new partnership of two states through 
“virgin birth”78 can be accepted. The federal solution will be a partnership of two 
                                                 
76
 Joint Statement by Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat, 23 May 2008; available at http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent. 
cfm?a_id=1588 
77
 Joint Statement by Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader 
Mehmet Ali Talat, 1 July 2008; available at http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id= 
1906&tt=graphic&lang=l1 
78
 During the negotiations for the Annan Plan, the negotiators tried to cut the Gordian knot of 
the transition from two existing administrations to a new united State with an ambiguous, 
largely unwritten, concept that became known as the “Virgin Birth”. To that effect Article 12(1) 
of the Foundation Agreement of the Annan Plan provided that ‘[a]ny act, whether of a 
legislative, executive or judicial nature, by any authority in Cyprus whatsoever, prior to entry 
into force of this Agreement, is recognised as valid and, provided it is not inconsistent with or 
repugnant to any other provision of this Agreement or international law, its effect shall 
continue following entry into force of this Agreement. No-one shall be able to contest the 
validity of such acts by reason of what occurred prior to entry into force of this Agreement.’ It 
is important to note that Talat has said that he would be happiest with a concept similar to 
“Virgin Birth” in which the new state would have ‘no mother and no father, or both of us as 
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communities.’79 He also referred to the issues of “settlers”, properties and territory as 
issues outstanding.80 At the same time, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, 
in his Opening statement, attached great importance to ‘the continuation of the 1960 
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance as an essential part of a settlement; safeguards 
to ensure that neither side can claim jurisdiction over the other; and maintaining the 
internal balance between the two sides in Cyprus as well as the external balance 
between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.’81 In a speech delivered later that day, 
Mehmet Ali Talat reaffirmed that the community he represents has ‘no intention of 
giving up their rights over the island of Cyprus. We know that these rights of ours can 
be safeguarded by “the political equality of the two peoples and the equal status of 
the two constituent states.”’82 
Despite the obvious differences in the way the two ethno-religious communities 
approach the basic parameters of the comprehensive settlement and which particular 
aspects they focus upon, one has to highlight that both communities agree that the 
solution entails a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined 
by relevant Security Council resolutions, with a single sovereignty, citizenship and 
international personality. It is exactly those principles that the UN Security Council 
Resolutions have adequately defined.  
First of all, the term “political equality” of the two communities has been defined in 
Resolution 716 (1991)83 which refers to the UN Secretary-General’s Report of  8 July 
1990.84 In paragraph 11 of this Report, the then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar sustains that although ‘political equality does not mean equal numerical 
participation in all federal government branches it should be reflected in various 
ways.’ Most importantly, it entails ‘the effective participation of both communities in 
all organs and decisions of the federal government.’  
On the other hand, the definition of the term “bi-zonal and bi-communal federation” 
appears in paragraphs 17-25 of the Report of Boutros Boutros-Ghali of 3 April 
                                                                                                                                           
mother and father.’ Christofias, on the other hand, does show some flexibility by saying the 
new republic will have a new name. International Crisis Group, op.cit., supra note 16 at 11. 
79
 Available at http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/B8C794DCED1A4937C22574 
B900363672?OpenDocument&highlight=opening statement 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Available at http://www.greeknewsonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= 
9040&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 
82
 Available at http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/ARSIV2008/ENGLISHarcive/ 
SEPTEMBER/040908.htm 
83
 UN Security Council Resolution 715 (1991). 
84
 Report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990, S/1990/21183, Annex I, at para 11. 
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1992.85 These paragraphs have been endorsed by the Security Council with 
Resolution 750(1992)86 and they provide as follows: 
‘The federal state of Cyprus will have a single international personality and sovereignty as 
well as a single citizenship. The two communities reject as options union in whole or in 
part with any other country and any form of partition or secession.’87 
‘The federation will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as 
regards the territorial aspects’88 
‘The bi-zonality of the federation is reflected in the fact that each federated state would be 
administered by one community which would be guaranteed a clear majority of the 
population and of land ownership in its area’89 
The freedom of settlement and the right to property would be implemented in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution that would be based on the principle of bi-zonality.90 
‘The security of both communities would be guaranteed through the 1960 Treaties of 
Guarantee and of Alliance each of which would be appropriately supplemented.’91  
These principles92 have never been reversed by the Security Council.93 Instead, they 
have been verified, developed and incorporated in the UN settlement proposals. The 
UN Security Council Resolution 1251 (1999) sums up the position as follows: ‘A 
Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and 
international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial 
integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described 
in the relevant Security Council Resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal 
federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with 
any other country or any form of partition or secession.’  
However, were a settlement to be reached which did in fact conform to these 
principles, it would pose challenges for Union law and especially the free movement 
of persons and capital acquis. This is especially so if the bi-zonality of the new 
unified federal Cyprus would be reflected in the fact that each ‘federated state would 
be administered by one community which would be guaranteed a clear majority of 
the population and of land ownership in its area’. It is almost definite that certain 
permanent restrictions to the free movement of persons and capital will be deemed 
necessary in order for the particular national identity of the unified, bi-zonal and bi-
communal Cyprus to be protected.  
The Draft Act of Adaptation that was included in the Annan Plan provides for a good 
example of the potential incompatibilities of a solution, based on the aforementioned 
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 Report of the Secretary-General of 3 April 1992, S/1992/23780, at paras 17-25. 
86
 UN Security Council Resolution 750 (1992). 
87
 See supra note 85 at para 18. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 Ibid., at para 20. 
90
 Ibid., at para 23. 
91
 Ibid., at para 24. 
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 UN Security Council Resolution 1251 (1999), at para 11. 
93
 UN Security Council Resolutions 789 (1992) and 1475 (2003). 
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principles, with the acquis. As extensively analysed in a previous CHAPTER, such 
incompatibilities could be summarised in three different aspects: Restrictions on the 
right of non-residents in the constituent States to purchase immovable property; 
restrictions on the right of Cypriot citizens to reside in a constituent State of which 
they do not hold the internal constituent State citizenship status; restrictions on the 
right not only of Greek and Turkish nationals but also of Union citizens to reside in 
Cyprus, after the comprehensive settlement takes place, in order for the 
demographic ratio between permanent residents, speaking either Greek or Turkish 
as mother tongue, not to be substantially altered. 
Thus, the question that should be answered for the purposes of the present research 
is whether the Union membership of the Cyprus Republic means that the agreed 
framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem should be amended to the effect 
that the future settlement will not entail any derogations from Union law. The 
CHAPTER clearly argues that both Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession and the 
Union practice to accept territorial exceptions to the application of the acquis suggest 
that the EU could accommodate a settlement that would even contain derogations 
from the acquis. Thus, there is no need for the two communities to overrule the 
described framework. 
 
3.3 Derogating from the acquis   
According to Article 49(2) EU, every Accession Treaty provides for the ‘conditions of 
admission to the Treaty on which the European Union is founded’ and enjoys the 
same rank as the founding treaties. They integrate the new Member States into the 
existing Union legal order but, at the same time, they incorporate agreements 
between the old and the acceding States to depart from certain established rules on 
a temporary or permanent basis. Thus, for example, a derogation was introduced, by 
way of Protocol No 6 to the 2003 Act of Accession, to allow Malta to maintain certain 
restrictive national legislation in force relating to secondary residences.94 Derogations 
to the free movement of people and services, the right of establishment and the 
                                                 
94
 Protocol No 6 on the acquisition of secondary residences in Malta provides in part: 
‘Bearing in mind the very limited number of residences in Malta and the very limited land 
available for construction purposes, which can only cover the basic needs created by the 
demographic development of the present residents, Malta may on a non-discriminatory 
basis maintain in force the rules on the acquisition and holding of immovable property for 
secondary residence purposes by nationals of the Member States who have not legally 
resided in Malta for at least five years laid down in the Immovable Property (Acquisition 
by Non-Residents) Act (Chapter 246).’ 
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purchase or holding of real estate have also been provided in the Åland Islands, a 
group of Swedish-speaking Finnish islands off the Swedish coast, in accordance with 
Protocol No 2 of the Finnish Act of Accession 1994.95  
The practice to agree on derogations from the acquis in special cases, however, is 
not limited to the Accession Treaties. Similarly, when Treaty amendments are 
negotiated, existing Member States may negotiate derogations from new provisions 
or developments, as Denmark has done with respect to defence policy, the UK and 
Denmark in relation to monetary union, and the UK and Poland, most recently, with 
the Protocol on the Charter of Fundamental Rights annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In each of these cases, the derogation takes place at the level of primary law (i.e. the 
Treaties or a Protocol to the Treaties) and therefore has the force of primary law and 
becomes, itself, part of the acquis. Thus, legally speaking, it would be perfectly 
possible for the new unified Cypriot State to formally ask all the other Member States 
to agree to certain derogations, even permanent derogations, from the Union acquis 
with regard to the free movement of persons or capital, in order to accommodate a 
settlement in Cyprus via a Treaty amendment.  
In the case of a future solution to the Cyprus problem, however, a simplified 
procedure that would enable the Union to accommodate the terms of a settlement, 
based on the principle of bi-zonality inter alia, may also be available, pursuant to 
Article 4 of Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession of 2003. The 5th Recital of the 
Preamble to Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession 2003 declares that the Union is 
‘ready to accommodate the terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on 
which the EU is founded.’ The wording of the preamble is in full conformity with the 
conclusions of the Seville European Council in June 2002. There, the Union 
expressed its willingness to ‘accommodate the terms of such a comprehensive 
settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the 
European Union is founded: as a Member State, Cyprus will need to speak with a 
single voice and ensure proper application of European Union law.’96 
More specifically, Article 4 reflects the Union’s willingness to accommodate the terms 
of a settlement after the EU accession of the Republic, expressed both in the 
Preamble of the Protocol and in the Seville European Council. It provides for a 
simplified procedure, according to which, ‘the Council, acting unanimously on the 
                                                 
95
 Act concerning the condition of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the 
Treaties on which the European Union is founded O.J. 1994, C 241/21. 
96
 Para 24. 
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basis of a proposal by the Commission, shall decide the adaptations to the terms 
concerning the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with regard to the Turkish 
Cypriot community.’ Accommodations and “adaptations” can thus be made. Could 
such adaptations entail derogations from the existing acquis? The critical question is 
whether legislative acts under such enabling clause, whose scope would be to 
accommodate the future settlement, may deviate from other elements of the primary 
acquis or whether those acts, as secondary law, could be challenged before the 
Court of Justice as to their validity, to the extent that they did not conform to existing 
primary law. It could be argued that, since the adoption of such acts does not follow 
the procedure described in Article 48, which provides that amendments to the 
Treaties require the common accord of an Intergovernmental Conference and only 
enter into force after being ratified by all Member States, they cannot consist of 
primary law. 
The Treaties foresee, however, special procedures for their amendment in some 
cases.97 The best example, for the purposes of this case, is the Council decision on 
the basis of Article 2(2) of the Accession Treaty of 24 June 1994, between the 
Member States and Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden, adjusting the instruments 
of accession after Norway’s failure to ratify.98 Several Articles of this Accession 
Treaty and of the Act of Accession were amended by a Council decision99 while other 
provisions were declared to have lapsed.100 Thus, in that case, the Council, itself, 
amended primary law in a simplified procedure without any ratification of the Member 
States. 
With regard to Article 4, it should be noted that it provides for ‘adaptations to the 
terms of accession of Cyprus.’ Given that, at the time it was drafted, the only 
foreseeable option for settlement was the Annan Plan, containing a request for a 
substantial derogation from the acquis relating inter alia to property and residency 
rights, it is likely that the drafters of Article 4 had the possibility of derogations from 
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 Art. 42 EU procedure; Article 222 EC. The Treaty of Lisbon will also introduce a simplified 
amendment procedure, with limitations. Article 48(6) EU allows the European Council to 
adopt a decision, by unanimity after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Commission, amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU, relating to the 
internal policies and action of the Union. Such a decision, however, cannot increase the 
competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties and shall enter into force only when 
approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.  
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 Council Decision 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the Council of the European Union of 1 
January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new Member States to 
the European Union O.J. 1995, L 1/1. 
99
 Article 3 of the Treaty; Articles 11, 13-17, 20-28 of the Act. 
100
 Part IV, Title II, Articles 32-68, 146 and Annexes III-V, VII of the Act. 
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the acquis in mind and its wording is broad enough to cover such a possibility. Thus, 
it could be argued that Article 4 allows the Union, by a unanimous Council Decision 
and with the consensus of the new unified Cyprus at a future date and ‘in the event 
of a settlement’, to alter the terms of Cyprus’s EU accession that are contained in the 
Act of Accession 2003, which undoubtedly has the status of primary law.  Those 
acts, that will amend ex post facto Union primary law, would thus be deemed to enjoy 
the status of primary law.101  
If the new state of affairs had been approved in the referendums of 24 April 2004, 
both procedures referred to above would have been followed in a complementary 
manner. Hoffmeister contends that the adoption of a legislative act under Article 4, 
adapting the terms of Cyprus’s accession, would have been the first step. As a 
second step those ‘adaptations would have been formally incorporated into primary 
law in order to bring about legal security within the Union’s legal system.’102 Neither 
procedure, however, allows unlimited derogations. Any derogations would be limited 
by the principles on which the Union is founded as laid down in Articles 6 and 49 EU. 
 
3.4 Possible limits to the derogations 
Undoubtedly, the Member States are the “masters of the Treaties” and can amend 
them as they wish. In the context of accession negotiations, the Court of Justice has 
recognised the freedom of negotiation, stating that ‘the legal conditions for such 
accession remain to be defined in the context of that procedure without its being 
possible to determine the content judicially in advance.’103 Despite functioning as a 
European constitution,104 the EC Treaty is still subject to the intergovernmental 
method of treaty-making and the will of Member States to accommodate specific 
economic interests has not, so far, been subject to legal limitations. The Member 
States have occasionally restricted the four freedoms, even permanently like in the 
case of the Danish prohibition for secondary residences in the Maastricht Treaty,105 
or with the special regime for the Åland islands.106 This is particularly important in this 
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 G. Ziegler, ‘The EU-Dimension of a Future Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem’, in A. Sözen (ed.), The Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead (Eastern Mediterranean 
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research since the derogations contained in a future settlement, based on the 
principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two communities, 
will mainly concern the free movement of persons and capital acquis, as mentioned 
before. 
However, this freedom of the Member States to amend the Treaties may not be 
completely unfettered. It has recently been suggested107 that derogations from 
primary law may not touch the very core of Union principles. The idea of 
“untouchable” core issues is present in the constitutions of Member States108 and in 
the notion of ius cogens in international law. In Opinion 1/91, the ECJ gave a small 
hint about the existence of such a “hard core” in holding that the establishment of the 
judicial organ of dispute settlement in the envisaged EEA agreement would threaten 
the role of the ECJ under Article 164 EC (now Article 220) and thereby the 
‘foundations of the Community’ to a degree which could not have been removed 
even by a Treaty amendment. This could be read as limiting the treaty-making power 
of the Member States.109 On the other hand, even the supposed freedom to negotiate 
an Accession Treaty is bound by the procedural requirements of Article 49 EU, and 
also by the requirement that a condition of Union membership is a commitment to 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Article 48 EU, similarly, provides a 
specific mandatory provision for Treaty amendment.  
Therefore, even if one accepts that a certain “hard core” of Union law exists and 
could not be modified, even by way of a new Treaty, such “hard core rules” would be 
found foremost in the characteristics of the institutional system of the EU, as a quasi-
constitution, protecting democracy, rule of law, human rights and the principle of non-
discrimination, as well as the supremacy and direct effect of EC law, rather than the 
full application of the four freedoms. 
As already mentioned, the 5th recital of the Preamble to Protocol No 10 on Cyprus of 
the Act of Accession declares that the Union is ‘ready to accommodate the terms of 
such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.’ Those 
principles, as already shown, do not include the internal market freedoms. There can 
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 A. Ott, ‘The ‘Principle’ of Differentiation in an Enlarged European Union: Unity in 
Diversity?’ in K. Inglis, and A. Ott, The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity 
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European Union Can the Member States Do As They Please?’ 3 European Constitutional 
Law Review (2007) 269. 
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 Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law provides that the principles contained in Articles 1-
20 may never be modified. In France, the republican principle may not be modified according 
to Art. 89(5) of the Constitution. 
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 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, at para 72. 
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even be permanent derogations from those freedoms. The principles on which the 
Union is founded are clearly defined in Article 6(1) EU which provides that ‘[t]he 
European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States.’ These principles are to be regarded as part of the 
non-derogable Union acquis in any constitutional settlement for Cyprus, inasmuch as 
they are a prerequisite for membership of the Union and a serious breach of these 
principles attracts the possibility of sanctions under Article 7 TEU. Thus, any future 
comprehensive settlement should be endowed with democratic institutions, respect 
the rule of law and effectively protect human rights and fundamental freedoms but, at 
the same time, it could contain some restrictions to the internal market freedoms in 
order for the particular national identity of Cyprus, as a bi-communal and bi-zonal 
federal State, to be protected. In any case, the Union has undertaken to ‘respect [the 
Member States’] national identities inherent in their fundamental structures …. [and] 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State…’.110 As long as the solution is compatible with the Union founding principles, 
any legislative act, under Article 4, that would accommodate derogations with regard 
to the four freedoms within the Union legal order, would be, most probably, accepted. 
Of course, this leaves open a large question as to how exactly these principles are to 
be translated into minimum standards for any Member State, including Cyprus. 
With regard to democracy and the rule of law, practice shows that the margin of 
appreciation that the Member States enjoy is rather wide. For the purposes of the 
present CHAPTER, suffice it to say that where there is a system in which citizens enjoy 
equal voting rights, in accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No 1 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and where the State’s decision-making body is 
endowed with democratic legitimacy the democratic principle would be satisfied. As 
far as the principle of the rule of law is concerned, where there is a constitution that 
secures the separation of powers, where the government is subordinated to the 
constitution, there are parliamentary laws and judicial review by independent courts 
exists, this rule of law would be in conformity with Article 6 EU.111 
Potentially, the biggest tensions between a solution based on the principles of bi-
zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two communities and the EU 
founding principles arise with regard to the protection of certain human rights. The 
                                                 
110
 Treaty of Lisbon Article 4(2) TEU. 
111
 Case C-222/84, Jonston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 
1651. 
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reason for this is that such a solution, as shown, entails restrictions of certain human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, especially restriction of the right to property and 
the right to free internal movement and residence.  
The founding principle of respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
enshrined in Article 6(1) EU, is further spelt out in Article 6(2) EU, which refers to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law. Hence, 
respect of the ECHR is a necessary guarantee that a future settlement is in 
conformity with one of the principles on which the Union is founded. Generally 
speaking, it should be noted that, with the exception of the prohibition of torture, 
Convention rights may be subject to proportional restrictions. Thus, those 
proportionality tests must be examined 
With regard to the right to property, Article 1 of the additional Protocol No 1 to the 
ECHR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and the general 
principles of international law.’ Moreover, paragraph 2 provides that the right to 
property shall not ‘impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ Thus, the 
restrictions to the property rights of the Cypriots, caused by a scheme whose scope 
would be to solve the property issue, could be largely justified for reasons of an 
important public interest, such as the overall settlement of the conflict.  
Given that the bi-zonality of the new unified federal Cyprus would be reflected in the 
fact that each ‘federated state would be administered by one community which would 
be guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of land ownership in its area,’ 
and that more than 75 per cent of the private owned land in the “Areas” belong to 
Greek Cypriots,112 it is unavoidable that the owners of property affected by the post 
1974 status quo would not enjoy an absolute right to reinstatement.113 Thus, the 
future restitution scheme will, most probably, combine partial reinstatement for some 
dispossessed owners, partial compensation for some others and may protect current 
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 Commission Communication, op. cit., supra note 18, at 13. 
113
 Even in the case that arrangements could be made that, in case all Greek Cypriots 
returned under Turkish Cypriot administration, there would still be a Turkish majority in the 
future Turkish Cypriot constituent State, the maintenance of the bi-zonal character of the new 
federal Republic of Cyprus would still entail restrictions with regard to the right to property of 
members Greek Cypriot community. 
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users who have made significant improvements to properties or have no alternative 
accommodation, as was the case, for example, in the Annan Plan. 
For reinstated owners, the situation does not raise serious issues of human rights. 
On the other hand, for the owners that will be compensated for the expropriation of 
their property, there should be a fair balance between the public and the private 
interest, leading to some compensation,114 including compensation for loss of use. 
More importantly, for the purposes of the Cyprus’s case, the Strasbourg Court, in the 
case of the Former King of Greece, held that matters of economic or political reform 
may call for reimbursement of less than the full market value.115  
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR provides that the right 
to internal movement and residence ‘may also be subject, in particular areas, to 
restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a 
democratic society.’ Thus, the right to free movement and residence may be 
restricted in the public interest. Such restrictions, however, shall not only have to 
foster a legitimate aim but should also be ‘necessary in a democratic society,’ and 
hence proportional. In particular, it has to be verified that the same policy goal, in this 
case a settlement that would respect the principle of bi-zonality, cannot be achieved 
with less interfering means. In other words, it has to be ascertained that it was not 
possible for a higher percentage of the members of the two ethno-religious segments 
to have the right to reside in the other constituent State of the bi-zonal federation. 
Generally speaking, however, practice shows that, unless there is manifest 
ignorance of a certain right which would diminish its essence substantially, ‘any 
negotiated restriction between the 2 communities must be presumed to reflect a 
reasonable compromise between the individual right and the need for temporary 
restrictions as proportional means to foster a common policy goal.’116 
With regard to the “settlers”, it must be pointed out that Article 4 of the 4th Protocol to 
the Convention prohibits collective expulsion of aliens. According to the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court, such a measure is only allowed as long as a reasonable and 
objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group has 
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 Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and others v. United Kingdom (Application Nos. 9006/80, 
9262/81, 9263/81, 9265/81, 9266/81, 9313/81, 9405/81) (judgment 8 July 1986). 
115
 Eur. Court H.R., The Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (Application No 
25701/94) (judgment 28 November 2002) at para 78: ‘Less than full compensation may be 
equally, if not a fortiori, called for where the taking of property is resorted to with a view to 
completing such fundamental changes of a country’s constitutional system as the transition 
from monarchy to republic.’ 
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 Hoffmeister, op.cit., supra note 102 at 140.  
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taken place.117 In other words, the new unified Cyprus can expel a number of 
“settlers” from its territory as long as the future settlement plan will provide for a 
procedure by which individual cases will be assessed in order for a prohibited 
collective expulsion to be avoided. 
As already mentioned, in case of a permanent and serious breach of the principles 
enshrined in Article 6 EU, the Union may take sanctions against a Member State 
under the procedure described in Article 7 EU. Such a system of collective 
supervision provides for a sufficient guarantee that, on the one hand, the future 
settlement would respect the aforementioned principles and, on the other, that the 
tragic experiences of the past will not be repeated. As a matter of political prudence, 
one has to question whether, given this framework that the Union Membership of the 
new unified State provides, there is still a need for the obsolete system provided by 
the Treaty of Guarantee. Apart from being a relic of colonialism that has been proved 
an unmitigated failure, it also undermines the EU collective supervision system by 
attributing a right of intervention to a third party. At least some readjustment to the 
terms of the Treaty is deemed necessary. 
Overall, however, it is evident that, despite the fact that the founding principles of the 
EU may provide for a limitation to the EU Member States’ power to agree on 
derogations from the acquis, the margin of appreciation that the two communities 
enjoy, in order to agree on a settlement plan that would be based on the agreed 
principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality and on the principles 
enshrined in Article 6 EU, is rather wide. In other words, given the important public 
interest that is at stake, i.e. the reunification of the island, the expressed willingness 
of the Union to accommodate the terms of the settlement, as long as it is in 
compliance with the EU founding principles and the special legal basis of Article 4, it 
is almost certain that a settlement plan, based on the agreed principles of bi-zonality, 
bi-communality and political equality and approved by both ethno-religious segments 
in Cyprus, will be accommodated within the Union legal order. 
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 Eur. Court H.R., Conga v. Belgium (Application No 34374/97) (judgment 30 November 
1999) at para 59 referring to earlier decisions of 23 February 1999 such as Andric v. Sweden 
(Application No 45917/99), which declared a series of applications against Sweden 
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3.5 “Seville” requirements 
With regard to Cyprus’s EU membership, it is critical to recall that the European 
Council, in paragraph 24 of the 2002 Seville conclusions, apart from declaring the 
Union’s willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement even if they deviate 
from the acquis, pointed out that as a Member State ‘Cyprus will need to speak with 
a single voice and ensure proper application of European Union law.’ This reflects 
both the pragmatic and the legal demands of Union membership as it affects the 
“interface” between the Member State and the Union.  
With regard to the “single voice” requirement, note that it would be relevant for many 
kinds of decision-making procedures. Ways will need to be found to ensure that 
Cyprus is represented in various EU fora, such as the European Council,118 in 
conformity with its (new) Constitution. Moreover, although, Article 203 EC119 provides 
that the Council of Ministers ‘consists of a representative of each Member State at 
ministerial level. Authorised to commit the government of that Member State,’ it is not 
prescribed to which internal level of government that representative shall belong. A 
number of paradigms arising from EU Member States practices exist.120 It is for the 
new Constitution of the federal Cyprus to decide which to follow. Equally, there is no 
rule that forces the Member States to constructively participate in Union affairs. An 
EU Member State is free to cast a positive or negative vote or to abstain from voting 
in the EU decision-making process. Thus, if the constitutional framework of the new 
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 Article 15 TEU Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version). 
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 Article 16 TEU Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version). 
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 In Belgium, the Federal Government, the Regions and the Communities entered into a Co-
operation Agreement based on three principles: consensus, mixed delegation and rotation. 
The so-called P-11 Committee fixes the common Belgian position. It is led by the Federal 
Ministry of Foreign affairs and unites representatives from both the federal and the regional 
level and decides by consensus. If there is no agreement, the committee refers the question 
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topics relate to subnational subject matters) a representative from the subnational entities 
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unified Cyprus hinders the adoption of positions in some EU matters that would not 
be in contrast with Union law.121  
The conclusions of the Seville European Council also underlined that Cyprus needs 
‘to… ensure proper application of European Union law.’ This is a reference to Article 
10 EC,122 according to which an EU Member State must be able to take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or in particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations arising from this Treaty or resulting from actions taken by the institutions 
of the EC. With regard to that, firstly, note that since the 1964 Costa v. ENEL 
judgment123 of the Court of Justice, EU law enjoys supremacy over national law, 
including constitutional law.124 Member States, however, including unified Cyprus, 
are free to decide how to integrate this principle into their national law.125 Moreover, 
there is no written requirement in EC law that directly concerns the internal 
organisation of its Member States. The ECJ has verified this position in Germany v. 
Commission126 where it was held that ‘it is not for the Commission to rule on the 
division of competences by the institutional rules proper to each Member State, or on 
the obligations which may be imposed on federal and Lander authorities 
respectively.’ It may, however, ‘verify whether the supervisory and inspection 
procedures established according to the arrangements within the national legal 
system are in their entirety sufficiently effective to enable the Community 
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requirements to be correctly applied.’127 On the other hand, it is important to note that 
the ECJ repeatedly held that a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or 
circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to 
comply with the obligations and time limits laid down in a directive.128 Hence, it is 
essential that a central government has a mechanism at hand to ensure compliance 
with Union law in the case of a regional “blocking”. 
To sum up this point, it could rightly be argued that the guidance that the EU offers to 
the two communities for the constitutional architecture of the future federal Cyprus is 
rather limited. Unsurprisingly, the Union has not provided any rules for the internal 
organisation of its Member States. Furthermore, it can be observed that immense 
differences exist between the constitutional structures of the 27 Member States. 
Unified Cyprus can create its own Constitution based on the principles upon which 
the two communities have agreed on numerous occasions and, at the same time, 
comply with the “Seville” requirements concerning the effective participation of 
Cyprus in the political life of the Union as one of its Member States. 
 
3.6 Remarks 
The Member States of the EU are bound by Union law and the norms of primary 
Union law may take priority even over rules of national constitutional law. Thus, any 
amendment to the Cypriot Constitution should, in principle, conform to the Union 
acquis. Derogations from the acquis are possible, and even common in the case of 
secondary law, but derogations to primary Union law (the Treaty rules) must be 
contained in primary law, either through a Treaty amendment or a specific Protocol. 
In the case of Cyprus, Protocol No 10 provides a possible legal base for such 
derogations in the event of a settlement and derogations may indeed be needed.  I 
have argued that although, no doubt, a solution in strict compliance with the acquis 
would be preferred, the Union is capable of accommodating a constitutional 
framework containing deviations from Union law, as long as that framework respects 
the principles on which the EU is founded.  
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Belgium [1998] ECR I-4281. 
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4. CONCLUSION  
During the week between 24 April and 1 May 2004, Cyprus lived its own Divine 
Comedy. From the “hell” of the rejection of a reunification plan to the “paradise” of 
Union accession. In the aftermath of those events that have changed the history of 
the Republic and the lives of its people, the debate for a “European 
approach/solution” has appeared. Intellectually stimulating as it may be, the two 
distinct but interconnected understandings of the role of the EU, as a principal 
mediator in future negotiations and as a framework that requires that a 
comprehensive settlement plan should be in strict compliance with the acquis, to 
which the “European approach/solution” discourse mainly refers, consist of a typical 
case where legal arguments could be used as a “sword”. The reason for this is that, if 
any of those two visions for the role of the Union to the conflict becomes dominant, 
the agreed framework of the bi-communal negotiations that take place under the 
auspices of the UN, according to which the solution will be based on the principles of 
bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two communities, could be 
overruled and thus whatever progress has been made for the last 30 years of 
negotiations will be meaningless. After legally and pragmatically assessing both 
propositions it has been shown, on the one hand, that, apart from the political 
“hurdles”, there are important legal constraints that should discourage the Union from 
replacing the UN as a “broker” in a new initiative that would lead to a settlement and, 
on the other, that it is capable of accommodating a settlement approved by both 
ethno-religious segments. In the meantime, the Union should continue playing a 
constructive role in bringing the two communities closer by adopting legislative 
measures such as the Green Line Regulation and the Financial Aid Regulation. 
However, it is for the parties in the conflict to show the appropriate political will if the 
reunification of the island, based on the agreed principles, is ever to be achieved.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
‘BOY: Mr. Godot told me to tell you he won't come this evening but surely tomorrow.’ 
Waiting for Godot, Samuel Beckett (1952) 
 
‘Κι ήθελε ακόµη πολύ φώς να ξηµερώσει. 
‘Οµως εγώ δεν παραδέχτηκα την ήττα’ 
[It was way long before dawn. 
But I have not yet accepted the defeat] 
Κι ήθελε ακόµη, Manolis Anagnostakis (1954) 
 
 
1. A STUDY IN TIME 
In the previous four chapters, the suspension of the Union law in northern Cyprus 
was set in its historical, political and legal context (CHAPTER TWO), an analytical 
framework of the very limited application of the acquis in the areas not under the 
effective control of the Republic was provided and the seemingly depoliticised and 
technical approach of the Union to that long-standing international problem was 
explained (CHAPTERS THREE and FOUR). In addition, it was argued that the Union 
cannot act as a principal mediator to the conflict replacing the UN not only because it 
lacks the competence but also because it is a party to the conflict. On the other hand, 
it was supported that the European Union can accommodate a solution that would 
entail derogations from the acquis (CHAPTER FIVE).  
Although a thematic approach has largely been followed in the structure of the 
present thesis (i.e. historical, political and legal context of the suspension; free 
movement of persons; free movement of goods; taking the Union membership into 
account for a future settlement plan) the thesis can be also read as a study of the 
interrelationship of the Cyprus problem and the Union legal order in time. Indeed in 
the previous four chapters there is an analysis of the several legal issues and 
debates arising from the age-old dispute: first, in the pre-accession period; second, 
after the 1 May 2004; and third, at a future time whenever a settlement plan is 
approved by both communities. 
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In CHAPTER TWO, after briefly presenting the most important legal and political 
debates from the birth of the Republic to the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the 
thesis mainly focused on issues arising from the membership application and the 
subsequent accession of the Republic to the EU. Thus, it first analysed the debate 
concerning the legality of the application of the Republic. Then, it examined the basic 
parameters of the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan, which was designed in order 
to take advantage of the “catalyst effect” of the accession and the last version of 
which was presented to the two communities just a month before Cyprus became a 
Union Member State. Finally, it legally evaluated the suspension of the acquis North 
of the Green Line after the overwhelming rejection of the Plan by the Greek Cypriots, 
a week before they started enjoying the rights attached to the ‘fundamental status of 
nationals of Member States.’1 Overall, it could be argued that CHAPTER TWO 
summarises the interrelationship of the Cyprus issue and the Union legal order until 1 
May 2004. 
CHAPTERS THREE and FOUR, on the other hand, offer an analytical framework of the 
status quo post-May 2004. The very limited application of the acquis in northern 
Cyprus, mainly through the Green Line Regulation, is a rare case where, instead of 
having derogations from Union law, derogations from its suspension can be 
observed. Indeed, as was seen, the fact that the scope of the suspension is territorial 
allows the citizens of the bi-communal Cyprus Republic, residing in the northern part 
of the island, to enjoy, as far as possible, the rights attached to Union citizenship that 
are not linked to the territory as such.2 More importantly, the Green Line Regulation 
mechanism has managed to partially but effectively lift the isolation of an area where 
the ports of entry have been declared closed for over 30 years. 
Politically speaking, the situation remains far from ideal. The existence of “a place 
that does not exist”3 inside the borders of the Union and the many problems arising 
from that stalemate make the search for a political solution absolutely necessary. 
Nevertheless, legally speaking, the post-accession legal regime of the relations of 
                                                 
1
 Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-
Neuve (CPAS) [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31 ; reaffirmed in Case C-413/99, Baumbast, R. v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091, para 82. 
2
 M. Uebe, ‘Cyprus in the European Union’ (2004) 46 German Yearbook of International Law 
375, 384. 
3
 The term refers to entities that have declared independence as states, have clear borders, 
governments who exercise effective control over a defined population but remain 
unrecognised as states (apart from by each other). Apart from the “TRNC”, other “places that 
don’t exist” are Nagorno Karabakh (Armenia/Azerbaijan), Transdniestria (Moldova), Abkhazia 
(Georgia) etc. The term is borrowed from C. Bell, On the Law of Peace, Peace Agreements 
and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford University Press, 2008) 226. 
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the Union with northern Cyprus is sufficiently viable and working. In a way, after the 
accession of the Republic, instead of pushing for the achievement of the 
comprehensive settlement, the Union has tried to absorb some of the stresses of the 
partition of the island by offering a mechanism that has enhanced the lives of most of 
the inhabitants on the island and has supported the normalisation of the relations 
between the two ethno-religious segments but also between the Turkish Cypriot 
community and the Union. In addition, if the views of Advocate General Kokott 
prevail in the much-awaited judgment of the Court of Justice in the Orams case,4 
being the first authoritative description of the limits of the suspension, then the 
viability and the proper functioning of this unprecedented regime (for the Union legal 
order), created after the accession of the Republic without it exercising effective 
control over the whole island, will be even more secured. 
However secured this legal regime is at present, nevertheless, the innumerable 
constraints arising from the political stalemate make the search for a comprehensive 
settlement in the nearest possible future an absolute necessity. The accession of the 
Republic to the Union is far from a trivial change of context in considering any future 
solution. This is the main reason why CHAPTER FIVE takes into account the 
membership of the Republic for a future comprehensive settlement. Despite the fact 
that I have argued that the Union cannot and should not replace the UN as the 
principal mediator, still, on the one hand, it could provide for measures that could 
bring the two communities closer, such as the financial instrument and on the other, 
to make everything possible in order to accommodate a settlement of the Cyprus 
issue.  
At a time when the “European approach/solution” discourse, that entails the strict 
compliance of any solution inter alia ‘with European constitutional principles and the 
acquis communautaire’,5 has been “high-jacked” by the maximalist/rejectionist school 
of thought in order for the agreed parameters of the settlement to be overruled, it is 
of critical importance to understand that Protocol No 10 allows the Union to 
accommodate a solution that would entail derogations from the acquis. This is all the 
more important given that the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General in the bi-
communal negotiations taking place at the moment, Mr. Alexander Downer, has 
                                                 
4
 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams (delivered on 18 
December 2008). 
5
 A. Auer, M. Bossuyt, P. Burns, A. De Zayas, S. Marcus-Helmons, G. Kasimatis, D. 
Oberdoerfer and M. Shaw, A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the 
light of international and European law (Paper of the International Expert Panel, committed by 
the Committee for a European solution in Cyprus, presented to Members of the European 
Parliament, 12 October 2005) at para 26. 
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confirmed that there might be derogations from the Union law by mentioning that a 
federal model entailing bi-zonality is, by itself, a derogation from the acquis.6 
 
2. STRANGERS IN THE SAME LAND? THE CO-OPERATION OF THE UN 
AND THE EU IN RESOLVING THE CYPRUS ISSUE 
If the present thesis is also read as a study in time of the Union policy on the Cyprus 
problem, one could easily observe differences in such policy over time. Such 
differences could prima facie be explained by the different contractual relationship 
that the Republic enjoys with the Union in the aftermath of the “Big-Bang” 
enlargement of May 2004. Other important factors that have influenced the stance of 
the Union on the Cyprus issue are the policies and actions of the principal mediator 
to the Cyprus issue, the United Nations in various phases of the conflict. 
More analytically, in the pre-accession period, the formal institutional cooperation of 
the two international organisations has been extremely limited and mainly occurred 
during the very last phases of the negotiations procedure. Nevertheless, the prospect 
of Union accession of the Republic was expected to have a catalytic effect7 in the 
quest for a comprehensive settlement. The “catalyst” rationale rested on a realist 
logic of conflict settlement. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot desire to reap the 
conditional benefits of membership, and the high costs entailed in the absence of a 
solution before accession, would create the “ripe” conditions for a settlement by 
generating Turkish incentives to change their positions. In other words, a conditional 
“stick” both to Turkey and the “TRNC” would raise the costs of the status quo. In 
addition, the EU “carrot” would encourage the parties, including the Greek Cypriots, 
to support reunification within the EU. Furthermore, although such a strategy was 
effective enough to ensure the support of Turkey, and most importantly the Turkish 
Cypriots to the Annan Plan, it failed to foresee the stance of the Greek Cypriots after 
they signed the Treaty of Accession in 2003 and had, thereby, ensured that the 
Republic of Cyprus would become an EU Member State. Overall, although in the pre-
accession period the Union was supposed to offer the necessary “carrots and sticks” 
in order for the UN mediation to succeed, the lifting of the conditionality for the Greek 
                                                 
6
 Available at http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=960630 
7
 For a detailed account of the “catalyst effect” theory see N. Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics 
and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace and Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2004); J. Ker-Lindsay, EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); T. Diez, (ed.) The European Union and the Cyprus conflict. 
Modern conflict, postmodern union (Manchester University Press, 2002).  
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Cypriots, first in the Helsinki European Council and later after signing the Act of 
Accession 2003, was a significant factor that lead to the overwhelming rejection of 
the Annan Plan. Despite this, the co-operation between the two international 
organisations at the institutional and political level, albeit without bringing the 
expected results, has largely formulated the policies of the Union towards the Cyprus 
issue until 1 May 2004. 
Later, in view of the Turkish Cypriot vote in the referendum for the Annan Plan, the 
UN Secretary-General, reporting on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, expressed 
his hope that the Members of the UN Security Council ‘can give a strong lead to all 
States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate 
unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish 
Cypriots and impeding their development.’8 The adoption of the instrument of the 
financial support and the Green Line Regulation, which facilitates the free movement 
of persons in northern Cyprus and regulates trade relations between the two parties 
of the conflict and also between northern Cyprus and other EU Member States, and 
the Commission proposal for the Direct Trade Regulation prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the Union framework is deemed to be the most effective political and 
legislative means in order for an end to be brought to the economic isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious segment, without the recognition of any other 
authority on the island apart from the Republic - a goal set by the United Nations. 
Again, in the post-accession period, it can be observed that although there is no 
formal co-operation between the two organisations, the policy goal declared by the 
UN has influenced the Union’s stance on the issue. 
Finally, it is critical to note that any future attempt for a comprehensive settlement of 
the Cyprus saga, including the pending bi-communal negotiations, should take the 
realities created by the certain EU membership of the Cypriot federal State into 
account. Obviously, the Union cannot replace the UN as the principal locus and actor 
in any new initiative to move towards a solution. Not only does its current and future 
institutional framework not allow it, but also the Union memberships of Greece and 
Republic of Cyprus make the Turkish Cypriots extremely reluctant to accept such a 
perspective. At the same time, the synergy of the two international organisations is 
deemed necessary in the procedure for the achievement of a comprehensive 
settlement in order for any solution that will most probably entail derogations from the 
acquis to be accommodated within the Union legal order. Thus, not only have the 
                                                 
8
 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus of 28 May 2004, 
UN Doc S/2004/437, at para 93. 
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Union policies on the Cyprus conflict been significantly influenced by the UN 
initiatives, but it is also difficult to consider that this will change in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
3. LESSONS LEARNED (?) 
Two years ago, Commissioner Olli Rehn summed up his experiences in the following 
way: 
I have worked on the Cyprus issue now with five consecutive Presidencies, since 2004. In 
these two and half years we have not been able to make progress either on the trade 
regulation or on the ports issue. One could say “Sapienti sat” – or “enough for a wise 
man”. The essential conclusion we must draw is that a comprehensive settlement is the 
best way to solve the problems […] It is in the EU’s interest to see a reunification of the 
island and the end of a conflict on European soil that is now more than 40 years old. Such 
division is unacceptable within our European Union, which is founded on the principles of 
peace, reconciliation and human rights. Recalling these basics is all the more justified as 
we approach the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.9 
In those 137 words Rehn has managed to sum up three important lessons learned 
from the “constructive engagement”10 of the EU in the Cypriot “Rubik’s cube”.  Firstly, 
despite the partial but effective lifting of the economic isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots and the normalisation of the relations between the two communities, mainly 
through the adoption of the Green Line Regulation, the status quo remains far from 
ideal. This is underlined by the fact that since 2004 no progress had been made on 
the trade regulation and on the application of the Additional Protocol. Given this 
political stasis, it is hard to overstate that a comprehensive settlement is the best way 
to solve the issues arising from the Cyprus problem. Finally, since according to 
Article 6 EU, the Union is founded ‘on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’, the division of the 
island of Cyprus is unacceptable for the political ethos of the EU. 
 
                                                 
9
 Lecture at Helsinki University on 27 November 2006 under the title ‘Turkey’s accession 
process to the EU’; available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/rehn/press_corner/ 
speeches/speeches_2006_en.htm 
10
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The 
European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, 
(Brussels, 8 May 2001) COM(2001) 252; available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
human_rights/doc/com01_252_en.pdf 
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3.1 ‘[W]e have not been able to make progress either on the trade 
regulation or on the ports issue.’ 
As repeatedly mentioned in several places throughout the present thesis, the Union 
has managed, by a seemingly depoliticised and technical approach, to offer 
pragmatic solutions to certain issues arising from the particular international dispute. 
The Green Line Regulation mechanism has provided the rules for the crossing of the 
line by EU citizens and third country nationals and has also gotten around a 
fundamental recognition conflict to allow legal bilateral trade to take place between 
the parties in dispute and between the Turkish Cypriot community and the Union. 
Hence, it has been a significant step, not only in order for the two communities on the 
island to come closer and thus the cleavages of Cypriot society to be bridged, but 
also in order for the Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious segment to come closer to the 
Union. In essence, the post-accession legal regime of northern Cyprus could be 
deemed as a method of differentiated integration, albeit the very limited application of 
the acquis in the area in question. The Union has de facto recognised that there are 
irreconcilable differences within the integration of the two geographically divided 
parts of Cyprus, arising from the partition of the island. Therefore, it has allowed for a 
differentiation of the integration policies applying to the two parts.  
Such a “variable geometry” within the Union membership of that Member State has 
been ‘aimed at improving the situation of Turkish Cypriots. However, more needs to 
be done in order to facilitate Turkish Cypriots’ integration into Cyprus and Europe.’11 
Therefore, the Assembly of the Council of Europe inter alia has recently called for 
‘new goodwill steps to be taken to allow increased international trade as well as 
educational, cultural and sporting contacts for the Turkish Cypriot community, it being 
understood that these activities are consistent with United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) on Cyprus and cannot be misused for 
political ends incompatible with the aim of reunifying the island.’12 Unfortunately, as it 
has become clear from the discussion about the Direct Trade Regulation, the 
Republic of Cyprus has not been convinced that such measures, as the ones 
described in the Parliamentary Assembly Resolution, would contribute to the 
reunification of the island. Instead, conventional wisdom on the Greek Cypriot side 
suggests that such measures would lead to the “Taiwan-isation” of the “TRNC”. 
                                                 
11
 Resolution 1628 (2008) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, at para 9. 
12
 Ibid. 
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No matter when and if the Direct Trade Regulation is adopted, it should be stressed 
that the viability and the proper functioning of the unprecedented regime of northern 
Cyprus for the Union legal order is being tested at the moment in front of the Court of 
Justice. If the Court follows the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the Orams 
case13 that viability will be largely secured. If, on the other hand, consensus emerges 
on the lack of enforceability of judgments that protect the property rights of Greek 
Cypriots in the North, there is an imminent danger that the property aspect of the 
Cyprus problem will remain largely unresolved since the rights of the “new owners” 
will be upheld. More importantly, if the Luxembourg Court follows the rationale of the 
UK court then this would mean that the suspension of the acquis, instead of limiting 
the responsibilities and the liability of Cyprus as a Member State under EU law for 
actions and omissions of the breakaway State in the North, will pose a threat for the 
effective protection of the fundamental rights of the Union citizens. 
However, even if the Court of Justice follows Kokott’s Opinion and the proper 
functioning of this special case of “variable geometry” is secured, this does not mean 
that this differentiated integration method should be used as a model in order to 
accommodate order international problems of future Member-States within the Union 
legal such as the case of Serbia and Kosovo. On the contrary, the Union should 
clarify that the peaceful resolution of international political problems is part of its 
membership conditionality. This is the only way that it could play a constructive role 
in the resolution of the pending conflicts as shall be seen later. It is imperative that 
the Cyprus problem is deemed an exception to this well established rule, dictated by 
the political dynamics of the previous enlargement. 
 
3.2 ‘[A] comprehensive settlement is the best way to solve the 
problems’ 
The process of differentiated integration has clear limits. It is far from probable that it 
can offer solutions to all the pending thorny issues arising from the Cypriot Gordian 
knot. Thus, it is difficult to overstate the need for a comprehensive settlement to be 
achieved in the nearest possible future also given the recent developments in 
Kosovo and Caucasus. Talat has referred to those developments in a speech he 
delivered the day that the bi-communal negotiations were launched. Referring to the 
Greek Cypriot community, he mentioned that ‘[t]he world has been going through 
                                                 
13
 Supra note 4. 
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quite eventful days. I am aware that the recent developments in the Balkans and the 
Caucasian [sic] are causing concern on your part. You perceive these examples as 
“bad examples”. Unless we reach a just, viable and comprehensive solution for the 
Cyprus problem, you will continue to observe these “bad examples” with concern.’14 
It is imperative, however, to understand that the just and viable settlement of the 
Cyprus issue, to which both leaders refer, should be envisaged as a mechanism for 
the solution of all aspects of the age-old dispute rather than as the creation of a 
utopia on the island. It is true that ‘[t]he broader the settlement project, the more it 
appears that peacemaking is a project of envisaging utopias recognised as elusive 
even in western liberal democracies.’15 This is the reason why the future settlement 
plan, apart from creating a new political imagination within the citizens of the future 
federal Cypriot State, should also be characterised by viability and functionality.  
Of course, one could reasonably wonder how to move from the existing two 
administrations to a new united federal State when 45 years have passed from the 
moment that the two communities were living together under the aegis of the 
Republic of Cyprus and when so many differences have been detected in the current 
bi-communal negotiations, with regard to the approach of the two leaders, to the well-
known parameters of the solution. After three months of negotiations, these 
differences still concern all possible aspects of the Cyprus issue, from power-sharing 
to the property issue.16    
On the other hand, the solution to that problem might be what Christine Bell, citing 
Ramsbotham, calls “Clausewitz in reverse”.17 Claus von Clausewitz described war as 
‘simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.’18 
According to the “Clausewitz in reverse” view, then, a future peace agreement on the 
Cyprus issue should be viewed in converse terms, as a legal document which 
embraces politics as the continuation of the conflict of the two communities by other 
means. The preservation and incorporation of all the clashing claims at the heart of 
the conflict would paradoxically aim to transform it away from the current stalemate, 
by designing political and legal institutions in which the conflict can continue to be 
                                                 
14
 Available at http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/ARSIV2008/ENGLISHarcive/ 
SEPTEMBER/040908.htm 
15
 Bell, op. cit., supra note 3, at 6. 
16
 For a detailed account of the differences of the two communities see International Crisis 
Group ‘Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet’, Europe Report N°194 – 23 June 2008, 10 -
16. 
17
 Bell, op.cit., supra note 3, at 200. 
18
 K.M. Von Clausewitz, On War [1876] (Princeton University Press, 1976)  
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negotiated. In other words, the future settlement plan should be recognised as a 
forum of metaconstitutional debate, a debate as to what type of constitutional vision 
will prevail at the domestic level.19 Such an approach would be in marked contrast 
with the approach of the Annan Plan, which tried to resolve ‘ex ante all legal and 
political issues and then, critically, to set it “in stone”.’20 
Be that as it may, one has to stress that, whatever the result of the current 
negotiations, it seems that the process will be “owned” by the communities on the 
island. Downer, in his opening statement at the launch of the bi-communal 
negotiation on 3 September 2008, told the two leaders that they ‘own this process 
and, as a result, your continuing leadership is the critical element to make it succeed. 
In that regard, bringing Cypriots to the conviction that reunification of the island will 
work for the greater happiness and prosperity of all Cypriots will, ultimately, be 
paramount.’21 Christofias has also called for the need to ‘safeguard the Cypriot 
ownership of the process and that the outcome will be a Cypriot solution by the 
Cypriots and for the Cypriots.’22 It remains to be seen whether the Cypriot-owned 
process will lead to an end that was not reached in four decades of UN-led 
negotiations, the much awaited solution. 
 
3.3 ‘Such division is unacceptable within our European Union…’ 
The EU’s historical success as a peacemaker between France and Germany has 
inspired many to wonder whether the EU may also bring peace to other conflict 
zones, especially in Europe. This query is even more justified given that the Union 
has pointed out that conflict resolution is a key foreign priority in its southern and 
eastern neighbourhoods, presenting it as an ‘essential aspect of the EU’s external 
action.’23 The unmitigated failure, however, of the accession of the Republic to the 
                                                 
19
 Bell, op.cit., supra note 3, at 293. She further notes that ‘[t]he idea of the peace agreement 
as a site of metaconstitutional discourse follows and extends Neil Walker’s conception of the 
post-Westphalian order “as involving an interplay between state constitutional law on the one 
hand and non state or cosmopolitan metaconstitutional law on the other”’  
20
 Weiler in Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: A European Approach Workshop organised by 
the Hauser Global Law School Program and the Jean Monnet Center for International and 
Regional Economic Law & Justice at New York University School of Law (Villa La Pietra, 
Florence 18-19 October 2006). 
21
 Available at http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2199&tt=graphic&lang=l1 
22
 Available at http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/B8C794DCED1A4937C22574 
B900363672?OpenDocument&highlight=opening statement 
23
 Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper 
(Brussels, 12 May 2004 COM(2004) 373, at 3; available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ 
strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf 
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EU to “catalyse” the reunification of the island proves, in the most emphatic way, 
that, although ‘the EU does represent a working peace system in its relations and 
may be expected to continue as such, its capacity to prevent conflict outside its 
borders –themselves in flux– remains much more dubious.’24  
Tocci has pointed out, however, that the ‘EU’s “structural diplomacy” i.e., the various 
forms of association and integration offered by the EU, is potentially well-tailored to 
induce long-run structural change both within and between countries.’25 According to 
that rationale, the closer the form of association is with EU, the stronger the potential 
to achieve the respective conflict resolution goal. Accordingly, ‘Europeanisation in the 
field of secessionist conflict settlement and resolution should be understood as a 
process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the 
European Union, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of 
integration of the parties involved in it into European structures.’26  
By taking the aforementioned theory at “face value”, it will be difficult to explain the 
results of the accession process of Cyprus. As explained above, however, the 
“catalyst effect” of the accession procedure has largely failed in the Cyprus conflict 
mainly because conditionality was lifted for the Greek Cypriots in order for the Union 
to deal with the intransigence of the then Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and 
Turkey. In other words, the problem was not the instruments at the EU’s disposal. ‘It 
was rather in the focus on whether and how to use them, and in service of what 
strategy.’27 
However, it is going too far to argue that in the Cyprus case ‘[d]espite the potential in 
its “structure”, the Union failed in the realm of “agency”.’28 One has to note that 
although the EC/EU area itself has proved remarkably free of conflict, the Union has 
not managed to play a significant role as an actor in the settlement of conflicts that 
have taken place inside its borders, such as the ones in Northern Ireland and in the 
Basque country.29 The minimum (if any) involvement of the EU in the aforementioned 
cases, together with its failure to “catalyse” a solution in the Cyprus issue, 
                                                 
24
 C. Hill ‘The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention’ 6 European Foreign Affairs Review 
(2001) 315, at 326. 
25
 Tocci, op.cit., supra note 7 at 173; see also N. Tocci ‘Comparing the EU’s Role in 
Neighbourhood Conflicts’ in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 216. 
26
 B. Coppieters et al. Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the 
European Periphery (Academia Press, 2004) at 2. 
27
 Tocci, op.cit., supra note 7 at 173. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Hill, op.cit., supra note 24, at 326. 
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demonstrate that the toolbox of the Union is rather limited when dealing with conflicts 
and that the EU membership itself is far from a panacea. Instead, a robust and well 
functioning democratic State structure is a conditio sine qua non for an effective EU 
membership. More importantly, the Union’s failure to act effectively in all those 
cases, in order for a settlement to be achieved, shows that the complexity of the 
Union’s multi-level decision-making framework raises the difficulties in effective 
external action in cases such as the interventions in ethno-political conflicts. 
Apart from being an actor in the resolution of a given conflict through the process of 
Europeanisation, it is submitted that the Union is able to participate as a framework 
by offering alternative institutional solutions for the conflict, such as federal state 
arrangements, based on the EU’s own model of multi-level governance. The Union’s 
comparative advantage is in its long-term efforts to change the environments out of 
which conflicts spring, so as to inoculate against them.30 Four years after the 
accession of the Republic to the EU, it is still too early to evaluate whether the view, 
according to which the EU mode of governance could move historical antagonists to 
new routes of cooperation, will be verified in the case of the Cyprus problem. 
Although progress has been made since 2004, to the effect that the two communities 
on the island have come closer to each other and the Turkish Cypriot community to 
the Union, still the idea that the post-sovereign vision of European constitutionalism 
can be supportive of post-sovereignty in the Cyprus conflict will be prima facie judged 
in the current negotiations. In other words, the result of the current negotiations will 
be the first test where it will be measured whether the two communities, after the five 
years experience of the Union membership of the Republic, have moved from their 
traditional views of sovereignty to positions that more actively support a 
consociational federal model of governance, compatible with the known parameters 
of the solution of the problem.  
If the idea is verified, it would be another case where it will be proved that the Union 
is mainly a mechanism that promotes, to use Popper’s terms, “piecemeal social 
engineering” rather than “Utopian”.31 At the end of the day, Europe itself was not 
                                                 
30
 C. Hill, ‘EPC’s Performance in Crisis’ in R. Rummel (ed.), Toward a Political Union: 
Planning a CFSP in the EC (Westview, 1992) 135, at 146. 
31
 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (volumes 1 and 2) (Princeton University 
Press, 1971). 
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made all at once, or according to a single plan. It was built through concrete 
achievements which first created a de facto solidarity.32  
In any case, it is the two communities who should, first and foremost, mobilise their 
resources in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement and the reunification of 
the island. Waiting for the European Godot to offer them the solution is 
meaningless…
                                                 
32
 Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950; available at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/decl_en.htm 
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